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Abstract 
This dissertation has three goals. The first goal is to outline how twentieth century 
advocates qualify education as a human right. The second goal is to offer an i tegrative 
account which argues that, to defend a right to education both the provision of educational 
resources and the freedom to do something with those resources must be taken into account. 
This requires more than the rhetoric of a UN document like the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. It also requires more than the good intentions of duty-bound adults acting in the 
best interests of the child. To do this, it is necessary to consider how the institutional 
structure dedicated to education – in particular the structure dedicated to basic primary 
education to which the UN claims all children are entitled – integrates with the freedom each 
child has to do something with that basic primary education once he or she has obtained it. 
Finally, by identifying education as a human right within this integrative structure, this 
dissertation will demonstrate that, if policy documents related to education shift from a focus 
on the traditional relationship between an experienced adult and a dependent child to one 
based on the relationship between an individual and a capability set, the claim that education 
is a human right becomes a meaningful claim which can provide a justification for the social 
commitments required to recognize this claim.  
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Introduction 
People think only of preserving their child’s life; this is not enough. He must be 
taught to preserve himself as a man, to bear the blows of fate, to brave wealth and 
poverty, to live if necessary among the snows of Iceland or on the scorching rocks of 
Malta. In vain you guard against death: he will nevertheless have to die, and even if 
you do not kill him with your precautions, they are ill-conceived. It is less a question 
of keeping him from dying than of making him live. To live is not to breathe but to 
act. It is to make use of our organs, our senses, our faculties, of all the parts of 
ourselves which give us the sentiment of our existence.  
 — Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile 
 
According to the United Nations (UN), education is a right to which all human beings 
are entitled. Since 2000, the UN has been promoting the millennium development goal 
(MDG) (established by the World Forum on Education in Dakar) to achieve free universal 
primary education for all, regardless of gender, by 2015. One catalyst motivating the 
establishment of this ambitious goal was the conviction that, if we consider the social 
dynamic found in many countries around the world, it would suggest that usually the more 
education people have, the better off they can be. A more formal catalyst driving this goal 
was the desire either to improve upon or to endorse more forcefully existing international law 
and UN documents like the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)  or the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) which already support1 the 
                                                     
1 In conjunction with other documents like Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),  
Principle 7 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), Articles 7 & 10 of the European 
Social Charter (1961) (and 17 in the revised ESCR), Articles 10 & 11 of the UN Declaration Regarding 
Social Progress and Development (1969), or articles 17 & 25 of the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (1981). See Appendix for specific wording. 
   
 
 2  
desire to make basic primary education free to all. Consider, for example, Article 13 (1) of 
the ICESCR, which stipulates:  
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall 
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, 
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, 
and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 2 
 
This stipulation highlights the need to recognize, b yond a loose symbolic suggestion, not 
only the fundamental nature of having a right to education but also the instrumental and the 
intrinsic value of this right. Consider also Article 28 (1) of the CRC, which builds upon the 
ICESCR by stipulating: 
States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to 
achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall in 
particular: 
Make primary education compulsory and available freto all; 
Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including 
general and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, 
and take appropriate measures such as the introducti n of free education and offering 
financial assistance in case of need; 
Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate 
means; 
Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible 
to all children; 
Take measures to encourage regular attendance at school  and the reduction of drop-
out rates. 3 
                                                     
2 Available online at www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm, especially Articles 13 & 14. 
3 Available online at www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm. 
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To date, many governments have drawn upon these exiting documents successfully in the 
development of their own national education programs. A closer inspection of Article 29 of 
the CRC, however, suggests that the desire to make b sic primary education free for all also 
rests upon five demanding stipulations which attempt to address the educational interests of 
the three main stakeholders – the state, the parent/educator, and the child – as well as the 
general interests of society and of the environment:  
States Parties agree that the education of the child s all be directed to: 
The development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities; 
The development of respect for human rights and funamental freedoms, and for the 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; 
The development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, 
language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child is 
living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations different 
from his or her own; 
The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, 
ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; 
The development of respect for the natural environme t. 4 
 
Moreover, implied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (UDHR), the ICESCR and 
the CRC is the suggestion that the role of the parent/educator is both one of mediation 
between the state and the child and one of authority over the child. Thus, these documents 
represent demanding – even contradictory – guidelines because they fail to address whose 
                                                     
4 Available online at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm.  
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authority should have priority when the values or beliefs of the parent clash with those of the 
state. 
While many countries (157 signatories)5 have agreed to the principles embodied in the 
ICESCR, and most UN-recognized countries (193 signatories)6 have agreed to the principles 
embodied in the CRC, the demanding nature of these stipulations have left doubt in the 
minds of many about the feasibility – the actual attainability – of a universal human right to 
free and compulsory basic primary education. One notable case in point is the United States, 
which has signed the CRC but has yet to ratify this treaty.7  For many Americans, a 
document like the CRC represents a direct violation of ot only American sovereignty but of 
parental sovereignty as well.8 Furthermore, many Americans believe that American domestic 
policy documents governing the well-being of children actually represent the needs of 
children more appropriately than any document which gives authority to a small committee 
in the middle of Europe. That is, a document which gives the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, the international body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the CRC, the 
power to develop and direct the education of American (or any country’s) children. 
                                                     
5 As of October 11, 2007. Available online http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/3.htm.  
6 As of July 13, 2007. Available online www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/11.htm.  
7 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner forHuman Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal 
International Human Rights Treaties, (2004). Available online at www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.  
8 For example, at www.lifesite.net, the Evangelical ministry Focus on the Family has suggested that the CRC is 
“a danger to children, parents and national sovereignty.” See also the Home School Legal Defense 
Association declaration against ratification of theCRC at www.hslda.org/docs/nche/000000/00000021.asp. 
See also David Weissbrodt (2006) “Prospects for Ratific tion of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,” 
in Emory International Law Review 20. 
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Another notable case, which would actually strengthen this American claim, is a 
country like Iran which, despite ratifying the CRC in 1994, continues to violate the human 
rights of children. In fact, the UN recently found9 that the Iranian government is in violation 
of the CRC, citing the Iranian definition of a child as being inappropriate for the promotion 
and protection of Iranian children. According to the International Bureau for Children’s 
Rights, Iran’s Civil Code defines a child by age of puberty – which for girls is around 9 years 
and for boys 15.10 Age stipulations such as these not only place Iranian children in a much 
different category than their Western counterparts, who are considered to be children until 
the age of 18 (regardless of sex),11 but they are certain to leave some children, particularly 
girls, vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.  
To enhance the visibility of the right to education and to work towards the elimination 
of obstacles and challenges such as these, the Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights (OHCHR) established Katarina Tomaševski as the first UN Special Rapporteur for 
education (1998-2004). Until her sudden death in 2006, Tomaševski was highly motivated by 
this role and produced a vast array of key resources dedicated to understanding the current 
state of education worldwide, and, to understanding what should be done to improve it. At 
                                                     
9 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: The Islamic Republic of Iran, (Thirty-
eighth Session, Official Records, 2005). Available online at www.bayefsky.com/pdf/iran_t4_crc.pdf and 
www.bayefsky.com/pdf/iran_t4_crc_38.pdf.  
10 International Bureau for Children’s Rights, Making Children’s Rights Work: Country Profile on Iran (draft). 
Available online at www.ibcr.org/PAGE_EN/E_CP_3.htm.   
11 Article 1 of the CRC defines a child as every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the 
law applicable to the child, majority age is attained earlier. For the purpose of this dissertation, this will be 
the assumed standard, acknowledging the further stipula on in Article 5 of the CRC which recommends that 
while any individual under the age of 18 is considere  a child, all decision-making done on behalf of a child 
should be done in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. 
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the end of her term, however, she concluded that the OHCHR should not employ another 
Special Rapporteur to continue the work which she began. According to Tomaševski, she 
made this decision because it became apparent to her hat while individual governments and 
the UN were committed to the right to education in pri ciple, they failed to act on this 
commitment.12 According to Tomaševski, while it is true that 193 countries have ratified the 
CRC and have thus made a commitment to the provision of free and compulsory primary 
education for all of their citizens, almost ½ (91) of the world’s countries continue to charge a 
fee for elementary education.13 Given Tomasevski’s reservations and given the actual state of 
primary education around the world today, it is important to question what it means to have a 
right to education. 
To come within reach of the UN’s desire to meet the MDG of education for all by 
2015, and in so doing to improve the lives of children by adopting practical approaches to 
meeting this goal, two things need to occur. First, the CRC needs to be ratified by all 
countries, including the United States (US). Currently only the US and Somalia14 have yet to 
ratify, and according to Shulamit Almog and Ariel Bendor for example: 
Ratification of the CRC by the United States may aid to transform the convention into 
a supreme law of the world. Such a transformation will constitute, for the first time, a 
truly universal declaration for the aspirations, hopes and goals of children. 
                                                     
12 Katarina Tomasevski, (2005c) “Unasked Questions about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from the 
Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (1998-2004),” in Human Rights Quarterly 
27: 709-720. 
13 Katarina Tomaševski, (2006c) “The State of the Right to Education Worldwide: Free or Fee, 2006 Global 
Report,” in Studies in Human Rights Education (Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers). 
14 Given that Somali has not had a permanent, national government since 1991, it is unfortunate that the CRC 
has not been ratified but it should not be surprising that no legislative process is in place to deal with the 
adoption of an international document such as the CRC. 
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Ratification of the Convention by the US, a move that will hardly have implications 
on American positive law, is not a too high price to pay for such objectives.15 
 
Clearly, Almog and Bendor recognize the fact that American law already does much for 
American children. Moreover, they acknowledge that, from an American point of view, it 
does seem as if ratification of the CRC will have a negligible effect upon the American 
institution of education. With that being said, however, Almog and Bendor argue that, by 
ratifying the CRC, despite this perceived lack of internal effect, the American government 
will have an influential and unifying impact on global policy related to children’s rights and, 
furthermore, will provide a long-term influence by eing able to participate as an active 
member on the Committee on the Rights of the Child.  
Second, with this desire to establish an unconditional endorsement of the CRC, comes 
the need to move beyond the all-inclusive rhetoric (as noted by Tomaševski) contained in this 
legal document to establish a more concrete understanding of what it means to have a human 
right to education for all, so that trophy laws, such as those endorsed in Iran, are no longer 
perpetuated. The CRC is already the most universally accepted human rights instrument to 
date. With this near-universal consensus that the CRC should be ratified, it is now essential 
to look beyond ratification toward action. As this di sertation will argue, if the UN is correct 
in suggesting that, “education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of 
realizing other human rights,”16 then there is a duty on the part of all governments, especially 
                                                     
15 Shulamit Almog and Ariel Bendor, (2004) “The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child meets the 
American Constitution: Towards a Supreme Law of the World” in International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 11: 277. 
16 UNESCO, Right to Education: Scope and Implementation (General Comment 13, 1999). Available online at 
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one as powerful and influential as the US, to influence and support the institutional reforms 
necessary to achieve basic primary education for all. Moreover, there is a responsibility on 
the part of all individuals to ensure that the institutional structure dedicated to the provision 
of basic primary education is set up not only to prvide children with access to a vague 
notion of education, but to a notion of basic education which can provide children with the 
freedom to do something with that education, once they have obtained it.   
According to Brian Orend, the standard definition of a right is “a justified claim on 
someone, or on some institution, for something which one is owed.”17 For someone to claim 
a right to education, on this definition, suggests that there is a reason for that individual to 
claim that he is entitled to an education and, similarly, there is a reason for someone else to 
honour this claim. So, what reason exists for the claim that an individual is entitled to an 
education, and that others are responsible for honouri g this claim? In the case of pure 
contractual arrangements, it is easy to provide reasons for such entitlements. I, as a customer, 
have paid for the services of a tutor, and the tutor, as a provider of teaching services, is 
obliged to tutor me. If either party fails to fulfill their obligations, there are established legal 
and social conventions for protection. Similarly, if I am a citizen of a country (a democratic 
one at least), whose constitutional arrangements include the provision of basic schooling, the 
government, whose duty it is to carry out the constitutional provisions, is obliged to provide 
                                                                                                                                                                     
http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/file_download.php/c144c1a8d6a75ae8dc55ac385f58102erighteduc.pdf 
17 Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2002), 17. 
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me with that service. The suggestion that a right to education is a human right, however, 
stakes a stronger claim on moral grounds not purely conventional ones. 
If we accept Orend’s suggestion that “a human right is a high-priority claim, or 
authoritative entitlement, justified by sufficient reasons, to a set of objects that are owed to 
each human person as a matter of minimally decent tr atment,”18 and if we accept that the 
right to education is such a human right, then we also need to establish what qualifies 
education as an object in the set of vitally needed material goods, personal freedoms, and 
secure protections which human rights advocates claim e ch individual is owed. Now, it is 
correct to assume that without things like food or water an individual cannot survive 
physically. It is also correct to assume, although perhaps more controversially, that an 
individual without freedom or protection cannot continue to exist psychologically or 
spiritually. But is education equally significant? Does education provide something for an 
individual in the same way as food or freedom? Chapter 1 will address these questions by 
establishing what qualifies education as both a human right and an indispensable means of 
realizing other rights. To do this, it is important first to understand the development of the 
various UN documents that currently stand as models for the protection and promotion of 
both children’s rights in general and the right to education in particular. These documents 
include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
                                                     
18 Orend (2002), 34. 
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In the beginning, children’s rights activists focused on the provision of emergency 
relief for children in desperate situations. This evolved into the general desire to secure 
formal and precise statements regarding the welfare and rights of children. For some, 
however, it was necessary to go beyond the discourse of rights designed by adults for adults, 
to establish a new discourse on rights specific to children. The creation of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, and the current UN challenge to establish education for all, represent 
a significant shift in how we think about children a d their education. The original 
humanitarian proposal for childhood protection shifted to become a welfarist model to deal 
with childhood neediness. But then, this shifted again to become an all-inclusive framework 
for the entitlements which each child is owed as both an individual rights-holder and as a 
member of the human family.  
Of course, claiming education as a human right is not without its critics, so Chapter 2 
will follow with an examination of three alternative arguments regarding the education of 
children. The first argument fully endorses the equal rights of children, including a 
fundamental right to education, but rejects the UN justification for this claim. This will be 
followed by two arguments, which suggest that, while it is in the best interests of children to 
have an education, they reject the idea that it is fea ible for children (or even in their best 
interests) to have a human right to free and compulsory education which is publicly funded 
and publicly directed.  
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The first argument for consideration comes from twoof the most vocal defenders of 
rights for children, Richard Farson19 and John Holt,20 who question the validity of the 
concept of childhood and the traditional belief that children are to be protected at the expense 
of giving them rights. More importantly, they also question the unconscious faith people 
have in the traditional approach to providing education through formal public schooling. 
Their platform is the idea that the same rights, privileges, duties, and responsibilities 
available to adults “be made available to any young person, of whatever age, who wants to 
make use of them.”21 Their concern is to improve the educational environment, and 
adult/child interactions within this environment, so that those children who want to make use 
of such rights, have the skills and understanding to do so. To this end, their goal is twofold: 
first, to recognize that children have an innate and u quenchable drive to understand the 
world in which they live; and second, to recognize th  child’s claim to the same set of rights 
to which any human is entitled.  
Farson, for example, defends this radical claim because he believes that the traditional 
dividing line between those with the capacity to be right-holders and those without this 
capacity is both arbitrary and unnecessary. For Farson, being a child should have no bearing 
on one’s ability to hold rights, especially a right to education, because “children should have 
the right to decide on the matters that affect them most directly.”22 While he acknowledges 
                                                     
19 Richard Farson, Birthrights: A Bill of Rights for Children  (New York: Macmillan, 1974). 
20 John Holt, How Children Fail (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964), John Holt, How Children Learn (New 
York: Pitman Publishing Co., 1967), John Holt, Escape From Childhood: The Needs and Rights of Children 
(New York: Dutton, 1974). 
21 Holt (1974), 18. 
22 Farson, (1974), 27. 
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that no guarantees come with children’s liberation, he urges that neither the promise of great 
benefits to all nor the prediction of great difficulties ahead can serve as the reason for 
granting or denying rights to children. The importance of rights, for Farson lies in the fact 
that, without them, all individuals (including children) can be incapacitated, oppressed, and 
abused. 
In Escape from Childhood, Holt also contends that, until such time that equal rights 
are granted, children will continue to be controlled and manipulated. As a pioneer of the 
home-schooling movement, he believed that “learning is not the product of teaching,”23 
learning is the product of the activity of learners. He also believed that, next to the right to 
life, the right to control one’s own mind is of utmost importance.24 For Holt, the traditional 
school setting takes away this right in its attempts to micro-manage what students should 
learn and how students should learn it. Moreover, for Holt, having a right to education does 
not equate to having access to a standardized curriculum with standardized textbooks and 
overworked teachers; having a right to education means having the right to be the planner 
and director of one’s own education.  
The second argument for consideration comes from the libertarian Jan Narveson,25 
who opposes the claim that children have a fundamental right to education, despite sharing 
the belief in liberty with ‘liberationists’ like Holt and Farson. Narveson suggests that rights 
                                                     
23 John Holt, Learning All the Time (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1989), 160. 
24 John Holt, “Doing, not ‘Education,’” in John Holt, Instead of Education: Ways to Help People Do Things 
Better (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1976). 
25 Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2001). 
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are for the protection or enhancement of individual liberty and must be limited to active 
claims or entitlements to the non-interference of others in the day-to-day activities of each 
individual. The libertarian – like the liberationist – argues that it is possible to have a concept 
of rights but – contra the liberationist – suggests that right-holders must be capable of 
promoting their own interests and taking responsibility for their own actions. A right to 
education fails to meet these requirements because education, by its very nature, requires the 
active and often involved assistance or ‘interference’ of others. Moreover, the libertarian 
argues that, when it comes to children, it is unusual to regard them as fully autonomous 
agents, and so, deliberate paternalism seems inevitable even prior to any discussion of rights. 
This is an idea strongly defended in the work of Narveson, who recommends that: 
Children should be under the special direction of their parents. (And where there are 
none?) In the case where the child has been abandoned, r his parents are dead, then 
next-of-kin have first refusals, and after that, the first persons who want the child 
enough to bring it up, or perhaps the ones who bid the most for the right to direct it.26 
 
He defends this position because he believes that it is “illusory and fraudulent”27 to imply 
that a child belongs somehow to society. According to Narveson, any kind of social decision-
making will inevitably place the child in a position which is inferior to the naturally 
protective environment of the family. He suggests thi occurs for the simple reason that the 
motivation to act beyond utilitarian considerations is diminished the more distant the 
adult/child relationship. He also suggests that parents, like any other ‘producer’, would only 
                                                     
26 Jan Narveson, “Children and Rights,” in Jan Narveson Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice: Essays on 
Moral and Political Philosophy (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 265-278. 
27 Ibid, 267. 
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be interested in the time-consuming and arduous task of child-rearing if they can voluntarily 
direct and develop the nature of that child’s environment and growth. With this in mind, 
Narveson includes the additional suggestion that there are no grounds for state-sponsored 
services or resources like public education outside of charitable provisions. Not only will 
parents likely be the most motivated to do the right thing, parents or individuals who are best 
suited to be guardians are also most likely to be in the best position to know what is in the 
interests of the children they care for. The claim that education is a right to which all children 
are entitled goes beyond what the libertarian accepts as a reasonable demand on the actions 
of others.  
The third argument for consideration comes from protectionists like Laura Purdy28 and 
Onora O’Neill.29 These protectionists do not outright deny the feasibility of a right to 
education, but recommend that such a right remain in the domain of social welfare benefits, 
and not human rights proper. On this account, a concept of rights broader than the 
libertarian’s is accepted to include both negative and positive rights, but the protectionist’s 
reason to reject education as a fundamental right worth promoting parallels the libertarian 
claim that children are simply not in a position to act on their own to claim such rights.  
Onora O’Neill, for example, argues it is possible to have a concept of human rights but 
“children’s fundamental rights are best grounded by embedding them in a wider account of 
fundamental obligations, which can also be used to justify positive rights and obligations.”30 
                                                     
28 Laura Purdy, In Their Best Interest? (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). 
29 Onora O’Neill, (1988) “Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives,” in Ethics 98: 445-463. 
30 O’Neill, (1988), 446. 
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Laura Purdy also suggests that the establishment of a human right to education would 
provide children with the misguided freedom to make their own decisions with regard to 
education, despite the observable fact that at leassome children are incapable of acting as 
successful decision-makers. Rather than rights, O’Neill and Purdy focus on the obligations 
adults have to minimize the difficulties inherent i growing up. To promote conditions for 
fruitful and happy development, however, the protectionist endorses at least the possibility 
that children have some rights beyond those to which their parents are entitled to act on their 
behalf.  
Thus, like the liberationist, the protectionist endorses the idea that children are rights-
holders and not simply the property of their parents. Moreover, the protectionist agrees with 
the both the liberationist and the libertarian that it is undeniable that most public school 
systems are far from ideal.31 The protectionist argues, however, that this fact does not 
endorse the elimination of a public school system. For the protectionist, the possibility that 
many children will simply be left to their own devices because there are no parents or 
individuals who are capable, willing, or even interested in acknowledging their inherent 
duties to this vulnerable group, indicates that there is a greater need to attempt to improve the 
public school system rather than reject it. For this reason, the protectionist proposes that it is 
necessary to establish a concept of a right to education which falls within the broad category 
of positive social benefits. While it is traditional to view the family as important initial 
                                                     
31 Laura Purdy (1994) “Why Children Shouldn’t Have Equal Rights,” in The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 2: 223-241. 
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guardians in the realization of the child’s need to be protected, nurtured, supported, and 
hopefully allowed to develop the knowledge and skill  necessary to become complete, 
socially competent adults, the 20th century inclusion of the right to education under the 
umbrella of economic, social, and cultural rights also grants much protection to children and 
their ability to access education in the form of a social welfare benefit.  The protectionist 
argues that it is easy to establish how the failure to protect the value of education will leave 
many children in a vulnerable and unstable condition, making it reasonable – the 
protectionist suggests – to justify the need for the provision of education as a social benefit 
that each country has an obligation to provide (to the best of its ability) for its members. The 
protectionist argues, however, that the beneficial effects of insisting upon a right to education 
as a fundamental human right are less certain. If rights are given priority, as the liberationist 
contends, the protectionist argues it will inevitably impair our ability to give our children 
what they need. According to the protectionist, there is nothing to be gained by giving self-
governing rights to children prematurely, especially rights which pertain to something as 
important as education.32 For the protectionist, the claim that education is a fundamental right 
to which all children are entitled undermines the important adult/child relationship necessary 
for the protection and promotion of the best interests of the child. That is, it models the child 
as ‘a little adult’ in a way inappropriate to his or her developmental status. 
Intuitively, the protectionist seems correct. As decribed, the protectionist argues that 
because children are dependents, we should simply stick with duties because every right 
                                                     
32 O’Neill (1988), especially 461-463. 
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implies a duty anyway. Nevertheless, it is important o ask what role the child should play in 
her own development and education. In this dissertation, I argue that while the protectionist 
comes closest to accepting education as a right by offering an approach which limits the 
scope of rights without eliminating the possibility of rights altogether, it does not go far 
enough to consider the rights of the child independently of external attachments (parents, 
adults, teachers). While children may be less capable of engaging their rights, it does not 
follow that they do not have rights. Nor does it follow that they must relinquish their rights to 
their parents, or to the state, or even to their own futures. Children, as members of the human 
family, have fundamental rights, and, the right to education is one of them.  
If children are ultimately to become autonomous agents, I consider in this dissertation 
whether the desire of the liberationist to free children can make a significant contribution to 
our understanding of what it means for a child to have a right to education. Of course, the 
liberationist offers an incomplete (and many would say radical) picture of what it means to 
be a child by demanding full-fledged liberty rights for all children. With that being said, 
however, the liberationist’s desire to free children is an important concept necessary to make 
the claim that children have a right to education bth meaningful and manageable. To answer 
the question – what role should the child play? — I offer an integrative account which 
replaces full-fledged liberty rights with capability rights appropriately matched to the 
unfolding of that child’s own unique mental and physical abilities and social circumstances. 
As this dissertation demonstrates, it is important o recognize that good intentions alone are 
not enough. The current move to establish the MDG of education for all by 2015 
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recommends that the desire to provide every child with a basic minimum education requires 
two things. First, there is the obvious requirement of protecting the child’s right to access a 
basic minimum education. Full ratification of the CR , including the US for example, would 
be a significant advancement towards this goal. More importantly, however, there must also 
be a social context in which education is seen as a right for all children (boys and girls) to 
actively participate in and develop through.33 Having access to a school or to adequate 
educational resources is only meaningful if one actu lly participates (or can participate) in 
learning something or in deciding what to learn. The need to increase access to education, 
and the need to recognize why it is important to do so, are mutually reinforcing concepts, 
necessary not only to address childhood vulnerability, or to reach those students who are 
currently ‘hard-to-reach’, but to retain those who are in the system as well – not through 
coercion but through choice. 
I argue that to move beyond mere questions of access, any desire to promote the right 
to education, must secure access directly through formal channels like human rights 
legislation and must incorporate the principles defended in such legis ation. Where the 
libertarian and the protectionist focus on the structure of the educational experiences from 
which the child is to benefit, and where the liberationist focuses on the effects of external 
agents on the ability of the child to achieve education l success, I argue that consideration 
needs to be given to both. That is, to defend education as a fundamental human right to 
                                                     
33 UNESCO, The Dakar Framework for Action (France, 2000), 75. Especially Article 3, which states “The most 
urgent priority is to ensure access to, and improve the quality of, education for girls and women, and to 
remove every obstacle that hampers their active participation.” 
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which all children are entitled requires both the provision of educational resources and the 
freedom to do something with those resources. This requires more than the rhetoric of a UN 
document like the CRC. It also requires more than te good intentions of duty-bound adults 
acting in the best interests of the child. To do this, it is necessary to consider how the 
institutional structure dedicated to education – inparticular the structure dedicated to basic 
primary education to which the UN claims all children are entitled – integrates with the 
freedom each child has to do something with that basic primary education once he or she has 
achieved access to it.  
To support this claim to an i tegrative approach, the work of four separate, though as I 
argue complementary, philosophers are considered. First, chapter 3 reflects on John Rawls’ 
theory of justice. Rawls famously and influentially posited that, if people were given the 
blanket protection of a rational, mutually-disinterested persona (a veil of ignorance), they 
would be able to design a social structure in which all could live at least a minimally decent 
life once the veil is lifted.34 From this state of ignorance, Rawls contends, ration l individuals 
will choose two foundational principles necessary to shape a just society. First would be the 
liberty principle, which states: each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme 
of liberties for all. Second is the difference principle, which states: social and economic 
inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first they are to be attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opp rtunity; and second, they are to be to the 
                                                     
34 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971). 
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greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.35  He recommends that these two 
principles of justice will be selected because he believes that, when biasing information is not 
available, rational agents will opt for a risk-avers  distribution of fair and equitable 
treatment. Although education is not the primary focus of Rawls’ work, education is one of 
the primary social institutions which he includes as an essential component in a just society. 
With this in mind, this dissertation provides a Rawlsian framework necessary to consider 
openly and critically both the role education should play within the larger social structure of 
a stable society and the scope of educational experience necessary to enhance an individual’s 
life prospects. 
Chapter 4 will continue with the work of another Rawlsian, Thomas Pogge, who 
reiterates Rawls’ belief that it is the design of scial institutions which determine whether 
people get the objects of their vital needs.36 Like Rawls, Pogge is interested in analyzing 
social institutions and in establishing how such an analysis can be used to justify the need for 
reform when these institutions are demonstrably unjust. Pogge recommends, however, that it 
would be more beneficial to adapt Rawls’ theory of justice to the complexities of the real 
world, which is interconnected and global in scope.37 Thus, Pogge importantly expands upon 
the Rawlsian framework to recommend that we can no lo ger limit ourselves to well-ordered, 
ideal societies and the provision of primary goods. Pogge favours instead a concept of human 
                                                     
35 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement Erin Kelly (ed.) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 42-43. A revised statement of the principles of justice found in Rawls (1971), 52-78. 
36 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2002), especially chapter 2. 
37 Thomas Pogge, (1988) “Rawls and Global Justice,” in Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2): 227-256. 
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rights. Moreover, he favours a concept of human rights that is not bound by national borders 
– for Pogge, human rights belong to humanity. Pogge chooses to adapt the Rawlsian theory 
of justice in this way because, while he is in favour f Rawls’ account of our natural duty to 
remove injustice through institutional reform, he also wants to question how far our moral 
concern for social institutions should extend.38 That is, Pogge is interested in how we should 
assess a global institutional framework from a moral human rights point of view. Of course, 
Pogge’s work has mainly been dedicated to the issue of global poverty; nonetheless, his 
conception of human rights as moral human rights, and his conception of the nature of social 
institutions, are highly relevant distinctions necessary to understand, not only why education 
is a human right, but, also why we have a duty to respond positively to securing this right for 
all.  
By examining the role institutions play in securing rights via Rawls and Pogge, 
chapters 3 and 4 address the first issue related to supporting the MDG of education for all by 
2015 – namely the child’s right to access a basic minimum education. To address the further 
issue of developing a social context necessary for all children to actively participate in, and 
develop through, their own education, however, requir s an alternative approach which 
favours human development and capabilities over an exclusive emphasis on rights. I argue 
that this approach is a necessary counterpart to understand fully what it means to have a 
human right to education. In particular, chapter 5 considers the work of Amartya Sen and 
chapter 6 considers the work of Martha Nussbaum. 
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Sen, like Pogge, is keenly interested in how to eradicate poverty, but he approaches 
this goal from the perspective of what individuals can do with the rights and resources which 
are available to them. For Sen, poverty is a complex notion of capability deprivation, not 
simply a lack of resources. With this in mind, he contends that, while it is correct to have 
concern for how certain institutional structures can deprive individuals of their material 
means to well-being, it is equally important to look t  achieving certain levels of basic 
capabilities, below which people count as “scandalously deprived.”39 To this end, it is 
necessary not only to examine the role institutions play in securing the child’s right to 
education, consideration needs to be given to a concept of human development through 
education as well. 
Of course, as an economist, Sen presents a rich and technical account of social choice 
theory and human development which goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. With that 
being said, however, the importance of considering Sen’s work rests in his more 
philosophical belief that having a right is only significant if that right enables you to do 
something which you value.40 By focusing on Sen’s notion of freedom or capability as the 
proper content of rights in this regard, it is possible to do two things. First, it is possible to 
deepen our understanding, in general, of both the rights and liberties which we each have as 
human beings, as well as the obligation which we all have to respond to the same rights and 
liberties of others. Second, it is possible to deepen our understanding, in particular, of 
                                                     
39 Amartya Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 
40 Nussbaum and Sen (1993). 
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education as a human right because, not only does Sen develop an important understanding 
of human capabilities, both he and Martha Nussbaum translate this understanding into a 
capability-sensitive educational framework – a framework which, according to Sen, 
embraces an old Bengali suggestion that: 
Knowledge is a very special commodity: the more you give away, the more you have 
left. Imparting education not only enlightens the receiver, but also broadens the giver 
– the teachers, the parents, the friends. Schooling not only benefits the person being 
schooled, but also others who are close to those who are being schooled. Basic 
education is a truly social good, which people can share and from which they can 
jointly benefit, without having to snatch it from others.41 
 
With this in mind, chapter 6 examines how Sen links education to human development and 
security, and how Nussbaum translates this into a three-part concrete model for development 
of capabilities in education.  
It is necessary to integrate an understanding of a right to access education with an 
understanding of the social context necessary to support this right. This is so because it is an 
inert claim to state that a child has a right to education if there are no means for that child to 
realize this claim. As Brian Orend has suggested, “we do not know the full scope of our 
human rights until we know that the duties correlative o them can be performed at a 
reasonable cost.”42 With this in mind, Orend recommends two key objections which need to 
be addressed when defending any socio-economic objet, like education. First, it is important 
                                                     
41 Amartya Sen, “Reflections on Literacy” in Namtip Aksornkool (ed.) Literacy as Freedom: A UNESCO 
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International Literacy Day 2002 in Paris.  
42 Orend (2002), 139. 
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to justify why the socio-economic object is a human rights object at all, and second, it is 
equally important, if not more, to justify the cost f its implementation.43 Providing children 
with educational opportunities can be expensive, and clearly, children (particularly young 
children) do not have the means to provide such resources for themselves. Defending every 
child’s right to education is one way to ensure that every child will get at least a minimal 
level of protection and support as he or she develops. But critics complain. As Jan 
Narveson44 has suggested for example, defending a right to education for which we all bear a 
responsibility is tantamount to defending a right to good old-fashioned socialism and, as 
such, should be rejected soundly. 
By examining the role which institutions play in securing rights via Rawls and Pogge, 
and by favouring a concept of human development via Sen and Nussbaum, this dissertation 
responds to this libertarian challenge – first, by establishing why basic primary public 
education is a fundamental human right and, second, by establishing that at least this 
minimum level of education is “readily absorbable in terms of cost”45 as well. To address this 
twofold understanding even further, the final chapter of this dissertation considers the field 
work of Katarina Tomaševski, and the current Education for All (EFA) revolution, to provide 
some concrete examples of this integrative approach which are currently being undertaken to 
translate the moral challenge which Rawls, Pogge, Sen and Nussbaum direct at institutions 
                                                     
43 Brian Orend, “Justifying Socioeconomic Rights,” Chapter 1 in Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Claude E. 
Welch Jr. (eds.), Economic Rights in Canada and the United States (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006): 25-40. 
44 Jan Narveson, “Education: Should We Sell the Schools?” Chapter 20 in Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea 
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and capabilities into the actual conditions and working forces of community life. By 
identifying education as a human right within this integrative structure, this dissertation 
demonstrates why policy documents related to education should shift from a focus on the 
traditional relationship between two parties (a vulnerable one and an experienced one), to one 
based on the relationship between an individual and a capability set – an inherently 
pedagogical idea. Moreover, it is an idea which can justify the need to recognize education as 
a human rights object of equal significance to the more familiar vital needs like food and 
freedom.  
The claim that a right to education is a human right s an important claim. It is an 
important claim, however, because there is a responsibility to enable children to develop an 
acquired set of capabilities to lead their own lives in a meaningful and fulfilling way. The 
MDG to achieve free universal primary education for all by 2015 is not meant to be an 
unmanageable or unsupportable goal. The desire to promote and protect a child’s 
fundamental right to basic primary education compleents the commitment – shared by 
Rawls, Pogge, Sen, Nussbaum and Tomaševski – to institutional reform that is both 
meaningful and manageable. This commitment by the UN and participating states parties to 
recognize and support education as a fundamental human right recommends that education is 
the key to three things: 1) sustainable development; 2) peace and stability within and among 
countries; and 3) a means for effective participation in the societies and economies of the 21st 
century.46 This dissertation provides a comprehensive overview of cutting edge 
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developments in this contemporary conception of education as a human right, it also provides 
a robust Rawlsian justification for the social commitments required to recognize this 
conception of education as a human right and, finally, it offers some concrete and 
manageable policy implications regarding the implementation of this conception of education 
as a human right.  
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Chapter 1 
The UN Claim to Education as a Human Right 
Human rights advocates claim that every child has a right to education. This claim is 
based primarily on two premises: a positive one and a egative one. First, human rights 
advocates value education because they believe that if a child receives basic primary 
education, she will likely be literate and numerate, nd will have the basic social and life 
skills necessary to secure a job, to be an active member of a peaceful community, and to have 
a fulfilling life. Second, human rights advocates rcognize that, despite this positive premise, 
many children fail to benefit from even basic primary education. This gap between the 
positive reason to value education, and the negative reality facing many children, has led 
human rights advocates to conclude that education must be considered a human rights issue 
on par with the right to food or the right to freedom. Nevertheless, over 70 million children 
of primary school age still do not (or cannot) attend school.47 This leads one to question, as 
representatives of organizations such as the UN48 and UNESCO49 are doing – what does 
having a human right to education mean? 
This chapter considers some reasons which justify education as a right and whether 
the added stipulation that it is a human right really makes a notable difference. Section 1.1 
                                                     
47 Nicholas Burnett (Director), “Education for All by 2015: Will We Make It?” EFA Global Monitoring Report 
2008 (Paris: UNESCO, 2007). Available online at www.efareport.unesco.org. 
48 Katarina Tomasevski, (2005c) “Unasked Questions about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from the 
Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (1998-2004),” in Human Rights Quarterly 
27: 709-720. 
49 UNESCO, Education for All: Is the World on Track? (EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2002). 
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provides a brief overview of existing UN human rights documentation, like the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
(DRC).50 These documents have helped to establish viable legal mechanisms, from which 
nation-states can and have implemented, supported, and assessed effective social structures. 
In the specific case of a right to education, the standard assumption is that education should 
be viewed as a social welfare right that either the parents or the state are obliged to recognize 
and support. This assumption is reflected in the tradi ional division of rights into first-
generation and second-generation rights. Section 1.2 considers this traditional division, to 
reflect on why it is common to view the right to education as a social benefit and whether this 
common classification is, in fact, a warranted claim.  
Section 1.3 of this chapter considers the more recent d bate, which stresses the need to 
look beyond simply valuing education as a social good. The establishment of documents like 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), for example, represents a significant shift 
in language from first-generation and second-generation rights to a more inclusive language 
which incorporates the minimum set of vitally needed considerations which should be 
granted to any individual as a matter of decent treatm nt. Where rights were once thought to 
be about either protecting negative liberties, or about providing positive welfare benefits, the 
language of the CRC has shifted the focus toward categories which are more suitable to the 
rights of children. For example, as Thomas Hammarberg has suggested, it is more 
                                                     
50 For a complete history of the CRC see: L gislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
volumes 1 and 2 (New York: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007). 
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appropriate to think of children’s rights by grouping the articles found in the CRC into the 
“three P’s” of children’s rights – provision, protec ion, and participation.51 For advocates of 
the CRC, like Hammarberg, this shift in language is instrumental in making the CRC the 
most universally accepted human rights instrument to date, and the most comprehensive 
statement by the UN for why education should be included as part of the fundamental set of 
human rights. The final section of this chapter considers why the US disagrees with 
Hammarberg’s claim and what implications the current failure of the US to ratify the CRC 
has on the realization of every child’s right to education. 
1.1. The Universal Promotion and Protection of Children’s Rights 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Ellen Key proclaimed that we were entering 
the “Century of the Child.”52 Of course, many before her had written on children and 
education, but her proclamation heralded a new era of social movements specifically aimed 
at children as individuals, independent of parental or governmental attachments. One 
example demonstrating this development was the 1919adoption of the Minimum Age 
Convention by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which fixed the minimum age of 
employment at 14. Another example was the creation of the United States Children’s Bureau 
in 1912 – a bureau described as “the first governmental agency in the world created solely to 
consider the problems of the child.”53 One social reform movement of note, however, which 
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focused specifically on the rights of children and their need to be treated as human beings 
and not simply dependents, occurred in 1919. This wa  hen Eglantyne Jebb established the 
Save the Children Fund. 
Jebb established this Fund in London to deal with children primarily in European 
countries ravaged by World War I (WW1). With the almost instant success of this 
movement, and with the realization that there was a gre t need to reach out to all children, 
this fund quickly developed into the International S ve the Children Union. As the tragedy of 
WWI subsided, and the need for immediate aid lessened, Jebb moved to craft a Children’s 
Charter, which would not only promote emergency relief services for children but would 
also continue to promote the rights of children in general. Her desire to formalize the need to 
recognize the rights of children was built upon her b lief that:  
We should claim certain Rights for the children andlabour for their universal 
recognition, so that everybody – not merely the small number of people who are in a 
position to contribute to relief funds, but everybody who in any way comes into 
contact with children, that is to say the vast majority of mankind – may be in a 
position to help forward the movement.54 
 
In 1924, this simple statement of rights became the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child (GDCR).55 While there were prior international reports which dealt with children, this 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Administration for Children and Families, the Children’s Bureau maintains, to this day, primary 
responsibility for administering Federal child welfare programs. For more: 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/.  
54 Eglantyne Jebb, (1923), Save the Children website 
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55 League of Nations, Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 (adopted on 26 September, 1924), 
preamble. Available online at University of Minnesota nline Human Rights Library, 
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declaration was one of the first internationally recognized legal assertions for the promotion 
and protection of children’s rights.  
As one of the first attempts to recognize legally the rights of children, the GDCR is 
very broad and vague, providing only the stipulation that children should have a right to 
develop without hunger, fear, distress, or exploitation. Its significance, however, lies in the 
fact that, after the League of Nations adopted this convention, other (less political) 
organizations, like Save the Children, were able to rec gnize formally the need to look 
beyond politics and national boundaries to focus on pecific issues related to children. 
Unfortunately, shortly after participating in the creation of the GDCR, Jebb’s health failed 
and she died in 1928. But the strength of her claim that it was the responsibility of humanity 
to ensure that the rights of children be recognized an  fulfilled did not diminish.  
The International Bureau of Education (IBE), for example, was founded in 1925 to 
promote advancements for children in the area of education. As a non-governmental 
organization, it was concerned with the goal of providing centralized educational 
documentation and research in Europe. It was no longer acceptable simply to pass 
information on from one generation to the next in arigid, hierarchical manner. According to 
this new educational movement, both children and society in general were entitled to 
progressive ideas derived from a comparative exploration of a variety of educational 
approaches. Another similar organization formed in 1923 when the American National 
Education Association hosted a world conference on ducation in San Francisco. This 
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conference brought together 50 different national education groups56 who collectively 
determined that the traditional nation-state-centred, or top-down, approaches to education 
must be tempered by a more well-rounded, internatiol focus (what we would now term 
today ‘civil society’), to foster progressive educational development and to ensure the 
maintenance of peace and goodwill among nations. Thi  decision resulted in the creation of 
the World Federation of Education Associations (WFEA), with the following stated purpose: 
To secure international co-operation in educational e terprises, to foster the 
dissemination of information concerning the progress of education in all its forms 
among nations and peoples, to cultivate internationl good will, and to promote the 
interests of peace throughout the world.57 
 
Of course, the concept of education itself was hardly new, nor was the concept of research in 
education, but what the founding of organizations like these revolutionized was the need to 
consider non-political, intercultural educational and developmental innovations, and also to 
consider what impact these innovations could have on the lives of children.  
There was also the need to consider how to implement such a vision, as it was not a 
vision shared by all. On the one hand, there was great optimism that the creation of non-
governmental educational forums would enhance the advancement of intercultural 
understanding and education. On the other hand, there was the reality that each country 
maintained its right to design and implement its own educational programs necessary to serve 
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its own societal needs. This discord in educational vision, and the additional need for 
financial backing to implement any resource development, forced the IBE to open its doors 
to government memberships under the stipulation that, as an organization, it would remain at 
arms-length from specific or partisan political interference. This allowed the IBE to continue 
to act on its two primary directives: to collect information concerning existing private and 
public educational systems, and to perform and publish experimental and statistical 
educational research. In addition to this, in 1934 the IBE began the first of an ongoing set of 
annual International Conferences on Education (ICE)58 to coordinate the independent work 
of the various Ministers of Education.  
Although the ICE did not take place during World War II, in 1942 (under the threat of 
totalitarianism), the participating members held the Conference of Allied Ministers of 
Education (CAME)59 to regroup and reform the educational systems that exis ed prior to the 
devastation of the war. This time, however, the consensus of those participating in CAME 
was to make a concerted effort to found a truly inter ational approach to ensure that 
progressive, intergovernmental educational ideas would persevere. To achieve this end, the 
IBE ultimately joined forces with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) to establish an ongoing forum for debate between political 
agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental org nizations, researchers, educators, and 
anyone interested in the promotion and advancement of an institution of education designed 
                                                     
58 For information about the ICE visit their website at 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/International/ICE47/english/ ndex_ICE47.htm.  
59 Fernando Valderrama, A History of UNESCO (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 1995). Available online at 
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to recognize that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the 
defenses of peace must be constructed.”60 Clearly, education in and of itself can be both a 
positive and a negative influence on a society, as w s demonstrated by the destructive 
influence that a highly educated society like Germany had on the world around that time. 
With this in mind, the founders of UNESCO were careful to point out that the peace they 
were interested in building was not a concept of peace at all costs but a concept of peace 
derived from the intellectual and moral unity of humankind, the kind of unity that the newly 
established Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) exemplified.  
The UDHR is a set of thirty Articles that the General Assembly of the United Nations 
adopted in 1948 and proclaimed as both morally persuasive and, one day it hoped, legally 
binding. The purpose of this declaration was to recgnize formally “the inherent dignity and 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”61 The foundation of this 
declaration was the desire to promote freedom, justice and peace in the world. With this hope 
in mind, the founding signers of this declaration believed that it was possible to establish and 
maintain: 
A common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that 
every individual and every organ of society, keeping this declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of 
Member States themselves and among the people of territori s under their 
jurisdiction.62 
                                                     
60 UNESCO, Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, (adopted on 
16 November, 1945), preamble. 
61 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted on 10 December, 1948), preamble. 
62 Ibid. 
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As a human rights instrument designed to provide a standard to which the actions of 
individual countries can be held to account, the UDHR provides several broad areas for 
consideration. Each area stipulates the kind of action necessary to promote things like: a 
sense of security; the need for due process, liberty, and equality; the importance of political 
participation; and finally, for those who are unable to provide for themselves, the provision 
of social welfare.  
 The desire to formulate one comprehensive document, which addresses each of these 
areas collectively, represents an important refinement of two key ideas which have been 
debated throughout history. The first idea comes from the belief that, because we belong to 
the group known as human, we are distinctive. The second idea builds on this to suggest that, 
because we have this distinct nature, we are somehow deserving of entitlements and are duty-
bound to respect the entitlements of others. Historically, this belief in our distinctive nature 
and our sense of entitlement was derived primarily from two identifiable sources: the 
spiritual or the natural. Throughout history, one approach has alternately dominated the other 
but both points of view rests on the idea that we somehow acquired or we naturally possess 
certain characteristics essential to our humanity, and that these characteristics require certain 
kinds of action, protection and provision. After WW II, many felt that accepting either divine 
or natural justifications were no longer sufficient reasons to promote adequately these human 
entitlements. What the UDHR represented was a progression from the belief that our 
authority for social action comes from either a divine or a natural underpinning, to the belief 
that it is up to each of us to come together to construct, and consent to, legitimate social 
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structures. It would be important to ask, however, why the founders of the UDHR felt the 
need to recognize human rights when there were already many laws for the protection and 
promotion of the rights of the citizens of individual countries.63  
During the creation of the UDHR, there was a desire to highlight certain human rights 
believed to exist prior to national law or positive law. This was highlighted because it was 
believed that only a notion of human rights could address and protect the person as a hum n 
being independently of all external attachments. The rights and laws which each individual 
country establishes represent the social agreements citizens of a particular country make with 
each other and the social conventions to which these citizens should abide. If an individual 
legitimately has any of these rights, it is usually because that individual has participated with 
others to come to an understanding about what he can claim and what others have to do in 
response to that claim. A complementary notion of a positive law helps to enforce these 
claims when either side fails to comply. What the founders of the UDHR were also interested 
in establishing, however, were stipulations for those cases where an individual’s own 
government or societal arrangements fail to act on that individual’s behalf. Theirs was an 
enduring promise for all of humanity, not simply particular sub-groups. As Micheline Ishay 
has noted: 
“Never again!” was the rallying cry of Jews and human rights activists after World 
War II. The Nuremberg trials (1945-1946) and the Tokyo trial (1946), in which 
former Nazi and Japanese leaders were indicted and tried as war criminals by an 
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2004), chapter 4 “The World Wars: The Institutionaliz tion of International Rights and the Right to Self-
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international military tribunal, vindicated the pers cuted. They also set a new 
precedent in international law, namely that no one, whether a ruler, a public official, 
or a private individual, was immune from punishment from war crimes.64 
 
While the UDHR represents one of the most comprehensiv  statements of human rights and 
one of the most persuasive devices for the protectin of individuals from the aggressive or 
inappropriate actions of governments, some dissenters suggested that two important areas 
still needed further reflection: 1) the rights of children; and 2) the divisive debate between 
liberty rights and welfare rights.  
For those interested in the rights of children, their concern was reflected in the fact 
that there were only two Articles dealing specifically with children in the UDHR. Article 25 
(2) notes the need to recognize that both women (mothers in particular) and children are 
entitled to special care and assistance. Article 26 (1) states: Everyone has the right to 
education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. 
Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be 
made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis 
of merit.65 While advocates of children’s rights did not deny that these two Articles were a 
big improvement on the GDRC, for example, they felt the UDHR failed to deal sufficiently 
with the rights of children. As a tool for adults, it is effective because adults usually have an 
official and immediate relationship with their governments. In the case of children, however, 
the UDHR does not directly protect them in the same way because children generally have a 
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relationship with their parents, which is prior to the one they share with their government. 
This is reflected in Article 26 (3) of the UDHR, whic  suggests: Parents have a prior right to 
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. Recall the work of 
Eglantyne Jebb, however, who suggested that, when governments fail to protect adequately 
the rights of their members, it is often the children who suffer the most.  
To address this need to protect children to the same degree as adults, there was a move 
to adopt a new Declaration of the Rights of the Child (DRC)66 in 1959, as a more 
comprehensive version of the previous Geneva Declaration written by Jebb. One of the 
advancements to children’s rights found in this document is the need to recognize the child’s 
right to an identity found in Principle 3. That is,the child’s right to a name and a nationality 
from birth, which may be tied to the child’s parents, but which represents the child directly. 
Further to this, Principle 7 of the DRC builds upon article 26 of the UDHR not only by 
recognizing the child’s right to receive free and compulsory basic primary education (as the 
UDHR does) but also by stipulating clearly why having access to free and compulsory basic 
primary public education is essential to the development of the whole child. Where the 
UDHR emphasizes the need to recognize education as a e sential tool in the development of 
the human personality and for the promotion of peace and toleration among nations and 
social groupings, the DRC develops further the ideathat any education to which a child is 
exposed must be in the child’s best interests as well: 
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The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least 
in the elementary stages. He shall be given an education which will promote his 
general culture, and enable him on a basis of equal opportunity to develop his 
abilities, his individual judgement, and his sense of moral and social responsibility, 
and to become a useful member of a society. 
The best interests of the child shall be the guiding principle of those responsible for 
his education and guidance; that responsibility lies in the first place with his parents. 
The child shall have full opportunity for play and recreation, which should be directed 
to the same purposes as education; society and public authorities shall endeavour to 
promote the enjoyment of this right.67 
 
The inclusion of the child’s right to have an identity, and a more comprehensive statement of 
the child’s right to access and benefit from an education which addresses the child as an 
individual, was refined even further in 1960 by theadoption of the Convention Against 
Discrimination in Education (CADE).68 This document added to the DRC not only the need 
to address overt discrimination but also the need to promote equality of opportunity in 
education. While parents retained the pragmatic privilege of primary responsibility for their 
children, what the DRC (combined with the CADE) offered was the first significant 
statement of the child’s right to be treated with the same respect and consideration as any 
member of the human family. The advancements made by the UN in general, and UNESCO 
in particular, successfully shifted Jebb’s general concern for humankind’s responsibilities 
toward children to the establishment of a formal and specific statement on the welfare and 
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rights of children. Increasingly, children were being seen as independent rights-holders in 
their own regard. 
With regard to the divisive debate between liberty rights and welfare rights, it was 
determined that the comprehensive nature of the UDHR required two separate documents 
and committees, which could individually develop and promote either rights which favour 
the choices people make, or the benefits which people are entitled to claim.69 Some of the 
thirty articles of the UDHR encompass the traditional civil and political rights found in many 
of the previous documents dedicated to basic rights, like the English Bill of Rights, the 
American Declaration of Independence, or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen. All of these documents were created based on the acknowledgement of a 
universal right to self-preservation and to equal freedom from the interference of others in 
achieving this claim. Where the UDHR distinguishes itself, and where some of the criticism 
aimed at it comes from, is the additional inclusion of the need to consider economic and 
social standards. For some, this addition was a necessary requirement of being a free human 
being, as noted in the stipulation found in resoluti n 421 of the UN General Assembly which 
suggests that “the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of economic, social and 
cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent.”70 For others, however, such a 
stipulation is a direct violation of the freedom to which all human beings are entitled. This 
difficulty of the UN to achieve consensus on the scope of the UDHR, led to a more 
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comprehensive set of bundled rights called the Int rnational Bill of Rights (IBR). This set 
included not only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948), but the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR 1966) as well.71  
While all three pieces are critical components within e debate on human rights, it is 
a common view (especially in the English-speaking world) that the civil and political rights 
found in the ICCPR are more familiar, and perhaps more essential, to defenders of human 
rights. Historically referred to as first-generation rights, these liberty rights typically relate to 
self-determination and include rights to freedom of th ught and expression, freedom to 
peacefully assemble or associate with others of your own choosing, freedom to participate in 
political activities, security of the person, due process rights, freedom of religion and 
freedom to be in possession of property. The second area incorporates the remaining 
economic and social rights as outlined in the ICESCR. Historically referred to as second-
generation rights, these welfare rights typically include rights to recognition of equality, 
freedom from discrimination, adequate standards of living, health care, and education. These 
rights also typically involve the positive action (and often resources) of others, leaving some 
to conclude that they are merely social benefits rather than rights proper. In the specific case 
of a right to education, the standard assumption has been that education should be viewed as 
a social welfare right which either the parents or the state (or even the church) are obliged to 
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recognize and support, when it is feasible for them to do so.72 This assumption is reflected in 
the traditional placement of education within the category of social benefits. The next section 
considers this traditional division to reflect on why it is common to view the right to 
education as a social benefit, and whether this enduri g classification remains a warranted 
claim. 
1.2. Education as a Second-Generation Right 
Within the traditional debate between liberty and welfare rights, there are those73 who 
suggest that we are compelled to ascribe and respect the liberty rights stipulated in the 
ICCPR as human rights because they accord with certain common human attributes, namely 
the idea that individuals are small-scale sovereigns entitled to the freedom to act without the 
interference of others. Individuals, who hold this position, focus on the protected choices that 
the recognition of these human rights can provide. That is, they focus on the entitlements 
which we each have to a protected sphere for making free choices. This protected sphere 
grants us the personal freedom and autonomy to makechoices about what is in our personal 
best interest, implying the correlative duty that others will abide by that claim and not 
interfere with its realization. Individuals who argue for this reciprocal relationship suggest 
that recognition of a set of liberty rights, including the right to freedom, to equality of 
opportunity, and to political participation is sufficient to protect this personal space. Any 
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notion of human rights beyond these broad liberty rights – like the right to health care or 
social security for example – while nice to have, is dependent on coercive social structures 
necessary to collect and manage the resources required for these rights, and therefore should 
be considered secondary social benefits and not rights proper.  
On the other hand, there are those74 who suggest that we are compelled to ascribe to 
and respect the socio-economic rights stipulated in the ICESCR as human rights because 
there is an undeniable link between certain material objects/resources and a minimally decent 
life. Individuals, who hold this position, focus onthe protected interests which the 
recognition of these human rights can provide. That is, they focus on the entitlements we 
each have to the direct provision of concrete benefits. These protected interests grant us the 
personal well-being to live a minimally decent life, with the understanding that others will be 
able to do the same. Individuals who argue for this relationship suggest that, to be a fully 
functioning member of the human family, it is necessary to recognize not only a minimum 
set of liberty rights, but also a minimum set of social rights: including the right to freedom 
from discrimination, an adequate standard of living, and health care. Any notion of human 
rights which does not incorporate these rights willinevitably neglect those who are most in 
need of having their rights respected. 
When the rights of children are added to this polarized debate, as in the case of a right 
to education, it has been traditional to assume that, because children are not direct rights-
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holders, their rights necessarily fall into the category of rights as protected interests.75 
Children, after all, usually are not sufficiently pre ared to make major life choices. The 
preamble of the DRC, for example, states that we should respect children’s rights because 
mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. In light of this document, to suggest that a 
child is a rights-holder is to suggest that the child is entitled to the direct provision of certain 
concrete benefits which adults are obliged to provide. The further claim in Principle 7 of the 
DRC, which stipulates the child’s right to education, is to suggest that the child has an 
interest in having an education, which is so important o him that others are obliged to 
provide him with it regardless of whether he believes or understands that it is a good thing to 
pursue. While such a claim is better than no claim t all, do children automatically have a 
right to basic public education simply by virtue of it being in their best interest? Chapter 2 
will examine more closely the position held by opponents of officially sanctioned rights for 
children who believe that, even if we did have compassionate reasons to protect a child’s 
right to free and compulsory education, the inevitable cost which such a social benefit entails 
make it challenging to move beyond benevolence into the realm of human rights. The rest of 
this section, however, considers this standard assumption that education should be viewed, at 
least minimally, as a social right.  
To begin, it is common to assume that the intellectual immaturity and inexperience of 
children leave them unprepared to make the kinds of personal life choices adults can make. 
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Until children are capable of independent action, it is assumed that others must stand in as 
temporary rights-holders to act on their behalf. In light of this notion, the ICESCR promotes 
the care and education of children as a social responsibility. This document suggests that is in 
the best interests of children to have an education to develop the intellectual maturity and 
experience necessary to become fully participating members of society. Similarly, it is in the 
best interest of a society to have a social system, including public education, which can 
develop citizens who are capable of fully participating. Given the level of resources required 
to deliver an adequate educational experience, defen rs of the ICESCR suggest that the state 
is often in the best position to stand in on behalf of children to determine both the distribution 
and the content of education for that end. Ideally, children who are in a position to claim this 
right to education can ultimately become adults capable of understanding their role in 
society. To this end, Article 13(2) of the ICESCR articulates both the need to provide free 
and compulsory basic primary education, and as many equal opportunities as possible to 
access a more complete education which is directed to the full development of the child’s 
potential. 
Similarly, it is believed that those governments who recognize and promote the right 
of every child to a free and compulsory basic primay education will reap the benefits of 
having a skilled workforce and active citizenry. To this end, Article 14 of the ICESCR 
addresses the concern that some under-developed countries will automatically be unable to 
secure compulsory basic primary education. According to this Article, the element of 
compulsion is necessary, not to penalize directly those countries who are incapable of 
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fulfilling this treaty, but to highlight the non-optional, interdependent nature of basic primary 
education. This Article is meant to highlight the principle that a child is entitled, regardless of 
nationality, sex, race, religion, or economic status to a free basic primary education. 
Moreover, it is the responsibility of each participating member country to secure this right – 
either through their own local resources, or by securing international assistance and 
cooperation. Therefore, while immaturity and inexperience are obvious barriers for children, 
the inclusion of a social right like education in the ICESCR is an important step for children 
to become rights-respecting individuals. 
A second reason the defenders of the ICESCR suggest for the promotion of the right 
to education as a fundamental social right concerns the unique relationship which exists 
between adults and children. It is a common, and presumably correct, view that parents 
usually play a significant role as primary caregivers and teachers in the adult/child 
relationship. The ICESCR acknowledges this unique relationship carefully by maintaining 
that, although children have rights, it is the parents who maintain the primary responsibility 
to recognize and realize these rights. Article 13 (2) of the ICESCR carefully acknowledges, 
however, that in the specific case of the child’s right to education, the parents must be seen as 
partners and not as executive directors. This Article maintains that there is a unique 
relationship between parent and child, but stipulates that the kind of education which will 
develop the child’s potential fully, must progressively embrace both the familial values and 
the values of the society to which the child belongs, and in which the child will ultimately 
have to become a fully participating member. Therefore, while parents are essential to the 
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development of children, the promotion and protection of a right to education highlights the 
interconnected nature of the relationship between th  child, the parent/educator, and the state. 
Finally, the move to incorporate education in the ICESCR as a fundamental social 
right to which all children are entitled reflects the need to deal more aggressively with the 
sizeable problem of childhood vulnerability. Each year millions of children suffer from 
neglect, abuse and poverty. In particularly difficult situations, they are also vulnerable to 
slavery and armed conflict. Even in countries where these extreme circumstances are not 
obvious, it is believed that children who do not go to school are vulnerable to life choices 
which are not conducive to their full development. Promoting education as a fundamental 
social right is a natural consequence of the common and correct assumption that we have 
certain duties towards children to compensate them for these inherent vulnerabilities. Onora 
O’Neill, for example, has suggested:  
Children are more fundamentally but less permanently powerless; their main remedy 
is to grow up. Because this remedy cannot be achieved rapidly they are peculiarly 
vulnerable and must rely more than other powerless groups on social practices and 
institutions that secure the performance of others’ obligations.76  
 
The ICESCR’s claim that the right to education is afundamental social right represents this 
need to secure the commitments of adults to counteract childhood vulnerability. Article 13 
(1) commits adults to recognize that until children have acquired enough skills and resources 
to develop their own sense of self, they are entitld o an education. To complement this, 
Article 13 (1) also emphasizes that, by recognizing this fundamental right, not only will the 
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child’s own sense of self be developed, but the child’s sense of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms will be developed as well. 
For many, the ICESCR represents an important and comprehensive international legal 
commitment to the provision of economic and social onsiderations necessary to ensure the 
possibility of a good life for all members of the human family. It also represents an important 
human rights document which builds on the belief that all human rights are universal, 
indivisible and interdependent. In the case of the sp cific right to education, for some like 
Kenneth Henley for example, the ICESCR offers a progressive statement of the kind of 
educational considerations necessary to represent and protect the interests of the three main 
stakeholders in this debate: the child, the parents, a d the state: 
The state can best exercise this ultimate authority as parens patriae by supporting the 
immediate authority of parents over the early and informal education of children, and 
by requiring schooling under strong licensing provisions which protect the maturing 
child’s right to grow into an independent adult. The privacy of the family fosters the 
continuing intimate relationships so essential to the child’s well-being, while the 
school’s openness establishes the older child within the larger society.77 
 
Thus, Henley recommends that, while it is essential to recognize that children are members 
of the human family entitled to the same kind of resp ct and concern as any member, giving 
them rights is not a matter of stipulating a blanket denial of the protective role that adults 
(and parents in particular) must play. For Henley, documents dedicated to human rights 
should satisfy the interests and protect the liberties of the child, the parents and the state, and 
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the ICESCR is a positive document which stipulates both why adults should have a restricted 
authority to educate children, and why children should have restricted influence over their 
own education.  
Others contend, however, that focusing on the right to education in this way provides 
both the child and the state with certain liberties hat might cause unnecessary harm or 
disadvantage. Defenders of the home-schooling movement, for example, have defended the 
parents’ fundamental right to direct and manage their own children’s education because it is 
only the parents who can legitimately understand what is in the best interests of their 
children.78 Many reasons are offered for this position but, most significantly, parents want to 
have the right to choose an education which is not based on secular, pluralistic values, or 
narrow political ideologies, for example. They want  education for their children which 
protects and reflects their own values and beliefs.  
Defenders of children’s rights and the ICESCR, however, have suggested that, unless 
there is a specific statement of the boundaries which provide for the rights of children and 
limit the paternalistic powers of others, the rights of children in general, and their right to 
education in particular, will always take a secondary role in rights deliberations. That is, 
when a bilateral parent-child relationship is favoured over a broader trilateral one, there is a 
greater chance that the more powerful party will dominate the weaker. While parents (like 
those interested in home-schooling) believe that they are offering their children both what 
they need and what is in their best interests to prevent them from making unwise or unsafe 
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choices, they neglect to acknowledge that everyone is likely to make unwise or unsafe 
choices occasionally. It is difficult to demarcate th boundary between the need to protect the 
innocence and inexperience of childhood, and the need to allow children to learn from their 
own mistakes. The ICESCR is a document which attempts to address this problem of 
demarcation by recognizing that it is essential for the child’s own growth toward 
independence that certain limits be placed on either the parent’s, or the state’s, paternalistic 
denials of liberty.79 
Recall the response to the stipulation found in resolution 421 of the UN General 
Assembly, which suggested that the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms are 
interconnected and interdependent with economic, social and cultural rights. For supporters 
of social rights, such a stipulation is a necessary requirement of being a free human being. On 
this account, the ICESCR represents an appropriate legal commitment made by the 
participating members to defend and protect both the autonomy and the social security of 
each of their members.  For libertarians, however, such a stipulation is a direct violation of 
what it means to be a free human being. On this account, while it may be possible for the 
defenders of social rights to suggest that having a ri ht to education is in the best interests of 
its members, the level of external interference requir d to support this claim make it an 
untenable human rights claim. At most, it is for them a claim to social welfare or charity.  
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In the interest of the importance of their own positi n, and to avoid this persistent 
polarization, many defenders of children’s rights deci ed that this traditional division 
between social rights and liberty rights was outdate  and unhelpful. They decided to create a 
new document, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), to develop a more inclusive 
language, which incorporates contemporary groupings of rights including rights that provide 
for a child’s basic needs, rights that protect a child from harm, and rights that allow a child to 
participate in decisions which will ultimately affect her life. As Thomas Hammarberg has 
suggested: “The division between economic and politica  rights has plagued UN discussions 
on human rights; [a division that] is not reflected in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.”80 The next section considers the significance of this s ift in human rights language. 
1.3. Beyond Simply Valuing Education 
The previous section considered the traditional view that a right to education is a 
social benefit which societies should strive, to the best of their ability, to recognize and 
support through official channels. For many, it is possible to justify this traditional view 
because it seems obvious that having a right to education is in the best interests of both the 
child and the society of which the child is a member. Moreover, children need the protection 
and guidance adults can provide until such time that they become capable of rational 
decision-making. For others, however, such a view can only work when there are already 
official channels in place to recognize and support the human rights project – what about 
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those many situations where children are not in the company of caring, capable adults? This 
section considers the more recent view which suggests that, while recognized legislative 
channels provide an important legal guide for the provision and distribution of social goods 
like education, such a guide requires additional support to recognize the same right to 
education for all, regardless of existing social structures.81 On this view, it is not enough to 
recognize the legal rights to which children are entitl d; sustained consideration needs to be 
given to the moral rights children are entitled to as well. 
Twenty years after the creation of the DRC, the UN General Assembly convened 
again to discuss why, despite their best efforts, children were continuing to suffer needless 
and undue harm. In 1979, to mark the 20th anniversary of the DRC, the UN proclaimed the 
International Year of the Child (IYC). A notable difference between this proclamation and 
previous attempts to focus the world’s attention on children was the shift from both the 
humanitarian vision of Jebb and the welfarist vision of the DRC, to a focus simply on 
children.82 More specifically, there was an interest in understanding the child as slave, the 
child as prostitute, the child as disease carrier, th  child as student and, unfortunately, the 
child as invisible. Although largely a symbolic act, the IYC was instrumental in much the 
same way that Jebb’s Children’s Charter was in bringing the rights of children to the 
forefront of international debate. As with Jebb’s charter, this ‘purely symbolic’ gesture to 
recognize children internationally also resonated. This time, however, the focus was not only 
                                                     
81 Philip Veerman, The Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1991). 
82 Michael Jupp, (1989) “The International Year of the Child: Ten Years Later,” in Proceedings of the Academy 
of Political Science 37 (2, Special issue on Caring for America’s Children): 31-44. 
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on the rights to which children are entitled; there was a concerted effort to bring the voices of 
children to the forefront as well.  
In 1924, the aim of the GDRC was to encourage men and women to declare and 
accept as their duty that mankind owes to the Child the best that it has to give.83 In 1959, the 
aim of the DRC shifted to call upon parents, men and women, and public authorities to 
recognize children’s rights so that the child may have a happy childhood and [may] enjoy for 
his own good and for the good of society the rights and freedoms set forth.84 The intent of 
supporters of such documents shifted again when the existing DRC transformed into the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) to develop the minimum set of vitally needed 
considerations that should be granted to any individual, including a child, as a matter of 
decent treatment.   
The Government of Poland, inspired by the work of Dr. Janusz Korczak85 and by the 
momentum of the IYC, initiated this transformation n the hope that the adoption of the CRC 
would be the highlight of the IYC. Dr. Korczak, a pediatrician, children’s author and 
orphanage director86 was a pioneer of the notion that children are autonomous beings with 
needs, interests and rights. Although his life ended tragically in a gas chamber in Treblinka in 
                                                     
83 League of Nations, Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 (adopted on 26 September, 1924), 
preamble. 
84 UN General Assembly, Declaration of the Rights of the Child (proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 
1386 (XIV) on 20 November, 1959), preamble. 
85 Janusz Korczak, When I Am Little Again and The Child’s Right to Respect Trans. E. P. Kulawiec (Lanham: 
University Press, 1992), originally published 1925 and 1929 respectively; Janusz Korczak, How to Love a 
Child Trans. Hatif Al Jinabi (UNESCO, 2002). 
86 Adir Cohen, The Gate of Light: Janusz Korczak, The Educator, and Writer Who Overcame the Holocaust 
(Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1994). 
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1942, the Polish Government developed the first draf  of the CRC, in honour of his vision 
that children are rights-holders, who not only require care and concern but who have rights 
and interests which must be respected.87 The Polish Government also felt a great need to 
honour the more than two million Polish children who were displaced or who lost their lives 
needlessly to Nazi persecution and medical experimentation during WWII.88  
From this first draft by Poland, a broad-based committee including – government 
representatives, agents from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
and the World Health Organization (WHO) – convened annually (over a ten year time-frame) 
to develop and refine the Polish document into the final document, which ultimately the UN 
General Assembly adopted as the CRC on November 20, 1989. This time, the aim was an 
appeal to the world to ensure that each child is fully prepared to live an individual life in 
society, and [is] brought up in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United 
Nations, in particular, in the spirit of peace, dign ty, tolerance, freedom, equality, and 
solidarity.89  
It is important to note that, in addition to viewing the child as a rights-holder rather 
than dependent, the creation of the CRC was part of a larger movement to fine-tune the 
                                                     
87 UN, Legislative History of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, volumes 1 and 2 (New York: Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2007). Available online at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/history_crc1.pdf. 
88 Lawrence LeBlanc The Convention on the Rights of the Child: United Nations Lawmaking on Human Rights 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). 
89 United Nations, Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted on 20 November, 1989), preamble. Available 
online at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm.  
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language of rights in general. For example, it was believed that the concept of civil and 
political rights, on its own, was lost on children because children do not share the same direct 
relationship with their government as adults. Although more in tune with the needs of 
children, it was also believed, that the concept of socio-economic rights alone did not 
adequately deal with the child as an independent rights-holder. As Jaime Sergio Cerda has 
pointed out, for example, for a country like Poland, it was particularly important that the 
civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights of children be balanced sufficiently given 
“the historical problem of the separation of children from their families”90 during various 
wars. Eugeen Verhellen has also remarked on the numrous examples which exist to suggest 
an evolution in the interpretation of the child’s need to be seen as both an object of protection 
and as an independent rights-holder.91 Among his examples, he includes the input to the CRC 
from the European Charter for Children’s Rights, which states: Children must no longer be 
considered as parents’ property, but must be recognised as individuals with their own rights 
and needs.92 And, as Lawrence LeBlanc has commented “[T]he substantive articles of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child reflect this “new” way of thinking because they affirm 
a broad range of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights while making no formal 
distinctions among them.”93 No longer was it acceptable to organize human rights into the 
                                                     
90 Jaime Sergio Cerda, (1990) “The Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: New Rights,” in Human 
Rights Quarterly 12 (1): 115-119. 
91 Eugeen Verhellen, “Changes in the Images of the Child,” chapter 7 in M. Freeman and P Veerman (eds.) The 
Ideologies of Children’s Rights (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992): 79-94.  
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polarized categories of negative civil-political rights and positive socio-economic rights; new 
categorizations emerged, like Thomas Hammarberg’s three-P’s of children’s rights: 
Provision – the right to get one’s basic needs fulfilled – for example, the rights to 
food, health care, education, recreation and play. 
Protection – the right to be shielded from harmful acts or practices – for example, to 
be protected from commercial or sexual exploitation, physical or mental abuse, or 
engagement in warfare. 
Participation – the right to be heard on decisions affecting one’s own life.94 
 
This fits into the more general classification of rights, offered by Jack Donnelly and Rhoda 
Howard, into groups that represent: 
“Survival” rights, which guarantee individual existence: rights to life, food and health 
care. 
“Membership” rights, which assure one an equal place in society: family rights and 
the prohibition of discrimination. 
“Protection” rights, which guard the individual against abuses of power by the state: 
rights to habeas corpus and an independent judiciary. 
“Empowerment “ rights, which provide the individual with control over the course of 
his or her life, and in particular, control over (not merely protection against) the state: 
rights to education, a free press, and freedom of association.95 
 
As already mentioned, the CRC, through much deliberation and public consensus-building, 
made available a minimum set of vitally needed considerations which should be granted to 
any child as a matter of decent treatment. By incorporating these more contemporary 
                                                     
94 LeBlanc (1995), xviii. Taken from Thomas Hammarberg, (1990) “The UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child – and How to Make it Work,” in Human Rights Quarterly 12: 97-105. 
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groupings of rights into the CRC, children were formally recognized as both objects of 
protection and as independent rights-holders. 
To begin, the preamble of the CRC maintains the traditional and commonsense view 
that the child’s situation is one of needing special safeguards and care, including appropriate 
legal protection due to physical or mental immaturity, or perhaps even exceptionally difficult 
living conditions. In addition to this, Article 3 emphasizes: In all actions concerning 
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration. So, first and foremost, the CRC is a document concerned with acting 
in the best interests of the child. 
In regards to the child’s education, one of the most direct and most widely cited 
statements regarding the right to education is Article 28 of the CRC. Like Principle 7 of the 
DRC and Article 13 of the ICESCR, this Article stipulates the right of all children to free, 
compulsory, basic primary education, and it stipulates the responsibility of the States Parties 
to recognize this right. In addition to the need to pr vide a basic minimum education, this 
Article also encourages States Parties to make available further educational options so that 
the full potential of the child can be developed. Although not as comprehensive as Articles 
13 and 14 of the ICESCR, there is also the suggestion that the most effective educational 
approach is one which embraces international cooperation and resource sharing, while at the 
same time emphasizing the importance of regular attendance and continuous studies. To 
achieve this end, Article 28 recommends the need for an educational environment built and 
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administered on a public foundation which respects human dignity and the principles 
espoused by the UDHR.  
Prior to the CRC, most UN documents commenting on the right to education stopped 
at this point. To fulfill the CRC’s goal of preparing a child to live an individual life in 
society, and to do this in the spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the UDHR, however, the 
creators of the CRC further suggested that two things were required. First, it required the 
understanding of the minimum educational opportunities o which a child should have access 
as stated above. In addition to this, it required an understanding of the aims which these 
educational opportunities are intended to address, as outlined in Article 29. According to 
General Comment 1of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, where 
Article 28 stipulates what educational opportunities governments are obliged to provide for 
children, Article 29 stipulates the nature of the educational programs to which it would be 
worthwhile for children to have secure access.96  
The UN further recommends that all countries who have greed to participate in 
recognizing the CRC, must be committed to providing a  educational environment which is 
child-centred, child-friendly, and empowering. Such an environment is necessary to shift 
from the traditional parent-centred, or state-centred, educational models to one which 
represents the rights of children. To do this is to recognize, as the UN does, that a right to 
education “goes beyond formal schooling to embrace the broad range of life experiences and 
                                                     
96 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner forHuman Rights, “The Aims of Education”, Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, General Comment 1 (2001). Available at the University of Minnesota Human  
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learning processes which enable children, individually and collectively, to develop their 
personalities, talents and abilities and to live a full and satisfying life within society.”97 To 
this end, Article 29 stipulates the importance of promoting and protecting an educational 
environment which strives to balance the child’s ability with the child’s familial and cultural 
identity, and which strives to be directly relevant to he child’s socio-economic 
circumstances. By focusing on the need to develop the diverse, evolving capabilities of each 
child, Article 29 stipulates the need to recognize both the human dignity and the inalienable 
rights of each child, and the need to establish appropriate educational environments capable 
of promoting and modeling this as well. 
While Articles 28 and 29 are dedicated most directly to education, four other articles 
in the CRC round out the need to establish an educational environment that is both rights-
respecting and child-friendly. Article 2, for example, specifies the importance of respecting 
and ensuring the rights of all children regardless of background, ability, sex, or any other 
factor which might distinguish one child from the nxt. This is a stipulation that is 
particularly important when it comes to the education of girls in the developing world, and 
the education of minorities in the developed world. As already mentioned, Article 3 
stipulates the best interests of the child should be the primary concern of all actions and 
decisions which may affect his or her life. To ensure that educational decisions are made in 
the best interests of the child, however, it is necessary for the child to be a participant in that 
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decision-making process, not necessarily as an equal participant, but as an age-appropriate 
contributor. Article 5 addresses the need to consider the significa t role parental guidance 
can play in influencing the development of the child. The family, both the immediate and the 
extended community ‘family’, can and should be allowed to contribute positively to the 
evolving capacities of the children that they come into direct contact with, a condition which 
complements Article 6 and its stipulation that the c ild has an inherent right to life and to 
healthy development. These four Articles, in conjunction with Articles 28 and 29, suggest 
that, to realize the full rights a child is entitled to as a member of the human family, a holistic 
approach must be taken which recognizes the interconnected nature of this convention and, 
above all, the objects it specifies as necessary for a child to live a minimally decent life.  
To complement the need to establish an educational environment that is child-friendly, 
there are additional Articles which support the child’s right to an educational environment 
which is also empowering. Article 12, for example, stresses the rights of those children, 
capable of forming their own views, to express those views when they are relevant to 
decisions which will affect them directly. In accordance with appropriate consideration of the 
child’s age and maturity, children should be given the opportunity to participate in school 
life, including involvement in the creation of student councils, peer-mentoring programs, and 
the creation of curriculum materials which are both meaningful and relevant to their interests 
and experiences. The CRC also recognizes that having  voice is a meaningless entitlement if 
there is not a corresponding entitlement for children freely to access information. Article 17, 
for example, highlights both the importance of access to information, as well as the 
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importance of access to information that remains open and flexible. Article 17 (a), in 
particular, highlights the value to be gained by encouraging the mass media to disseminate 
information and material of social and cultural benefit to the child and in accordance with 
the spirit of Article 29. Article 17 (b) maintains the desire to advance int rcultural 
understanding and education through international co-operation in the production, exchange 
and dissemination of such information and material f om a diversity of cultural, national and 
international sources. Finally, Article 17 (e) reinforces the importance of recognizing that 
any rights granted to children must also account for he role parents play in the upbringing 
and development of their own children, and the rolepublic authorities, as stipulated in their 
laws, play in the protection and promotion of public order and national security. That is, the 
CRC recognizes the role which the state must play in enabling children/families to develop 
their own cultural identities freely and fully while, at the same time, recognizing the role 
which children/families play in the establishment of a peaceful and stable society. 
1.4. Implications for Policy, Both in the US and Internationally 
This chapter has described the development of children’s rights throughout the 20th 
century, with a specific emphasis on the child’s right to education. At the beginning of this 
century, the primary concern was directed at the responsibility of humanity to ensure that the 
immediate needs of children in desperate circumstances be taken care of unconditionally. 
This interest in the plight of desperate children translated into an interest to protect the rights 
of all children to a happy and fulfilling life, an i terest which translated again into the 
responsibility to promote the rights of children to the same set of objects (including 
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education, as highlighted here) to which each individual, as a member of the human family, 
is entitled.  
From this careful consideration of the historical progression of the rights of children, it 
is possible to conclude that not only is education clearly considered a right from which all 
children can benefit, but education is a human right that is indispensable in the realization of 
other human rights. This is a conclusion which has influenced the recent UN challenge to the 
world to participate in an education revolution which would see every child in school, 
participating in a child-centred environment designed to meet his or her own unique needs. 
Defenders of this global action plan suggest that, by embracing such a human rights-
respecting agenda, individual countries will be able to coordinate and improve international 
and national efforts to provide children with the skill  and knowledge necessary to maximize 
their personal and intellectual development which, in turn, will maximize each individual 
country’s social and economic returns. Moreover, they also suggest that, by embracing the 
language of rights, as outlined in the CRC, it is po sible to apply rights to children in an 
appropriate way. According to defenders of the CRC, it makes no sense to talk about the civil 
and political rights children have because they do not have the same direct relationship with 
their governments as adults do. Also, it makes no sense to limit children’s rights to only those 
concerned with welfare obligations because children o have a unique status outside of 
dependency – an individuality, an emerging autonomous personhood – which also needs to 
be considered.  
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As Kofi Annan confidently asserts: “Education is a human right with immense power 
to transform. On its foundation rest the cornerstones of freedom, democracy and sustainable 
human development.”98 To this, however, he regretfully acknowledges, many millions of 
“children in the developing world are denied this right – almost two thirds of them girls. 
Nearly 1 billion people, or a sixth of the world’s population, are illiterate – the majority of 
them women.”99 Such a powerful assertion, by the then-Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, supported by such deplorable statistics, would seem to provide compelling reasons 
for accepting education as something from which all individuals should be allowed to 
benefit. If education can provide a stable foundation for freedom, democracy, and sustainable 
human development – as Annan and the UN assert – and if so many people are being denied 
this foundation, who would choose not to support the right of all children to be educated? 
After all, even those uncomfortable with the notion of fully endorsing a UN-driven human 
right to education usually acknowledge that it is in the best interests of children to have at 
least some form of education. Providing a more satisfying understanding of what it means to 
have access to an education is not so simple. Furthermore, providing a justification for the 
stipulation, in the CRC, that basic primary education is a fundamental human right to which 
all children are entitled, and which governments and civil society are duty-bound to provide, 
as a free and compulsory public endeavour, is even more controversial.  
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For example, Christopher Klicka and William Estrada rgue that: “On February 14, 
1995, war was declared on parental rights in America.”100 What was their concern? It was on 
this day that the Clinton Administration announced the United States would send Madeleine 
Albright, acting as the US Delegate to the UN, to sign the CRC, and to send it to the US 
Senate for ratification. The opposition from the ‘Religious Right’, as noted by Klicka and 
Estrada, was so overwhelming101 that, while Albright did sign the CRC on behalf of 
President Clinton, as of 2007, the CRC still has not been ratified by the US. The US remains 
one of only two countries worldwide to fail to ratify the CRC (Somalia being the second). If 
Kofi Annan is correct to declare that “the Conventio  on the Rights of the Child – the most 
widely ratified human rights treaty in history – enshrines the right of all children to a primary 
education that will give them the skills they need to continue learning throughout life,”102 and 
if he is correct to suggest that a solid institution of public education forms the foundation for 
freedom, democracy and sustainable development, then to what are opponents of the CRC 
(like Klicka and Estrada) so opposed? Why is the CRC seen as a threat to the well-being of 
children (and parents), rather than as a means to ensuring greater social benefits and 
securities?  
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To begin, American objection to the CRC rests on two main issues: the restrictions it 
places on things like corporal punishment for children under the age of 18; and the degree to 
which it is believed to undermine both parental sovereignty in particular and American 
sovereignty in general. According to opponents likeKlicka and Estrada, the CRC gives 
children (to their detriment) protected freedoms: to express themselves; to choose their own 
religious beliefs, moral values and educational influences; to associate with others of their 
own choosing; and to privacy, such that parents could be prevented from directing or 
safeguarding their own children’s actions. Moreover, according to Klicka and Estada, the 
CRC takes away parental freedom to discipline their own children by making things like 
spanking a legally enforceable offence.103 They do acknowledge that ‘attempts’ are made to 
bridge parental concerns with the rights of children within the CRC, but they recommend that 
these concessions simply pay ‘lip-service’ to the primacy of parents. For Klicka and Estrada, 
Americans should reject the CRC, despite its widespread acceptance, on the basis that 
Americans already have “a massive child welfare system in place throughout the country,”104 
a system which, they believe, will only be weakened an  destabilized if the US ratifies the 
CRC.  
It is Klicka’s and Estrada’s belief that ratification of the CRC by the US is too 
damaging to the sovereignty of parents, too costly to implement, and too irrelevant to a 
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country which is already uniquely poised at the top of human development. Klicka and 
Estrada argue, “the cost of ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
its subsequent implementation would be staggering.”105 Furthermore, they argue that if the 
US ratifies the CRC, “for the first time, America will have its domestic policy subjected to 
foreign control through the arbitrary whims of this Committee of Ten.”106 Similarly, Bruce 
Hafen has also cautioned that, “the CRC’s widespread acceptance seems surprisingly 
uncritical – especially for a convention that includes an unprecedented approach to the legal 
and personal autonomy of children.”107 Hafen claims any country which accepts the CRC is 
essentially “abandoning children to their rights”108 – for example, leaving them free to make 
major, life-impacting decisions about things like abortion or other potentially harmful 
medical treatments, in isolation and without parental advice or consent. Another opponent to 
the CRC, David Gregory, encourages children’s rights advocates not to forget the simple fact 
that children are not adults and, as such, should not be granted the same rights and privileges 
as adults. Gregory warns: 
In an over-extensive effort to raise children to adult status, the CRC disregards a key 
fundamental right of every child – the right to responsible parenting, ideally by 
biological parents in a stable marriage and family dynamic. By denying this 
right/reality, the CRC’s egalitarian calculus is exposed as fundamentally flawed.109 
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Have these opponents of the CRC correctly identified, however, why the CRC should be 
rejected? Does the CRC really ‘unburden’ parents from esponsible parenting? Moreover, 
does the CRC give children the protected freedom to do as they (perhaps irrationally) please? 
A comprehensive analysis of the CRC, like the one rec ntly published by the UN,110 
can demonstrate how the CRC accounts for childhood vulnerability, while avoiding the 
reckless desire to merely ‘abandon children to their rights’. As Shulamit Almog and Ariel 
Bendor have correctly pointed out, however, “there is an immanent incongruity between 
perceiving children’s rights as human rights – which are based upon principles of autonomy 
and subjective choice – and constructing them according to the ‘best interest’ doctrine, which 
is based upon an objective paternalistic and protecti nist approach.”111 While Almog and 
Bendor are themselves in favour of a US ratification of the CRC, they suggest that it is easy 
to fall into the trap of perceiving that the CRC goes too far in the direction of giving 
autonomy or liberty rights to children while not sufficiently protecting the traditional 
safeguards associated with the parent/child bond. 
Almog and Bendor recommend that, despite some passionate (yet somewhat 
undeveloped) reasons for Americans to forgo recognizing the CRC, the unifying potential to 
be gained from even a symbolic signing of the CRC outweighs the effect of current 
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American silence on the topic of children’s rights, e pecially in regard to their fundamental 
right to education. To this, Almog and Bendor add – not only will American ratification 
elevate the status of the CRC to a supreme law of the world – American ratification can have 
a long-term impact (both practically and morally). Almog and Bendor conclude that the gap 
between the CRC and current American laws regarding children has been exaggerated. By 
ratifying the CRC, the US government (including its re ources and expertise) can be engaged 
once again, as an active member on the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Moreover, 
they recommend that any possible gaps which might exis , such as those highlighted by 
Hafen or Gregory for example, can be addressed sufficiently by the flexible nature of the 
CRC, which allows countries (even non-democratic ones) to ratify with reservations.  
According to Philip Alston and John Tobin, for example, there are two reasons why 
American non-participation can be ignored no longer. First, Alston and Tobin suggest “the 
US is not a country which can be ignored and its opposition to the CRC will, over time, 
manifest itself in a more damaging and destructive wayvis-à-vis the overall enterprise of 
promoting children’s rights in general and the Convention in particular.”112 Second, Alston 
and Tobin suggest, echoing Almog and Bendor, “the reasons for US opposition, which by 
definition have never been officially spelled out, are frequently either exaggerated or 
misrepresented, or are assumed to be synonymous with the views of radical groups of one 
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type or another, whose agency is wholly antithetical o ny reasonable notion of children’s 
rights.”113  
Cynthia Price Cohen has also suggested it is time for the US to reignite its connection 
to the “instrument that it fervently labored to creat .”114 According to Price Cohen, herself a 
participant in the drafting of the CRC, by ratifying the CRC two important advancements to 
children’s rights will occur. First, ratification of the CRC will enable the US to reconfirm its 
commitment to children as rights-bearing individuals, thus establishing a world-wide 
commitment to both the contents of the CRC and to the progressive realization of those 
contents. Second, the American leadership which proved instrumental in the drafting of this 
comprehensive and thoughtful document could once again participate in the next stage in the 
progression of children’s rights.  
Finally, consideration needs to be given to Patricia Marino’s suggestion that, for 
progress, particularly moral progress, to occur it is not enough to accept simply that we have 
certain obligations to each other (or to our own children), because it is not always clear what 
form those responsibilities will take. Marino suggests that, over time, obligations change and 
our mutual interdependencies shift. For example, while Klicka and Estrada may think they 
are correct to assume that a massive child welfare system is already in place throughout the 
US, including a system of education, and while they may think they are correct to assume 
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that the parent/child bond within the US is stable and appropriately nurturing, the current 
data on child abuse and children’s rights violations suggests something different. According 
to Sarah Fass and Nancy Cauthen, for example, nearly 13 million American children live in 
families with incomes below the federal poverty level, which is $20, 650 (USD) a year for a 
family of four – an 11 % increase in poverty from 2000-2006.115 While the CRC is not a 
magical document which can make statistics such as t ese disappear, the CRC can be a 
positive mechanism in maintaining social stability and uncovering unwarranted inequities. 
By ratifying the CRC, it will be possible to constan ly, and consistently, reflect upon what 
kind of education is the best option available for children. According to Marino:  
At first, there may be nothing morally wrong with the system in place, in the sense 
that it may not flout any of the obligations we areused to recognizing. Then over 
time, we come to understand those obligations differently, where, for example, there 
are limited resources or unequal wealth. Our sense of those obligations then change, 
as the occurrence of dilemmas forces us to see where w  are failing. In the school 
example, we might come to feel that the system we hav  created is unfair in ways we 
hadn’t considered when we started.116  
 
The insight, which Marino offers with regard to how we should deal with our collective 
responsibilities, is particularly relevant to why it is time for the US to ratify the CRC. 
Despite the confidence that advocates of children’s rights and defenders of the CRC 
have, in the ability of a universally ratified CRC to achieve great things for children, it is 
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important to reflect upon a recent UNICEF report on the impact of the implementation of the 
CRC.117 This report asks an important (albeit not so inflamed) question: Is the impact of the 
CRC, fifteen years after its near universal ratificat on, real or rhetorical? To answer this 
question, and to translate the normative claims found in the CRC (such as the one directed at 
the child’s fundamental right to free and compulsory education) into the actual conditions 
and working forces of community life,  two things need to occur: one symbolic, one 
dynamic. First, as already stated, the CRC needs to be ratified by all countries, including the 
US. More importantly however, with this need to establish an unconditional endorsement of 
the CRC, comes a further need to look beyond the all-inclusive rhetoric (inherit in any 
formalized document), toward the kind of action necessary to bring about attainable reforms 
to children’s rights in general, and to the institution of education in particular – reforms 
which can intrinsically benefit children, and instrumentally benefit society. Before doing this, 
however, it is important to consider the merits of three alternative arguments to the UN claim 
that basic primary education is a fundamental right. 
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Chapter 2 
Some Alternative Arguments Regarding the Education of Children 
This chapter looks at three arguments that question the widely held notion, as 
developed in chapter 1, that it is in the best interests of both children and society to view free 
and compulsory basic primary education as a right. To begin, section 2.1 considers the 
liberationist movement and the desire to secure rights equally for both children and adults 
alike. The liberationist fully endorses the child’s right to all of the same rights as adults. This 
position is taken, however, not because the liberationist wants to protect something which the 
child cannot protect for himself. The liberationist suggests that children have the same right 
as adults to be free – free from constraints, free from coercion, and free from arbitrary age-
ism. Section 2.2 will look at the rival libertarian view, which suggests that, when rights 
language is engaged it refers to negative rights alone, that is, the right for me to act without 
the interference of others and vice-versa. As such, the logic of granting rights to children is 
minimal to non-existent. It is far better, according to the libertarian, to assume that children 
belong to their parents, and then to grant any rights intended for the child to the adult who is 
in the best position to act on behalf of that child. Section 2.3 will examine another rival view, 
which comes from protectionists and their desire to secure equal social benefits for children 
(like education and health care) by focusing on the duties we owe to children, not on what 
rights they have or should have. Finally, section 2.4 will recommend that, while deliberate 
paternalism seems inevitable (even prior to any discus ion of rights), securing a child’s right 
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to education requires more than acting in the best interests of children alone. Sustained 
consideration also needs to be given to the role that c ildren play in their own development. 
2.1. Free the Children 
The mid-twentieth century witnessed a movement to secure rights legitimately for all 
individuals regardless of gender, race, status, or age. It was believed that, if there is going to 
be a concept of rights, it must be a concept of rights for all, not just for some, and certainly 
not for some to the exclusion of an entire group of individuals (like women, racial minorities, 
or children). No longer was it acceptable merely to pr mote the rhetoric of rights: for these 
liberationists, having rights meant refusing to accept compromise or tokenism until such time 
that real rights were granted to all.  
In the case of children’s rights, two vocal supporters of the need to liberate children 
were Richard Farson and John Holt.118 Their chief concern was the nature of the institution of 
childhood, which they claim to be both arbitrary and artificial. Holt, for example, defines the 
institution of childhood as: 
All those attitudes and feelings, and also customs and laws, that put a great gulf or 
barrier between the young and their elders, and the world of their elders; that make it 
difficult or impossible for young people to make contact with the larger society 
around them.119  
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For Holt and Farson, rather than seeing this ‘barrier’ as an essential means to protect the 
delicate nature of childhood, they took it to be an artificially constructed outcome of the 
desire of adults to control children. According to H lt and Farson, their desire to eliminate 
this artificial construct by establishing rights for children, however, was not to eliminate all 
adult/child distinctions, as some of their critics have suggested.120 Their goal was to eliminate 
only those ‘double messages of distrust and contempt’ which they believed exist to lock 
children away in a “walled garden”121 of childhood. For example, Holt believed that, if these 
double messages were removed, it would be possible to give children back their childhood, to 
improve the adult/child relationship and most importantly to vitalize education, or at least the 
act of educating oneself.122 Holt believed this to be true because he believed that often 
teachers teach even when uninvited to do so. According to Holt: 
Anytime that, without being invited, without being asked, we try to teach somebody 
something, anytime we do that, we convey to that person, whether we know it or not, 
a double message. The first part of the message is: I am teaching you something 
important, but you’re not smart enough to see how important it is. Unless I teach it to 
you, you’d probably never bother to find out. The second message that uninvited 
teaching conveys to the other person is: what I’m teaching you is so difficult that, if I 
didn’t teach it to you, you couldn’t learn it.123 
 
Further to his belief that uninvited teaching should be avoided, Holt also believed that, by 
giving equal rights to children, children would no longer be cut off artificially from the adult 
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world, thus empowering them to see through these double messages and beyond what he 
believed to be the artificial world of childhood. 
With this notion of liberation in mind, Holt questioned the traditional belief that 
children are to be protected at the expense of givin  them rights by promoting a list of rights 
and privileges which should be made available to children. His list of children’s rights 
included rights: to equal treatment, to vote, to be legally responsible for one’s life, to work, to 
privacy, to financial independence, to choose one’s living arrangements, to travel, and to 
direct and manage one’s own education.124 Holt believed that, until such time as children are
granted such rights, they will continue to be contrlled and manipulated.  Similarly, Farson 
famously created a list of rights – “birthrights”125 that each individual is owed regardless of 
age. His list includes rights like: the right to alternative home environments (for example, 
multifamily communes, child exchange programs, or children’s residences), the right to 
economic power, the right to justice, the right to sexual freedom, and the right to educate 
oneself. He felt that recognition of these rights was the only way to shift the adult/child 
relationship from one that was consumed by the need to nurture, to one that could 
successfully guide the child to independence. For Farson, the greatest challenge for children 
is to break free from the controlling, over-protective environment that adults have created for 
them. Likewise, the greatest challenge for adults is o concede that, “to the extent that we 
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spend time with children, we spend it protecting, teaching, controlling, and disciplining them 
in the service of institutions which care little about their best interest.”126  
This desire to avoid manipulation is the key to the lib rationist’s claim that children 
are entitled to the same rights as adults. According to Farson, for example, “the issue of self-
determination is at the heart of children’s liberation. It is, in fact, the only issue, a definition 
of the entire concept. The acceptance of the child’s right to self-determination is fundamental 
to all rights to which children are entitled.”127 Article 13 (1) of the ICESCR, however, makes 
a similar claim that everyone has the right to he full development of the human personality 
and the sense of its dignity and that children, in particular, have the right to access education 
to develop their own respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. If this document 
was already in place, what did Farson and Holt believ  they were adding to the debate?  
They believed that, while documents like the ICESCR may have stipulated the child’s 
right to an education, what such documents fail to address is the need to recognize that 
having a right to education means having the freedom to develop one’s natural autonomy and 
curiosity. It does not mean to have the right to education as directed, or provided for, by the 
actions of others. Holt, for example, urges that: “Education is something a person gets for 
himself, not that which someone else gives or does t  him.”128 When asked what the most 
important thing American schools could do for children, Holt responded by suggesting: 
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It would be to let every child be the planner, director, and assessor of his own 
education, to allow and encourage him, with the inspiration and guidance of more 
experienced and expert people, and as much help as he ked for, to decide what he is 
to learn, when he is to learn it. How he is to learn it, and how well he is learning it. It 
would be to make our schools, instead of what they ar , which is jails for children, 
into a resource for free and independent learning, which everyone in the community, 
of whatever age, could use as much or as little as he wanted.129 
 
Holt argues that, when the rules of education are formalized in documents like the ICESCR, 
artificial environments, like schools, are also formalized. When this happens, education no 
longer represents what a child stands to gain in the way of a greater understanding of the 
world around him, or of his own personal role in that world. When this happens, education 
represents what society asks schools to do – namely to pass on traditions and higher values of 
a society’s particular culture, to acquaint the child with the world in which he lives, and to 
prepare the child for employment suitable to the neds of that particular society. Arguably, 
socialization is an important aspect of school but,according to Farson for example: “The 
only people in our society who are incarcerated against their will are criminals, the mentally 
ill, and children in school.”130 For Holt and Farson, it is this forced confinement, i  the name 
of socialization, to which they object. They argue that, if educators assume that socialization 
must be prior to self-determination, they assume that c ildren are incompetent and that it is 
their role as educators to compensate for this fact. Holt suggests, however, that if children are 
capable of gaining mastery over language prior to going to school, why should educators 
assume childhood incompetence. Moreover, he laments that: 
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Almost every child, on the first day he sets foot in a school building, is smarter, more 
curious, less afraid of what he doesn’t know, better a  finding and figuring things out, 
more confident, resourceful, persistent, and independent, than he will ever again be in 
his schooling or, unless he is very unusual and lucky, for the rest of his life.131  
 
For Holt and Farson, the most appropriate method to secure the rights of children is to allow 
them to develop their own natural talents and abilities without the confining interference of a 
formal school environment – which they argue has been established on the assumption that 
children need to be compensated for their incompetenc . It would be important to note, 
however, that while Holt and Farson may be correct to observe that children can already 
communicate when they enter school (a notably difficult task), being able to communicate 
with others does not automatically imply that they ave knowledge of the world or the 
cognitive skills to be able to make important, potentially life-altering decisions. 
Despite this potential weakness, Farson and Holt argue further that, when the rules of 
education are formalized in this way, education becomes arbitrary and oppressive. For the 
liberationist, schools are only one resource of many necessary for someone to develop his or 
her natural ability to learn. While schools can be a positive influence on the child’s 
education, learning can occur anywhere and anytime. Th y maintain that a child learns when 
a child experiences something, or when the interests and concerns of an individual doing the 
learning are engaged. Holt and Farson recommend that one does not necessarily need a 
school for this kind of learning to happen. Moreover, they warn that formalizing education as 
compulsory schooling often converts learning into training or programming. For the 
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liberationist, once this happens, schools become the last place where learning occurs. They 
argue that this approach to education isolates learning because children associate learning 
with school rather than with life experience. Moreov r, when learning is isolated in this way, 
the liberationist argues that children come to assume either that they cannot be trusted to 
learn on their own, or they become unmotivated to learn on their own. Finally, the 
liberationist suggests that children are further unmotivated by being in school because, when 
children do learn something, they are rewarded and when they either fail to learn something 
or they make an error in their learning, they are punished. Liberationists conclude that the 
best way to protect and provide for the interests of he child is first to grant children the same 
rights and privileges as adults, and then to allow them to be in control of their own education 
and development.  
Of course, not everyone is in agreement with such a radical approach. Giving children 
all of the same rights and privileges as adults seem , to many, not only irresponsible but also 
highly unusual and at odds with the clear fact of childhood immaturity. Moreover, going to 
school is often an enjoyable experience, which provides a broadening environment from 
which children can develop and grow into successful, ocially competent adults. Exposure to 
peer children, and adults other than their parents, is often valuable. Thus, where Holt and 
Farson believed they were attacking paternalism and ‘pe ophobia’, their critics believed they 
were simply promoting inaccuracy and recklessness, and an exaggerated view of a child’s 
capabilities.  
   
 
 80  
One set of critics, like Laura Purdy and Onora O’Neill for example (whose work will 
be discussed in section 2.3), recommend that it would be far better to promote childhood 
interests by devoting resources to enforcing the obligations of adults to protect childhood 
vulnerability. A second set, as discussed in chapter 1, has suggested that, while the desire of 
Farson and Holt to liberate children is grounded in the idea that it is in the best interests of 
children to do so, having rights is not just about freedom. To defend an idea that children 
should have access to all of the same freedoms adults have, fails to acknowledge the realities 
of childhood vulnerability and inexperience. Documents like the ICESCR and the CRC, on 
the other hand, apply a precautionary principle rather han a liberty principle. This 
precautionary principle promotes the rights of children to participate in important life 
decisions when they are capable of doing so – thus accounting for childhood vulnerability 
and avoiding the reckless desire of the liberationist to ‘free the children’. A third group of 
critics, however, has suggested that the liberationist fails, not from the use of the liberty 
principle, and not from the failure to recognize child ood vulnerability, but from the 
assumption that children have rights at all. Jan Narveson, for example, has argued that, while 
it may seem obvious that children are like any other, fellow human being, entitled to have the 
same rights as everyone else, “children are not simply ‘fellow people,’ and it is therefore an 
open question whether they have the same rights as adults.”132 The next section considers this 
open question posed by Narveson, which has led him to conclude (despite sharing a common 
belief with the liberationist in the importance of being free) that any notion that children have 
rights directly is both illusory and fraudulent. 
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2.2. The Scope of Negative Rights Alone 
Where liberationists like Farson and Holt represent the radical position that children 
can and should play a direct, and even controlling, role in their own development and 
education, there is an alternative debate that is generally accepted as being more central to 
the question of a child’s right to education. Murray Rothbard summarizes this long-standing 
debate, centred on who should be in charge of the education of children: 
The key issue in the entire discussion is simply this: shall the parent or the State be 
the overseer of the child? An essential feature of human life is that, for many years, 
the child is relatively helpless, that his powers of pr viding for himself mature late. 
Until those powers are fully developed, he cannot act completely for himself as a 
responsible individual. He must be under tutelage. This tutelage is a complex and 
difficult task. From an infancy of complete dependece and subjection to adults, the 
child must grow up gradually to the status of an independent adult. The question is 
under whose guidance, and virtual ‘ownership,’ the c ild should be: his parents’ or 
the state’s. There is no third, or middle, ground i this issue. Some party must control, 
and no one suggests that some individual third party have authority to seize the child 
and rear it.133 
 
Clearly, Rothbard has dismissed the potential ‘third’ l berationist position which places the 
authority to educate the child directly in the hands of the child himself, as considered in the 
last section. What he is able to capture in this description, however, is the standard and 
important debate which exists between those who argue that the parents should have the 
authority to educate their own children, and those who argue that the role of educator should 
be reserved for the State.  
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In Chapter 1, an argument for state-sponsored education was considered which 
suggested that international law, as stipulated in UN documents like the ICESCR and the 
CRC, has helped to establish viable legal mechanisms, from which nation-states can and 
have implemented supportive and effective social structures, including the institution of 
formal public education. This section considers why libertarians like Jan Narveson take this 
position to be nothing more than ad hoc pragmatism, ai ed at establishing unnecessary 
institutions that coerce us to do things we would not otherwise choose to do. Narveson 
suggests that any claim to positive rights, like th right to education, must account for why 
society should protect a child’s right to that claim. Even if our intuitions recommend to us 
that we have compassionate reasons to protect a child’s right to education, the inevitable 
costs which supporting and sustaining this right will entail make it impossible to move 
beyond benevolence into the realm of human rights. According to Narveson, if there is an 
inability to explain why the rest of us have the onerous obligation to cater to the unfortunate 
or the vulnerable, then we should have no interest in upporting the UN claim that every 
child has a right to free and compulsory basic prima y education.134 
To begin, it is important to understand some of the distinctions Narveson makes 
concerning the individual, the public and the state.135 As both a contractarian and a 
libertarian, Narveson suggests that we develop our most important and meaningful sense of 
society from the voluntary associations we find ourselves engaged in during our day-to-day 
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activities. These associations are meaningful, according to Narveson, because we choose to 
engage in them. If I want to join a club or be a member of a group, for example, I do so 
because I am interested in the kind of activities that hat particular club or group represents, 
and that club or group is interested in having me as a member. Likewise, if I want to work for 
a particular employer, I apply for a job with that company, and that company can choose to 
hire me or not. Narveson argues that it is interactions such as these, in liberal democracies at 
least, which make up the bulk of the associations which we make. When all of these 
associations come together, they form the public. Narveson describes the public as an 
aggregate of all of these voluntary sub-associations, but he also suggests that the public 
which you find yourself immersed in is simply that, just an aggregate. Everyone forms the 
public, but the concept of the public is not very meaningful to an individual because no one 
interacts with everyone and no one actually chooses the whole ‘public’ in which she finds 
herself engaged. Ultimately, it is the concept of the state where things get most interesting for 
the libertarian. Narveson describes the state as a public with a formal government and, for 
most libertarians, including Narveson, this desire to formalize some kind of governmental 
structure over and above the voluntary associations we make is unnecessary. For Narveson, 
the best that the state can offer is protection and peace of mind to get on with our own 
personal day-to-day activities.136 Narveson suggests, however, that regrettably the individuals 
elected to make up the government within a state all too often choose to overstep their 
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function as protector or guardian, and go on to become provider, nursemaid, counsellor and 
even educator. Moreover, Narveson argues that we hav  no choice but to accept this breach 
of authority and legitimacy because, once a governmnt is in place within the public in which 
we find ourselves, we are obliged to accept what that government decides is in our best 
interests to do – a fact which Narveson suggests is most in need of reflection within the 
debate on rights. 
Libertarians, like Narveson, suggest that the only rights to which we are entitled are 
negative rights. That is, we have the right to do what we want provided we do not interfere 
with someone else’s right to do the same; and provided we do not actively demand the 
assistance of others in the pursuit of our own interest fulfillment. Like Hobbes, Narveson 
recommends that our common humanity warrants a commitment to this preservation of our 
own self-interest, provided we allow others to do the same. If the state is formed to protect 
our right to the non-interference of others, and to enforce our duty to respect the rights of 
others to the same claim, then according to Narveson the state is acting as it should. The state 
becomes controversial when it oversteps this role as a defender of negative rights to become 
a promoter of positive rights. When this occurs, it is controversial, according to Narveson, 
because the moment one group of individuals begins to make decisions on behalf of others, 
our voluntary actions suddenly become involuntary or coerced. When this happens, a 
paradox occurs because the rights we are entitled to are violated by the very organization that 
was given the power to defend them.  
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Recall that the liberationist objected to the unacceptable act of vacillating between two 
sets of rights: one for adults, to provide them with opportunities to exercise their own 
powers; and another for children, to keep them under control. For the liberationist, this 
double standard results in the desire to protect children at the expense of giving them rights. 
And according to the liberationist, this result which, despite having the intention of being in 
the best interests of children, actually leaves children more vulnerable to things like 
manipulation. Instead, the liberationist contends that he best thing to do for children is to 
increase the scope of rights so that, when the discour e of rights is engaged, it is extended to 
all human beings, including children. This desire of the liberationist to question how rights 
are delimited is shared with the libertarian, who also objects to the act of vacillating between 
two sets of rights.137 In the case of the libertarian, however, the concern focuses on the desire 
to vacillate between protecting the right to the non-interference of others, and protecting the 
right to a potentially unlimited set of goods and services, which the state must somehow 
provide. This libertarian distinction is significant. Where the liberationist is interesting in 
extending the scope of rights to include things like the child’s right to educate himself, the 
libertarian wants to constrain the scope of rights by limiting any notion of rights to negative 
rights alone. For the libertarian, the language of rights should never be engaged in order to 
secure something that someone else has to provide on your behalf. Formal education, for 
example, by its very nature requires the active and often involved assistance of others (such 
as teachers); therefore, the claim that education is a r ght to which all human beings are 
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entitled goes beyond the scope of what the libertarian accepts as a reasonable demand on the 
actions of others.  
Recall also Narveson’s open question regarding the rig ts children either do or do not 
have. He claims that, while it may seem obvious that c ildren are like any other human being 
entitled to the same rights as everyone else, children in fact are not like everyone else – and 
any suggestion that children have rights is both illusory and fraudulent.138 According to 
Narveson, it is illusory because, to be a rights-holder, one must be capable of promoting 
one’s own interests and of taking responsibility for one’s own actions. Narveson, as a 
contractarian, rejects the intuition that children ( ven as potential agents) have this ability to 
participate in rational decision-making and deliberation. Children, especially young children, 
are not fully autonomous, rational agents capable of making real choices, so they 
automatically require adults to stand in for them until such time that they become adults 
themselves capable of truly participating in rights discourse. This is not to say that Narveson 
believes that children are not privy to the benefits of rights; rather, Narveson suggests that, as 
‘moral patients’ children require adult agents to make agreements on their behalf regarding 
the entitlements from which they will benefit – a position that, for many (outside of the 
liberationists) is non-controversial and widely accepted. 
Narveson’s second claim – that the concept of children’s rights is fraudulent – is more 
thought-provoking and controversial. He bases this claim on his rejection of the standard 
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intuition that children will somehow benefit from the social decision-making invoked when 
the language of rights is engaged. According to Narveson, children do not belong somehow 
to society; children belong to their parents, and it is only their parents who should be 
involved when decisions need to be made regarding their lives. He argues that parents 
usually know their own children best. They are usually in the best position to act in the best 
interests of their own children. Moreover, they are usually the most motivated to do so 
because of the nurturing bond which usually exists be ween parent and child. For Narveson, 
the more distant the adult/child relationship, the more likely the best interests of the child will 
be replaced by more efficient utilitarian calculations which maximize the benefits to society, 
rather than the benefits to the child or to the family. 
In the case of education, Narveson rejects the typical intuition that state-sponsored 
education is the best way to secure a child’s educational needs.  For Narveson, not only is 
state-sponsored education too costly to support and sustain as a public service for all, but it 
represents a violation of the parents’ fundamental right to liberty as well: 
Some liberals, now known as ‘libertarians,’ hold that the right to liberty is the only 
fundamental right there is, and thus that respecting people’s liberty is the only 
fundamental duty of ethics. Those theorists hold that e right of private property is a 
fundamental entailment of this right to liberty. And some libertarians, in turn, regard 
children as, at least initially, the property of their parents. The right to educate one’s 
child is therefore, in their view a property right, and the presumption to force your 
child to learn something other than what you judge he or she ought to learn is 
contrary to your basic right to do with this item of property what you will.139 
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Although this seems to be a very strong and controversial position to take, Narveson is not 
suggesting that he believes that children should not be formally educated (as the liberationist 
does), or that he believes that the decision whether to ducate children at all should simply be 
left in the hands of the parents. On the contrary, he fully endorses the many benefits gained 
by having a formal education, both for the individual to be educated and for the society in 
which the child will ultimately become a participating member. What he is interested in 
promoting by suggesting that children are the property of their parents, is that parents should 
have the right to be responsible for their own children’s education. They are responsible for 
creating the children and, as such, are the largest stakeholders (of course apart from the 
children themselves), something which the libertarian believes qualifies them as the most 
eligible to manage and direct their own children’s education. 
This is also not to suggest that he is arguing for wholesale paternalism. Narveson is 
careful to acknowledge that, although he claims that c ildren are the property of their 
parents, additional factors for consideration must come into play when it comes to accepting 
the responsibility of parenthood. First, Narveson recommends that “people should raise their 
children in such a way that those children do not become burdens on others.”140 He argues 
that, if respecting people’s liberty is the only fundamental duty of ethics, as long as parents 
are mindful of this liberty principle, they should be allowed to raise their children in a 
manner that best suits their own cultural belief system. Such a stipulation, however, could be 
interpreted in radically opposed ways. It could suggest that parents are responsible for 
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insulating their own child’s development so that it is in line with the values and beliefs that 
they share within their family and within their immediate community. On the other hand, it 
could suggest that parents are responsible to ensur that their own children’s autonomy is 
secured through an open reflection upon a wide variety of life choices.  
It seems likely that Narveson is interested in the latter, because he cautions – as the 
liberationist does – that it is easy to fall into the trap of the misdirected intentions of overly 
nurturing or overly protective parents. He refuses to commit one way or the other, however, 
by suggesting that only the parent has the right to make this choice because “children are, 
after all, a big investment in trouble and expense, and it is hardly surprising that people 
would like to see a return on their investment.”141 Nevertheless, despite this noncommittal 
stance, he is quick to add that ultimately it makes little difference because it will be the 
children themselves who decide anyway. They will either embrace or reject the path their 
parents first established for their development and education. He maintains that, no matter 
what efforts adults choose to undertake, children establish their own boundaries quickly and 
it is best to “leave parents largely in charge, to be shown right or wrong when their children 
emerge into the world as fellow grown-ups.”142 By asserting ambiguously that the right to 
educate children is a right to which parents are entitl d by virtue of being parents, however, 
does he endorse the idea that children should simply be eft to the mercy of their parents?  
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On Narveson’s own account, he does not unburden parents from educational 
accountability. He recommends, while parents are the first teachers, teaching is about making 
judgments – “judgments of intellectual merits of alternative ideas.”143 By recommending that 
the parents take control of their own children’s education, he is not recommending that 
parents have carte blanche in their role as educational directors. He is recommending that 
parents need to be able to seek out actively those individuals who are most interested and 
qualified to educate their children. For Narveson, if state-sponsored education is both a free 
and compulsory requirement that all children have to participate in, very few options are left 
for parents to seek out better or more suitable alternatives for their own children’s particular 
needs. By recommending this position, however, it seems possible to conclude that on the 
libertarian account, much of the child’s development is simply left to luck. By granting 
parents the exclusive right to be responsible for their own children’s education, the libertarian 
is effectively granting the parents the right, theoretically, not to educate their children at all. 
Moreover, by vaguely suggesting that parental choices make little difference over the child’s 
lifetime because ultimately the child will choose eith r to embrace or to reject the original 
choices which their parents have made for them, he seems to neglect the fact that the 
experiences to which the child is exposed to within e formative years are the most critical. 
The libertarian views Jan Narveson offers – to reject both the concept of children’s 
rights, and the UN claim that children have a fundamental right to free and compulsory basic 
primary education – are reflected in his belief that p rents, as the main stakeholder, are the 
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most eligible to act in the best interests of their own children. For Narveson, if parents meet a 
minimum baseline of non-violence and respect for others, they should be given as much 
scope in the development and education of their own children as they think appropriate. 
Beyond that, he suggests that any attempt to formalize education should be built on what the 
market allows, not on what the state deems to be nec ssary interference. With this belief, 
however, he seems to assume that parents will either automatically do the right thing, or 
more importantly be able to do the right thing. While Narveson may be correct to suggest 
that the state’s role in securing and protecting a child’s right to education is still open for 
debate, it seems that the more general question of wh  should be in charge of the education 
of children also remains an open question. 
It would be important to bear in mind that both theCRC and the ICESCR reflect 
similar assumptions about the need to protect children. These protective measures, however, 
are not there to assume that children are the property of the state. Nor are they there to 
diminish the child’s (or the parents’) right to freedom or choice. They are there to 
acknowledge the unique relationship which exists bewe n individuals who have interests of 
sufficient importance in their lives and other indivi uals upon whom it is appropriate to 
impose correlative duties for the satisfaction of these interests. What makes the nature of 
these obligations appropriate, however, is the ideathat they should not be allowed to 
supersede the relevance of the child having rights directly, regardless of parental status. 
When a rigid distinction is assumed between the librty rights of adults and the social 
benefits to which children are entitled, the unique relationship between adult and child is one 
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of dominance. Even if this dominance is established to be in the best interests of the child, on 
such a view it is possible to allow that the provision of basic primary education is an onerous 
responsibility which is optional. On the other hand, when it is understood that certain 
interdependencies exist between liberty rights and welfare rights, the unique relationship 
between adult and child becomes one of development. When this occurs, it is possible to 
accept that the provision of basic primary education is a responsibility, albeit onerous, that all 
adults have a duty to uphold. 
In Chapter 1, it was mentioned that Onora O’Neill has suggested that there is a 
common assumption that we have certain duties towards children to compensate them for the 
inherent vulnerabilities of childhood. These vulnerabilities interfere with a child’s ability to 
act on his own and, as parents and adults, we have a dir ct responsibility to protect children 
until such time that they can protect themselves. According to O’Neill, one way to do this is 
to accept, as the liberationist does, that children have rights – and that these rights can 
provide children with legitimate and enforceable claims against others. But O’Neill agrees 
with the libertarian that it is inappropriate to support the liberationist demand for equal rights 
for children. She argues that, when we take rights as fundamental in looking at ethical issues 
in children’s lives, we get an indirect, partial and blurred picture. She cautions, however, that 
when we focus only on perfect rights,144 as the libertarian does, there will be harmful gaps 
between the obligations adults have and the entitlements children are owed. The next section 
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will analyze O’Neill’s concept of rights and consider why protectionists like O’Neill want to 
reject children’s rights as fundamental, in favour f what she believes to be a more direct, 
concrete account of obligations which can assess and monitor the institutions set up for the 
benefit of children and for the fulfilment of their r ghts. O’Neill is interested specifically in 
those unique situations where a child’s fundamental rights might not be violated directly, but 
where the child’s vulnerability is also not taken into account.  
2.3. In Their Best Interests  
The previous two sections considered arguments both for and against children’s rights. 
Interestingly, both of these arguments profess to be representing the best interests of the 
child. The liberationist argues it is in the best interests of children to grant them a full 
complement of rights – equal to adults – to enable them to pursue freely their own 
development and education. The libertarian, on the o r hand, suggests it is in the best 
interests of the children to grant no rights to them directly at all – children are the property of 
their parents and, as such, will benefit from the rights parents have to act on their behalf. This 
section considers a third option which suggests it is in the best interests of the child to 
consider both – which rights children are entitled to and which agents are obliged to satisfy 
these entitlements. This third option comes from protectionists like Onora O’Neill145 and 
Laura Purdy.146 What distinguishes their position from both the liberationist and the 
libertarian is their desire to limit the scope of rights without eliminating rights altogether, 
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while at the same time recognizing there are noteworthy features which distinguish children 
from adults and, as such, demand certain protective measures. To do this, they recommend 
that, rather than confine this debate to the sphere of ights; it is in the best interests of 
children to focus on the fundamental obligations from which children’s rights are derived. 
Onora O’Neill takes a broadly Kantian approach to suggest that often reflection on the 
concept of rights is a matter of perspective. One could choose to consider this concept from 
the point of view of the rights of the recipient, or from the point of view of the obligations of 
the agent. O’Neill contends that, in most cases, it i  purely a matter of choice because these 
two points of view form a symmetrical ethical relationship. Much like the libertarian, O’Neill 
suggests that there are certain rights and obligations which can be both grasped and realized 
without difficulty. She refers to these obligations as universal perfect obligations. According 
to O’Neill, these obligations specify completely who is bound by the obligation and to whom 
the obligation is owed. Such obligations are universal because they are fundamental, that is, 
they are not derived from any other social arrangement or from any more basic claim. As an 
example, O’Neill suggests the universal obligation hat we all have to refrain from child 
abuse and molestation. O’Neill contends that such a laim is not controversial, just as the 
libertarian contends that her non-harm principle is not controversial. When it comes to the 
overwhelming majority of adult/child interactions, there seems to be a common sense 
understanding of the significance of the child’s right not to be abused, and of the adult’s 
obligation not to abuse the child.  
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A second set of outwardly uncontroversial obligations, according to O’Neill, are ones 
she refers to as special perfect obligations. According to O’Neill, these obligations also 
specify completely who is bound by the obligation and to whom the obligation is owed. What 
distinguishes this set of obligations from the previous set, however, is the fact that they are 
directed towards specific relationships like that of parent and child. As a result, these rights 
are not fundamental, according to O’Neill, because they are derived from these special 
relationships. But they are perfect nonetheless, in the sense that they must be performed. She 
refers to these as positive obligations because they are based on social conventions we have 
come to know and accept. As parents, we regulate our interactions with our children based on 
the social conventions for parenthood which exist wthin our society. Likewise as educators, 
teachers regulate their interactions with their students based on the prescribed social 
conventions for education. For O’Neill, when consider ng either universal or special perfect 
obligations as they refer to children, it is acceptable for the liberationist to use the language 
of rights and correspondingly for the libertarian to prefer the language of responsibility, or 
even just that of providing benefits. There is a third set of obligations, however, which 
O’Neill suggests requires careful scrutiny. According to O’Neill, this set of imperfect 
obligations calls into question both the liberationist’s desire to endorse rights over 
obligations, and the libertarian’s desire to focus on the responsibility which a parent has to 
take care of her property.   
O’Neill defines imperfect obligations as those obligat ons we have which may bind all 
agents but that are not owed to all children or even to a specified set of children. These 
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obligations are the result of certain contingent circumstances. As an example, O’Neill 
suggests the fundamental obligation we may have to b  kind to children or to interact with a 
child in a manner specific to the fact that the individual is a child, not an adult. In this case, 
O’Neill claims there are no rights-holders because these obligations are not directed towards 
all children (as in the case of child abuse), nor are they directed towards a specified set of 
children (as in the case of parent/child or teacher/ ild relationships). In both of those cases, 
the obligations are clear and specific. In the case of an imperfect obligation, as outlined 
above, however, O’Neill contends: “If there are any fundamental obligations that are 
imperfect in this sense, then there are some fundamental obligations to which no fundamental 
rights correspond.”147 When this happens, according to O’Neill, there is a responsibility on 
the part of agents to institutionalize these imperfect obligations alongside the special perfect 
ones to ensure that positive obligations will be formally recognized and enforceable. 
Consider the obligation to take care of children. Clearly, not all agents are obliged to 
take care of all children. Similarly, if you are not the parent of a child, you are not obliged to 
take care of that child. If you happened to see a child standing alone in the middle of the 
street, however, according to O’Neill you should feel compelled to do something for that 
child. Although you have not violated any of that child’s rights, nor are you directly obliged 
to respect those rights, according to O’Neill you still have an obligation to that child because 
as an adult you are in a position to do something the child cannot do for herself. With this, 
O’Neill favours the perspective of agent obligation over the perspective of recipient rights 
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because she claims that universal and special obligations have corresponding rights and 
therefore corresponding rights-holders which make these obligations, at least in principle, 
enforceable. She suggests that imperfect obligations,  the other hand, rely on the 
institutionalisation of these imperfect obligations to enable any kind of enforcement or 
realization. 
For O’Neill, when rights (rather than obligations) are held to be fundamental, one’s 
‘ethical vision’ is drastically narrowed, something that is particularly problematic for 
children. By stressing fundamental obligations instead, O’Neill contends that not only will 
the traditional benchmarks of universal and special rights continue to be recognized, but such 
an approach will also allow obligations to be identified “successively rather than requiring 
the identification of all obligations in order to identify any.”148 O’Neill concludes that having 
a model to identify obligations successively, or in turn, can address individuals who are not 
only rational but who are vulnerable and needy as well. While she agrees that the rhetoric of 
rights is an important tool for those who lack power, she cautions that children are not like 
other powerless minority groupings. Children do not suffer from artificially-produced 
dependence, or dependence resulting from their own choices; their dependence is real and 
does not result from their own free will. With real dependence come real obligations, not 
rights.  
Another protectionist who argues against the strict adherence to rights for children is 
Laura Purdy.  Where O’Neill is interested in challenging both liberationists and libertarians, 
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however, Purdy is most concerned with the negative consequences which will result if the 
children’s liberation movement to secure equal rights is sustained. In her book In Their Best 
Interests? 149 Purdy offers three potential consequences which could arise from giving 
children equal rights. First, like the libertarian, Purdy suggests equal rights could weaken 
appropriate parental authority. She makes this claim not because she believes that granting 
rights to children undermines parental liberty rights, rather, she claims that when one 
assumes that children are in need of liberation, the conventional asymmetrical parent/child 
relationship is weakened, such that the traditional legal ties which bind parent to child will 
lose their force. Moreover, she argues that the weakening of this relationship will push 
parents to be more reluctant to participate in the kind of training their children require for 
responsible and moral behaviour, and children (adolescents in particular) will be less likely to 
take their parent’s guidance seriously.  
Second, Purdy argues that granting equal rights to children would require the abolition 
of compulsory schooling. She expresses this worry because she believes that, if children have 
equal rights to adults, then they will have the right to choose not to go to school. She 
acknowledges that the liberationist is correct to declare that not all formal school 
environments are ideal, but she maintains that the liberationist’s solution to this issue is not 
ideal either. Purdy argues instead that compulsory public schooling is an essential component 
of a good society. She stakes this claim for the obvious reason that it provides a public safety 
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net for many children who, left to their own devices, would be unable to benefit from any 
educational experiences (self-directed or not). Furthermore, she stakes this claim because she 
objects to the liberationist’s suggestion that compulsory public schooling is coerced public 
indoctrination. On the contrary, for Purdy, the social values public schools are able to 
transmit to children are essential both for the child’s ability to ultimately function as an 
active member of that society, and for the benefit of society in general, “because their moral 
temperament has enormous consequences for the futurof society as a whole.”150  
Finally, she contends that, if children are granted equal rights, not only could children 
choose not to go to school, but they could choose t en er the workforce prematurely – a 
choice Purdy suggests which would not only rob children of their childhood, but which 
would force many children to accept menial jobs with few options for advancement, 
effectively ruining their futures. According to Purdy, the only way to correct the possibility 
of such negative consequences is to accept that there ar  morally relevant differences 
between adults and children which require different kinds of interaction, and an asymmetrical 
distribution of rights. This idea echoes the sentiments of the originators of the rights-for-
children movement, like the International Labour Organisation, who established the 
Minimum Age Convention to place legal restrictions on employers interested in hiring 
children under the age of 14. By making education a compulsory, government-sponsored 
activity for all children under the age of 14, according to both the ILO and Purdy, it becomes 
                                                     
150 Laura Purdy, (1994) “Why Children Shouldn’t Have Equal Rights,” in The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 2: 223-241. 
   
 
 100  
nearly impossible for employers to rob children of their childhood and of the benefits to be 
gained from formal education. 
The most obvious of these morally relevant differences between adult and child, 
which Purdy highlights, are physical vulnerability and instrumental rationality. Of course, in 
the case of physical vulnerability no one can deny that sometimes children require protection 
from danger and exploitation. It is the liberationist’s attack on the traditional conception of 
rationality, however, which interests Purdy most. She defines instrumental rationality as “the 
ability to judge what steps are necessary to attain a particular goal.”151 She challenges the 
liberationist claim that any dividing line between the rational and the non-rational is arbitrary 
and unnecessary, by suggesting that it is difficult to find any human space which is not vague 
or fuzzy. She claims that human interaction is replete with inconsistencies and incongruities, 
but that fact does not entail that one should refuse to set boundaries between what constitutes 
appropriate childhood entitlements, and what constitutes appropriate adult entitlements.  
While Purdy is not willing to fully endorse the liberationist’s demand for extreme 
equality, she accepts that accommodations need to be made for those children who are 
unusually proficient, as well as for those adults who are unusually deficient. And so, she 
prefers a model which incorporates “emancipation procedures” as a possible alternative to 
the liberationist demands for a wholesale distribution of rights, or what she refers to as 
“unearned freedoms”. Purdy recommends that certain estrictions on liberties, especially 
those directed at children, are warranted because certain things are unacceptable for children. 
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For example, she suggests the potential “mayhem attributable to certain liberties such as 
unrestricted gun ownership should suffice to justify their prohibition.”152 Other examples of 
appropriate restrictions on childhood liberty, according to Purdy, would include any rights 
that are based on the presupposition that the holder f the rights understands the 
consequences of choosing to exercise those rights – rights such as the right to vote, drink, 
engage in sex, choose medical treatment, or to commit to a binding contract.153 She is not 
opposed to the concept of freedom. She is opposed t the concept of freedom at all costs, or 
an uncritical glorification of abstract freedom whic  ignores practical consequences. Rather 
than accepting the liberationist claim that, in reality, children are no more irrational than the 
least competent adult, and so are entitled to equal freedoms, she contends that children are 
only entitled to a social environment sensitive to the degree of non-rationality that each child 
might possess. To this, however, she is careful to build upon the liberationist’s intuition that 
freedom is essential, by adding that the development of critical thinking is key to a child’s 
education and autonomy. “Critical thinking is something that should be introduced the first 
day of school and continued until the last: high-quality compulsory education (no matter 
what its precise form) would therefore guarantee children’s exposure to it.”154 For Purdy, any 
protectionist measures should bear this in mind and be careful not to over-nurture or over-
protect.  
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Both O’Neill and Purdy, in my view, correctly conclude that supporting and 
protecting childhood freedoms must be a gradual, developmental process in which children 
are granted greater freedoms based either on traditional age-based assessments or on 
competency-based assessments that connect rights to abili ies.155 Further to this, however, 
they both prefer to endorse a view which at times favours certain paternalistic protections 
over freedoms, even if that protection is seen as confining or oppressive. They claim that 
freedom will come for children if they are guided to make the right choices in their lives, 
including being required to go to public school for example. Where the liberationist contends 
that compulsory schooling stifles the child’s naturl curiosity and motivation to learn, and 
where the libertarian contends that the parents are in the best position to take care of their 
own children’s education, the protectionist argues instead that, given the nature of childhood, 
compulsory publicly-driven schooling is in the best interests of children. The protectionist 
correctly makes this claim on behalf of all children, not just the small minority of highly self-
directed individuals whom the liberationist position can address, or the highly motivated 
parents whom the libertarian position can address. For the protectionist, contra the 
liberationist, it is acceptable to limit the freedom f children in a way which would be 
unacceptable for adults, to ensure a certain quality of life over a lifetime. For the 
protectionist, contra the libertarian, it is also acceptable to place limits on the role that the 
parents can play. Parental autonomy can sometimes int rfere with the child’s ability to learn 
things because those things interfere with parental i terests/abilities. The protectionist 
suggests that for the child’s own development, as an individual, even parental interest needs 
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limits. But what happens when the values of parents cla h with those of the state? When 
deciding what is in the best interests of the child, which authority should have priority, 
parental beliefs or state obligations to maintain a stable society? 
A classic case in the literature which deals with this issue is the case of Wisconsin v. 
Yoder.156 In this case, the United States Supreme Court found that placing Amish children in 
compulsory schooling beyond grade 8 was a violation of the parental right to freedom of 
religion. As an isolated farming community with deep r ligious faith, the Amish petitioned 
for their children to be exempt from any compulsory public schooling beyond the age of 14 
(2 years short of the State minimum). While the Amish do not reject (public) education per 
se, they believe that their children only require enough formal schooling to prepare them with 
the basic skills for farming and with literacy for Bible reading. This Amish model of 
education is based on their belief that any compulsory public (secular) schooling beyond 
these rudimentary skills will weaken their own community’s faith and very existence.  
In this case (an in many subsequent cases dealing with the Amish), it was determined 
that the Amish children should be excused from the last 2 years of compulsory schooling 
based in part on two key questions – a threshold question and a balancing question. The 
threshold question asks whether the contested practice constitutes a real burden on other 
rights, in this case, the right to the free expression of religion. The balancing question asks 
whether there are also compelling state interests which could outweigh the need to grant 
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accommodations. By accepting that compulsory schooling beyond grade 8 was a real burden 
to the beliefs of the community in which these children belong, and by acknowledging that 
there was no compelling state reason to outweigh an accommodation, it was determined that 
a reasonable accommodation could be made in the best interests of the children involved. Of 
course, there is a further question lurking as to whether the religious beliefs of a parent 
should trump those of a child157 but as far as the child’s basic education is concerned, this 
decision is reasonable. It is reasonable because by nding their children to a public school 
for 8 years, the parents acknowledge and accept the importance of exposing their children to 
a larger community than their own immediate one despit  the risks that such an exposure 
might bring to their relationship with their children. Likewise, by accepting that extended 
compulsory schooling represents a real burden to the beliefs of the Amish community, the 
state recognizes the rights of its citizens to freedom of thought and conscience. 
While in agreement that parents play a vital role in the lives of their children, Purdy 
questions: if education is something to which children are entitled because it is in their best 
interests, what priority should be given to parental rights? According to the protectionist, a 
clear demarcation between rights as free choices and rights as protected interests might lead 
one to assume, prematurely, that overall parents should always be allowed to trump the rights 
of their children because parents can actively claim certain primary rights which children 
clearly cannot. In a case such as the Yoder one, for xample, Purdy concurs with the 
liberationist to suggest that, in the interest of pr tecting the ability of the child to develop her 
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own rationality, it is sometimes necessary to override parental autonomy. She strengthens this 
claim even further to suggest that, not only do children have a positive right to an education 
which provides them with appropriate knowledge about the society in which they live, 
children “have a duty to learn it, even at the cost of some loss of liberty.”158 Purdy concludes 
that accepting education as a fundamental social good to which all children are entitled is 
essential to ensuring that the child’s interests and full development are the primary focus.  
While the protectionist offers a broad, pragmatic justification for the obligations we 
have toward children and their positive right to education, her desire to favour ‘grown-up’ 
obligations, over the rights children have, seems puzzling. On the one hand, the protectionist 
claims to be defending the child’s place in society; on the other hand, the protectionist 
contends that the best way to do this is to focus on the adult’s role in the child’s life. 
Moreover, the protectionist does this by further specifying that if the role which the child’s 
parents adopt conflicts with the role that society adopts, then certain protective measures 
need to be in place to control the choices the parents are allowed to make as well.  
It is important to recall the motivation behind the cr ation of the CRC. Prior to the 
drafting of the CRC, many people felt that the ICESR represented an appropriate 
commitment made by the participating members to defend and protect both the autonomy 
and the social security of each of its members. In the case of children’s education, for 
example, the traditional view (as supported by the ICESCR) held, much like the 
protectionist’s view, that education is a social benefit that societies have an obligation to 
                                                     
158 Purdy (1992), 166. Italics added. 
   
 
 106  
recognize and support through official channels. Critics of this view, however, felt that, while 
such a document was an important advancement in the area of human rights promotion, it 
relied too heavily on particular kinds of social structures, which already recognized and 
supported a liberal, human rights-respecting worldview. 
In an effort to remedy this oversight, the creators of the CRC believed that, to address 
the needs and interests of all children, regardless of existing social structures, certain factors 
required more sustained consideration. Positive rights and obligations are important but, to 
address the needs and interests of all children (regardless of the social structures they find 
themselves embedded in) consideration must be given to the moral rights each child is owed 
as a matter of decent treatment independently of any external attachments. It is only after 
such moral rights are understood that one’s genuine obligations can be derived. Protectionists 
like O’Neill and Purdy establish a vitally important understanding of fundamental positive 
obligations. The CRC’s focus on the fundamental rights of children broadens this, however, 
not only to take into account the obligations of both parents and adults in general, but also to 
consider the rights of the child independently of whatever attachments he or she may have to 
those adults to be able to determine more effectively which authority should have priority 
when values or beliefs clash. In the Yoder case for xample, while it may seem on the 
surface to be a battle between parental rights and state obligations, the compromises which 
had to be made by both the parents and the state indicate that the authority which was 
ultimately driving the decision was that of the child’s right to an education which can prepare 
him for an individual life within the society in which he is embedded.    
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To recap, this chapter has considered three alternative rguments which address what 
is in the best interests of children outside of the standard blanket UN assertion that every 
child has a right to free and compulsory basic prima y education. The liberationist defends a 
position which recommends that it is in the best interests of the child to release her from the 
artificial 20th century concept of childhood, including the UN demand for compulsory 
schooling. For the liberationist, such a release is necessary to stimulate the development of 
the child’s own natural curiosity and desire to learn. The libertarian, on the other hand, 
defends a position which enables the child’s parents, not an ‘arbitrary’ state authority, to 
provide the education her parents believe to be corre t for her. In so doing, the libertarian 
argues the child will be able to benefit from the ‘natural’ desire of the parents to act on behalf 
of their own dependents. Finally, the protectionist defends a position which recommends that 
codified responsibilities, like the ones listed in the ICESCR for example, be put in place to 
protect and positively support a child’s claim to tangible material goods and obvious social 
benefits, including education. According to the protectionist, however, if adults are 
encouraged to recognize their fundamental obligations t wards children, then there is no 
need for the further stipulation that children have  human right to education. Ostensibly, 
each of these positions defend a best interests princi le; in so doing, however, they also place 
demands upon children and adults which might not feasibly apply to the circumstances of all 
children.  
In proposing a model of equal rights for all, the liberationist is imposing upon all 
children the duty to design and engage their own educational plan. In insisting upon parental 
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control of all decision-making directed toward their own children, the libertarian is imposing 
upon all parents the duty to be available (e.g. not dead), knowledgeable and economically 
qualified to secure an education for their own children. In demanding all agents recognize 
and act on their positive obligations, the protectionist is imposing upon all agents the duty to 
be altruistic or to ‘do the right thing’. All three of these positions are correct to suggest that 
children are entitled to certain considerations, including their need to have an education. On 
the other hand, all three positions fail to recognize something which the UN has been careful 
to recognize, namely that the child has an identity – one which will inevitably be tied to the 
child’s parents or guardians, and which also represents the child directly as an individual and 
as a rights-holder.  
Thus the standard, blanket UN statement that every child has a right to free and 
compulsory basic primary education, as supported by the CRC and the current MDG of 
education for all by 2015, is directed toward children and their need to be able to access a 
basic minimum education which is of benefit to them. Rather than isolate rights from 
obligations because children belong to a set of transitional or incomplete rights-holders, the 
UN recommends that, as members of the human family, children are entitled to certain 
human rights which are indivisible. It is correct to caution that children have a greater chance 
than adults do to harm themselves if left to their own devices, but it is incorrect to maintain 
that it is in the best interests of children to avoid r disapprove of a social context that 
progressively enables them to develop into independent, rational decision-makers within the 
communities in which they find themselves. For the same reason, it is correct to assume that 
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children have the right to develop progressively, but it is incorrect to maintain that children 
do not need the proactive assistance of others to guide this development. The next section 
will propose that, while some deliberate paternalism seems inevitable even prior to any 
discussion of children’s rights, securing a child’s right to education requires more than sound 
policy or sound intentions: sustained consideration also needs to be given to the role that 
children play in their own development. 
2.4. Beyond Paternalism – Children as Meaning-Makers 
The argument from paternalism stresses that children a  likely to do harm to 
themselves because they are vulnerable, uninformed and inexperienced. As the previous 
section outlined, it is common to believe that children are incapable of rational choice and so 
are incapable of promoting their own good if given liberty rights.  Proponents of this 
position, as seen in the protectionist position at le st, choose to favour instead rights which 
can be derived from fundamental responsibilities or obligations that fully autonomous agents 
can fulfill on behalf of their less autonomous depend nts. This position is often taken, 
however, under the assumption that while children may be ill-equipped today, they will 
inherit the world tomorrow and so it is in their own best interests, and in the interests of 
society in general, to deliberate on what would be appropriate adult/child interactions to 
ensure this transition can happen. If children willultimately become autonomous agents, it 
would be important to consider whether the intuition of the liberationist is correct to 
recommend that children are not just future-performers waiting for life to begin, but are 
capable of acting as meaning-makers in this development as well. With this in mind, this 
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section returns to the CRC and its stipulation thateducation is a fundamental human right, to 
determine what role the child should ultimately play in her own development.  
Recall the CRC and its demanding claim that a child’s right to education must meet 
the needs of three different interest groups: the sate, the parent/educator, and the child. 
While critics of a right to education correctly suggest that vulnerability and inexperience 
render children less capable of engaging their rights than adults, it does not follow that they 
do not have any rights or that they must relinquish their own rights to their parents or to the 
state. Similarly, recognizing a child’s fundamental right to education does not necessarily 
mean that the CRC recommends that children should be free to do whatever they are moved 
to do, either. It is possible to reformulate the traditional division of establishing either liberty 
rights or welfare rights into a model which recognizes a child’s fundamental right to 
education based on the need to provide both, as noted in section 1.3. Not only should 
education be recognized as a fundamental right to which all children are entitled, any desire 
to provide children with education is going to have to balance the need for societal/parental 
protection with the need for self-determination.  
Where the liberationist suggests that children should be completely free to govern their 
own lives, and where the protectionist suggests that c ildren require adult intervention until 
such time that they are capable themselves of governing their own lives, the CRC takes a 
combined approach to the liberty and the welfare of children. It fulfills not only the 
protectionist’s need to stipulate specific claims that children have against the actions of 
others (so that they can grow up) but also the liberationist’s need to allow children to 
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participate actively in their own development and growth. This emphasis on a child’s 
fundamental human rights, built upon a framework of rights-respecting education, recognizes 
that it is possible to grant liberty rights to children – but liberty in the sense of improvement 
or independence rather than liberation. As Ann Palmeri has suggested:  
Our problem here is not in ‘liberating children’ but what we often take the notion of 
‘liberty’ to mean. ‘Liberty,’ in the classical liberal sense, has meant the absence of 
external impediments. Yet, the other sense, deriving from that tradition, is the sense 
of being a person, meaning being responsible, having reasons, acting with intentions 
and purposes. We want a society that enhances the liberty of a person to develop 
(creatively) in the fullest sense possible.159 
 
The liberty that Palmeri refers to is essential to our understanding of what it means for a child 
to have a right to education. Recall that one of the stated aims of education in the CRC is to 
go beyond formal schooling to embrace the broad range of life experiences and learning 
processes which enable children, individually and colle tively, to develop their personalities, 
talents and abilities to live a full and satisfying life within society. To suggest that the right to 
education represents a fundamental liberty right for children is to suggest that children have 
both a right to grow up, and a right to help determine the direction of that development. 
Joel Feinberg offers a similar justification for a child’s right to grow up or to have an 
open future. He suggests that it is important to grant ights to children not only to protect the 
child from her own vulnerability, but also to protect the autonomy of the adult whom the 
child will become: 
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It is the adult he is to become who must exercise the choice, more exactly, the adult 
he will become if his basic options are kept open and his growth kept ‘natural’ and 
unforced. In any case, that adult does not exist yet, and perhaps he never will. But the 
child is potentially that adult, and it is that adult who is the person whose autonomy 
must be protected now (in advance).160  
 
Here Feinberg is arguing for children’s rights not because he believes in the liberation of 
children as children, or the protection of children as dependents, but because he believes in 
the autonomy rights of children as future adults. He argues, however, that where it is 
unacceptable to interfere with an adult’s autonomy and ability to make choices, when it 
comes to children a unique understanding of autonomy is required. For example, allowing an 
adult to become an alcoholic despite knowing that such a choice will ultimately shorten his 
life is an acceptable acknowledgment of that adult’s right to choose. In such a case, an adult’s 
autonomy prevents others from interfering in his present choices for the sake of protecting 
his future liberty. When it comes to children, however, Feinberg contends – in agreement 
with the libertarian and the protectionist – that different decisions are required to ensure that 
the child’s future liberty is protected prior to giving way to his present desire to make free 
choices. Despite this consensus, Feinberg contends hat children have rights nonetheless: not 
the full-fledged autonomy rights of adults that thelib rationist is demanding, rather, children 
have what Feinberg refers to as ‘anticipatory autonomy rights.’  
According to Feinberg, these anticipatory autonomy rights are necessary to place a 
greater moral weight on the child’s future than onewould place on an adult’s future. For 
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Feinberg, the need to distinguish between the significa ce of the child’s future and that of an 
adult is necessary to manage the free choices of children rather than simply accepting them 
(as you would with an adult) or outright rejecting them (as you would with an infant, for 
example). Children represent unique philosophical ch lenges because they are neither 
completely incompetent nor are they completely capable of freely making choices. To 
complicate this further, children pass through observable stages of development and it is 
important to take this evolving nature of childhood ability into account. Consequently, 
Feinberg contends that the only reasonable thing to do is to recognize the child’s “right to an 
open future” and to manage actively the autonomy that c ildren are granted throughout this 
process to maximize the potential life-choices thatwill be available when the child becomes 
an adult.  
To avoid what he refers to as ‘blameable paternalism’, he is careful to specify the kind 
of management to which he is referring. By ‘blameabl  paternalism’, he is referring to the 
notion of “treating the child at a given stage as if he were at some earlier, less developed, 
stage.”161 Feinberg recommends that, while there is a need to protect children from their own 
harmful choices, and while it is perfectly acceptable for parents in particular to act 
paternalistically, there is also a need to reflect on he degree to which the adult can interfere. 
For example, he suggests that coerced educational experi nces are not a violation of the 
child’s rights because attending school is essential to the child’s future well-being. On the 
other hand, he warns that educational experiences can be over-managed if anticipatory rights 
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are not taken into account. When this happens, as in the case of the education of Amish 
children, as raised by Purdy for example, Feinberg suggests that coerced educational 
experiences can be as confining as they can be broadening. According to Feinberg, 
cooperative partnerships between children, their parents and the state are necessary to ensure 
these anticipatory autonomy rights are protected and promoted, and that children are 
provided with an educational experience which is both neutral and flexible. More 
importantly, Feinberg warns, if these anticipatory autonomy rights are not protected and 
promoted, as in the case of fundamentalist groups like the Amish, “critical life-decisions will 
have been made irreversibly for a person well before he reaches the age of full discretion 
when he should be expected, in a free society, to make them himself.”162 For Feinberg, 
children’s rights represent their claim against others for an open door to the future. If 
Feinberg is truly after manageable paternalism, however, then why engage the language of 
rights for children?  
As seen in this chapter, both the libertarian and the protectionist provide valid 
justification for such an account and, by focusing o  benefits or obligations rather than rights, 
they seem to provide certain enforceable claims. Parents have a vested interest or an 
obligation to care for children, including the provision of education, and children are entitled 
to expect their parents and teachers will act on this duty. In the case of the protectionist, her 
claim goes even further to place certain conditions  appropriate parent/child interactions 
which consider not only the primary rights of the parents to parental sovereignty, but also the 
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secondary rights of the child to the provision of fair and accessible social benefits. Given 
such a view, it seems reasonable for the protectionis  to question: what is to be gained by 
granting liberty rights to children prematurely, provided parental obligation is understood, 
enforceable and supportable through the resources of the state? Similarly, it seems reasonable 
for the libertarian to question: why establish the ne d for positive rights at all, provided 
adults respect the non-harm principle and are free to do what they do best, namely, take care 
of their own property? 
Recall the standard definition of rights that was given at the beginning – a right is a 
justified claim on someone, or on some institution, f r something, which one is owed. On this 
definition, to have a right to education means children have a right to claim against others, 
namely adults, the educational opportunities which they are owed. In the case of the right to 
education, the claim to education is usually justified because there is a good reason for others 
to honour it, namely, that children will fail to thrive without an education. Recall also, to this 
standard definition of rights, it was suggested that a further stipulation could be made about a 
particular set of rights which go beyond social conventions to represent the uman rights 
each individual is owed as a matter of decent treatm n . These rights go beyond any 
particular attachments we might have within our day-to-day interactions, to represent more 
generally the standards for reciprocal tolerance and mutual forbearance in any human 
interaction. Feinberg’s demand for the child’s right to an open future, including an education 
that promotes the child’s self-fulfillment at every stage of her development, represents this 
same desire to go beyond social conventions to establish a more secure voice for children. 
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While it is true that Feinberg opts for the language of paternalism (albeit managed 
paternalism), he prefers the language of recipient r gh s over the language of agent 
obligations (which O’Neill and Purdy prefer) because only a stipulation of fundamental 
human rights can provide all children with a potential claim against others. Nonetheless, his 
desire to focus on the future life of the child places an undue emphasis on the maintenance of 
adult intervention. In Feinberg’s model, there is the danger of adults feeling compelled to 
‘shop around’ continuously for new experiences and opportunities just for the sake of 
maximal exposure, without recognizing why such maxial exposure is vital. Having an open 
future requires not so much being exposed to all ptions; rather it requires matching 
appropriate options to the unfolding of the child’s unique personality, talents, mental and 
physical abilities and social circumstances. 
Consider again the CRC and its demanding stipulation that the child, the 
parent/educator and the state should be actively engaged in mutually supporting an 
interdependent alliance. This document is compatible with Feinberg’s recommendation that 
children should be able to claim the kind of educational choices necessary for the protection 
of their own inexperience and vulnerability, not to mention for the promotion of the self-
fulfillment of the adult that the child will become. What the CRC offers in addition to this, 
however, is the idea that children themselves should be allowed to participate actively in 
decisions that will ultimately affect their own lives. The human right to education which the 
CRC stipulates fulfills not only the protectionist’s need to insist on specific claims that 
children have against the actions of others so that they can grow up; it also fulfills the 
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liberationist’s demand that, as fellow human beings, children should be allowed to participate 
actively in their own development and growth.   
Eugeen Verhellen has suggested that this nature of the CRC is what makes it a 
revolutionary document. It is designed to move legislators and lawyers to read it in eractively 
and comprehensively rather than article by article. No longer is the focus on particular 
positive or negative rights that a child may or may not have; the CRC addresses both the 
child as a child and as a child who will ultimately transition into adulthood. This provision, 
Verhellen suggests, brings “children back into society by recognizing them as ‘meaning-
makers’ – by recognizing their citizenship.”163 He argues that the near universal ratification 
of the CRC – the most ratified international human rights document – suggests that there is 
already a “geo-political social contract”164 at least in principle, to the idea that children have 
a right to education and that others have a responsibility to recognize this right. He adds to 
this that, to respect children as human beings and as legitimate rights-holders, what is called 
for is the establishment of not only rights to education but the establishment of rights t rough 
and in education as well.165 He recognizes that significant progress in the production of 
important policy documents and international laws have ‘guaranteed’ a right to education for 
many children, but he cautions that other obstacles166 stand in the way of their actually 
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realizing this right. Like Feinberg, Verhellen agrees that the right to education includes 
having one’s interests protected from the power of others by the provision of basic social 
welfare benefits, including education. Contra Feinbrg, however, he also suggests that the 
right to education must include having the opportunity to participate actively as ‘meaning-
makers’, not just ‘future performers’. Once this role f children is recognized, adults can 
move from a model of providers of education to a model of promoters of a child’s right to 
participate actively in her own growth and development.  
In her role as UN special rapporteur on the right to education, Katarina Tomaševski 
concurs with Verhellen’s observations:  
Mere access to educational institutions, difficult as it may be to achieve in practice, 
does not amount to the right to education. Rather the ight to education requires 
enforceable individual entitlements to education, safeguards for human rights in 
education, and instrumentalization of education to the enjoyment of all human rights 
through education.167 
 
Both Tomaševski and Verhellen recognize that a document like the CRC is significant 
because it provides a comprehensive statement of the role of the parents/educators, the state 
and the child in the promotion and protection of children’s rights. They also recognize that 
the CRC confirms the fundamental role which education plays in the establishment of these 
rights. They both agree, however, that it is essential to move beyond the establishment of 
official legislative channels like the CRC to address the kind of social context necessary to 
establish a right to education for all children.  
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 Obviously, it is not possible to do the impossible. If a child needs to pay to go to 
school and her family has no money then, clearly, she will not be able to go to school, even if 
there is full acceptance of her right to such an entitl ment. Likewise, if a government is in the 
middle of a civil war or a famine then, clearly, it will not be possible for that government to 
secure the funds for compulsory schooling, or to all w schooling as a public service to trump 
other, more immediately pressing, needs.  For Tomaševski and Verhellen, however, such 
realities do not diminish the fact that education should be viewed as a fundamental human 
right to which all children are entitled. On the contrary, it simply makes their claim more 
urgent. Nevertheless, saying that something is a fundamental human right, even if such a 
statement is found in a comprehensive and well-supported document like the CRC, does not 
make it a human right. 
Tomaševski has argued that respecting the right to education is a primary public 
responsibility, and she stakes this claim on the belief that, to realize education as a 
fundamental right, three things need to be considered: the denial of the right to education, the 
violation of the right to education, and the distortion of the right to education. Obviously, the 
denial of the right to education is an unfavourable obstacle which can be overcome by 
establishing and fully ratifying human rights codes, like the ICESCR and the CRC, which 
recognize the right of all children to basic primary education. Nevertheless, a right to 
education is not just about access. Much of Tomaševski’s work as special rapporteur focuses 
on developing what she refers to as a 4-A scheme of making education: Available, 
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Accessible, Acceptable, and Adaptable.168 Establishing that the right to education exists 
symbolically through national and international law is important, but, Tomaševski argues, to 
ensure that the right to education is as acceptable as it is accessible requires input from both 
an official institutional point of view like the UN and an individual point of view which 
comes from the children and adults who actually participate in the institution of education. 
People and resources make the difference, not abstrctions. There are ample cases where 
‘trophy laws’ exist but where individuals do not benefit from the principles stipulated in 
those laws. Mechanisms need to be in place to deal with those circumstances where the right 
to education has been distorted and where children’s rights have been violated by this 
distortion. While the CRC offers the most complete formal statement of this integrative 
approach to protecting not only the child’s right to access an education, but also to promoting 
the child’s right to take ownership of that educational experience, the CRC has not been 
universally endorsed. American non-ratification, in particular, remains an alarming 
avoidance of issues related to the rights of children. Chapter 7 considers Tomaševski’s efforts 
to deal with these distortions and violations in greater detail, but before this can be done, it is 
important first to consider the nature of social institutions. After all, education is but one 
social institution. The next chapter considers what kind of institutional structure should be 
dedicated to the provision and promotion of education for all – in particular, the kind of 
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structure which would be necessary to establish and support the kind of basic primary 
education to which the UN claims all children are entitled.  
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Chapter 3 
Rawlsian Social Institutions 
Education is a social institution which typically is established through a collective 
social desire to have civil and supportive societies. With this in mind, many societies 
traditionally view education (at least primary and secondary education) as a public service 
which adults and educators provide for children until such time that they outgrow their 
childhood vulnerabilities and inexperience to become contributing members of society 
themselves. And, as the first chapter of this dissertation highlighted, it is for this reason that 
the UN has claimed free and compulsory basic primary public education to be a fundamental 
right to which all children are entitled. This belief – that free and compulsory basic primary 
public education should be recognized and supported as a fundamental right – is not 
universally accepted, however, and, as chapter 2 highlighted, there are at least three 
alternative perspectives which argue, strongly, whybeing able to have access to an education 
is important for children, but not necessarily a right, much less a human right.  
For example, it was suggested that the liberationist’s interest in education is based on 
the intrinsic good which comes from having an education that is directed and supported by 
one’s own hand. For the liberationist, any interference in achieving this end – like the UN’s 
additional stipulation that education must be a compulsory, publicly-directed activity – has 
the potential to convert the intrinsic value to be gained from having access to an education 
into ideological indoctrination. Second, it was suggested that the libertarian’s interest in 
education is based on the belief that having an education will enable children to become fully 
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autonomous, rational individuals. For the libertarian, however, it is the sole responsibility of 
the parent or guardian to protect and support this privilege. Education is not something which 
can be equalized effectively within a publicly direct d institutional scheme. Finally, it was 
suggested that the protectionist’s interest in education is based on both the intrinsic good 
which comes from having an education, and the role having an education can play in the 
child’s future. The protectionist supports this claim, however, based on the obligations adults 
have to protect the vulnerable and the needy, and not, she claims, on the need to endow upon 
the immature certain fundamental rights. These rights, to the protectionist, seem unnecessary 
and potentially disadvantageous. For the protectionist, the prime reason for establishing a 
public institution of education is to transmit particular social values to the next generation of 
citizens.  
While all of these positions seem to provide thoughtful and committed accounts of 
why having an education is important for children, this chapter examines one further element 
necessary to understand what it means for a child to have a right to education. More 
specifically, this chapter is going to consider an element which none of these positions have 
looked at sufficiently – namely, the concept of a social institution itself. An understanding of 
the basic structure of social institutions is essential to reflect on both the UN’s ardent belief 
that free and compulsory basic primary pubic education is a social institution to which all 
children are entitled, and the counter-claims that, while education is certainly important for 
children, it is not something which should necessarily be either free, or compulsory, or 
public, nor perhaps even a justified entitlement. 
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One of the most famous and influential articulations  the concept of social 
institutions and the basic structure of society comes from John Rawls and his Theory of 
Justice.169 According to Rawls, the basic structure of society can be defined as “the way in 
which the major social institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign 
fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arise through social 
cooperation.”170 At the time of its publication, Rawls’ commitment to understanding the 
basic structure of society and his firm focus on moral and political philosophy – most 
specifically “his spirited defense of liberalism”171 – represented an important re-awakening in 
philosophy (at least within contemporary Western liberal theory), a re-awakening which 
secured Rawls a position as one of the most influential political philosophers of the 20th 
century. In general, his theory represents a pivotal shift from the view that society should 
maximize the general net benefit achievable by social institutions to one that should also 
secure the rights and liberties of all individuals to access those institutions.  
In particular, according to Allan Bloom, for example, the work of Rawls represents 
“the most ambitious political project undertaken by a member of the school currently 
dominant in academic philosophy; and it offers not only a defense of, but also a new 
foundation for, a radical egalitarian interpretation of liberal democracy.”172 What makes 
Rawls so important, however, is not the fact that everyone agrees with his theory, as Bloom 
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pointed out when he suggested, “the magnitude of [Rawls] claims, deserves to be measured 
by standards of a severity commensurate with its proportions.”173 Nor is Rawls’s theory 
important because all liberals agree with him either, as John Chapman pointed out when he 
suggested, “[Rawls’] theory has been and will continue to be criticized by both libertarians 
and egalitarians.”174 The work of John Rawls is pivotal, as Martha Nussbaum175 has noted, 
because he revived an interest in two age-old philosophical fascinations – what makes a 
society just, and how social justice connects with an individual’s pursuit of a good life. 
Although Rawls himself is somewhat silent on the topic of education, education is one of the 
primary social institutions which Rawls assumes is es ential to the development of a well-
ordered just society. Thus, to validate more completely the claim that education is a human 
right, it is important to understand both what Rawls suggests is required for a well-ordered 
just society, and how Rawls connects this notion of social justice with an individual’s pursuit 
of a good life.  
At the beginning of Justice as Fairness, Rawls describes four key contributions he 
suggests political philosophy makes to the discipline of philosophy in particular, and to 
social-political thought in general. First, Rawls takes the role of political stabilizer to be of 
primary importance. Rawls argues political philosophy lays this practical role in that it 
provokes reasoned reflection on what are often deeply disputed, hot-button political issues. 
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According to Rawls, such reasoned reflection enables us to look beyond the issue itself, to 
determine if some overlooked philosophical or moral common ground actually exists. In the 
case of the right to education for example, Rawls would argue that reasoned reflection may 
uncover a new space between the polarized debate of those who either defend or deny the 
child’s right to education.  
Related to this are three explanatory roles, which Rawls suggests are both informative 
and relevant to the primary desire for socio-political stability. First, Rawls argues, the 
theoretical space of political philosophy can orient or familiarize individuals with many 
possible personal and social ends which they pursue. Again, in the case of the right to 
education, Rawls would argue that political philosophy can provide an informative 
conceptual space to explore the scope of educational experiences necessary to enable both 
individuals qua individuals, to realize their own sense of a good life, and individuals qua 
citizens, to recognize their role in society. To this, Rawls adds that, with reasoned reflection 
and conceptual awareness, political philosophy can also encourage what he refers to as 
reconciliation. For Rawls, an understanding of how institutions ‘hang together’ over time is 
essential to understand two things. First, the ideathat it is never good simply to be resigned 
to the often discouraging and trying effects of the social institutions in which we might find 
ourselves engaged. Second, while acquiescence can be potentially risky, it may be possible to 
come to understand how these social institutions developed over time, and to accept these 
institutions as both reasonable and indispensable. With this notion of reconciliation, he is 
careful to caution, however, that it is essential to maintain a prudent level of reasoned 
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reflection to avoid a corrupt justification of the status quo in the name of rationality alone.176 
Finally, Rawls suggests that, within the discourse of political philosophy, it is possible to 
“probe the limits of practical political possibility,”177 to view society through realistically 
utopian eyes. Of course Rawls recommends this not because he wants to advance an ideal or 
perfect society, rather Rawls wants to establish a reasonably accurate account of what 
political ideals and principles a society would found under social conditions which are 
favourable to a decent social and political order, and yet still within the realm of actual social 
possibility.   
As already mentioned, education is not the primary focus of Rawls’ work. 
Nevertheless, education is one of the primary social institutions which Rawls includes as 
essential to the development of a well-ordered just society. For this reason, this chapter 
considers the Rawlsian model, of “justice as fairness” to illustrate how this Rawlsian 
framework might apply to our understanding of education as a human right. Section 3.1 
considers how Rawls applies these three explanatory roles of political philosophy in the 
development of his own theory of justice as fairness. Of course, these explanatory roles feed 
into Rawls’ primary assertion that, to institute fair social-political structures – even ones that 
have been ‘established’ to be just – these institutions must uphold a commitment to reasoned 
reflection or public justification, and not some form of authoritarian, or dictatorial,  or 
supernatural decree.178 Section 3.2 will analyze this notion of Rawlsian public justification, 
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to understand two things. First, to understand how this notion supports the Rawlsian claim 
that rational agents will opt for a risk-averse distribution of fair and equitable treatment: then, 
to understand how this notion can support the claim of an organization like the UN, which 
suggests rational agents will opt to support education as a human right as well. Finally, 
according to Rawls, the most fundamental idea in his concept of just social institutions is “the 
idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the 
next.”179 With this in mind, section 3.3 will examine the role Rawls, and Rawlsian 
supporters, assign to education within a just society, and what this role means for children 
and their rights. 
3.1. The Basic Structure of Society 
To begin, what does the basic structure of a Rawlsin just society look like? In both 
Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism,180 for example, Rawls states that he rejected prior 
political theories like utilitarianism, and its desire to maximize net social benefits 
exclusively, to move toward a theory founded on priciples of social justice instead. 
According to Rawls: 
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, a  truth is of systems of thought. A 
theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; 
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be 
reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For 
this reason, justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater 
good shared by others.181 
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Thus, for Rawls, any conception of a just society must be built upon two fundamental ideas – 
the idea of a well-ordered society and the idea that all individuals within such a society are 
seen as equally human (that is, entitled to the same basic rights and liberties as anyone else). 
With this in mind, Rawls suggests that, if we accept that societies are a mixture of different 
individuals with different interests and potential, then the principles of social choice, which 
govern a just social system, cannot be utilitarian alone. Rawls recommends instead that: “a 
just social system defines the scope within which individuals must develop their aims, and it 
provides a framework of rights and opportunities and the means of satisfaction within and by 
the use of which these ends may be equitably pursued.”182 For Rawls, then, a just society 
must reflect both the desire to ensure that no one is left to fall below a basic social minimum 
while, at the same time, it must provide individuals with as much social freedom as possible 
to achieve their own desired ends.  
To realize this just social framework, according to Rawls, the basic structure of a 
society must include certain stabilizing mechanisms or ocial institutions. For example, 
Rawls recommends that a well-ordered just society requi es: a political structure, legal 
protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private 
property in the means of production, and (monogamous) 183 families.184 He also recommends 
that these stabilizing mechanisms should be establihed, despite the inequalities they are 
                                                     
182 Rawls (1971), 28. 
183 In the original Theory of Justice, Rawls recommend that families be monogamous, an idea he later amended 
to include any form of family. See John Rawls, (1997) “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in The 
University of Chicago Law Review 64 (3): 765-807, especially footnote 60.  
184 Rawls (1971), 6. 
   
 
 130  
likely to create or permit. Rather than allowing social inequities simply to run their course, 
Rawls importantly suggests that societies have an obligation to develop a concept of social 
justice which avoids (whenever possible) morally arbitrary social inequities within these 
institutions. In the case of education, section 3.3 will show that much of the commentary 
Rawls does direct towards the institution of education is focused on the role education can 
play in achieving this end of reducing or eliminatig some harmful inequalities. It is also 
important to note that, while education is not often discussed in detail, Rawls assigns the role 
of primary educator to the family. In so doing, he recommends that “a central role of the 
family is to arrange in a reasonable and effective way the raising of and caring for children, 
ensuring their moral development and education into the wider culture.”185 
Following the work of thinkers like Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant, Rawls describes the 
basic structure of a well-ordered society as one in which the main political and social 
institutions fit together into one system of social ooperation. Rawls revived this 
contractarian tradition in the 1970s to suggest that any society built upon such a system of 
social cooperation could use this system to designate b sic rights and duties, and to regulate 
just distributions of the potential benefits to be gained through such social cooperation.186 To 
this, Rawls adds that the basic structure must fit within a general conception of justice – a 
conception of social justice where, according to Rawls, “all social values – liberty and 
opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect are to be distributed equally 
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unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage.”187 
This will be discussed in greater detail in a moment but, as Brian Orend has suggested, 
“Rawls asserts that it is a rule of rational choice to insist on certain bedrock guarantees for 
the worst position in society.”188 Rawls takes this minimalist understanding of justice as a 
plausible starting point for his theory, because he accepts this notion of justice as something 
which people have naturally – it is an essential elem nt of being human without which, 
Rawls argues, we would be incapable of such moral feelings as resentment and indignation, 
trust and affection.189  
 To further support his notion of justice, Rawls considers two concerns that such an 
intuitive appeal may raise: to whom is this obligation of justice owed, and what causes an 
average individual to adhere to this obligation.190 To answer the first question, Rawls 
recommends that justice is owed to anyone who is capable of a sense of justice. Of course, 
Rawls is primarily referring to self-interested rational agents but, ultimately, he suggests that 
all individuals are capable of a sense of justice and re, therefore, entitled to certain basic 
rights and liberties. Rawls leaves room for the inclusion of children for example, by 
recommending, “in the instance of children, one supposes that the capacity for a sense of 
justice is there and only awaits development.”191 For Rawls, children are “prospective 
citizens”192 and not merely the property of their parents, as the libertarian asserts. According 
                                                     
187 Rawls (1971), 54. 
188 Orend (2002), 83. 
189 John Rawls, (1963) “The Sense of Justice,” in The Philosophical Review 72 (3): 281-305. 
190 Ibid, 281. 
191 Ibid, 303. 
192 Ibid. 
   
 
 132  
to Rawls, “just as the principles of justice require that wives have all the rights of citizens, 
the principles of justice impose constraints on the family on behalf of children who as 
society’s future citizens have basic rights as such.”193  
To answer the second question, Rawls recommends (like other contractarians), that 
anyone who chooses not to abide by the principles of justice removes herself unnecessarily 
from certain essential elements of social or political nteraction – namely, friendship and 
trust. For Rawls, it is a matter of common sense to accept the principles of justice because it 
is reasonable to expect that adherence to these principles will lead to results which are 
advantageous. Moreover, it is irrational not to accept them. Rawls believes this to be so 
because he suggests that social interaction is full of situations where individuals have to 
coordinate their behaviour to arrive at the rules which define their interactions and which can 
determine both the benefits they can enjoy and the burdens they have to bear. Rawls 
famously yet controversially suggests, however, that, from these interactions, it is possible to 
arrive at two primary principles of justice by whic each (self-interested rational) individual 
ought to abide. Of course, the now famous principles of justice he recommends are: 
The liberty principle: each person has the same indfeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all. 
The difference principle: social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two 
conditions: first they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.194   
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By probing the limits of social bargaining, Rawls confidently asserts that these principles will 
be the result of “the considered judgments of competent persons concerning the justice of 
political and social institutions,”195 under favourable conditions. He makes this assertion 
because, along with the establishment of the principles of justice, he also establishes a 
contemporary version of the Hobbesian hypothetical pre-political bargaining device – what 
Hobbes called “a state of nature”196 and which Rawls calls “the original position” or “veil of 
ignorance”.  
Rawls devises the veil of ignorance to answer his main question: what is the most 
acceptable political conception of justice for specifying the fair terms of cooperation between 
citizens, regarded as free and equal and as both reasonable and rational?197 It is a veil of 
ignorance because the veil conceals any information that could possibly bias the selection of 
the principles of justice – such as social standing, gender, race, intelligence, natural 
endowments, religion, income, and partisan politica attachments.198 Rawls argues for the 
inclusion of this veil to ensure that the ground rules for the political institutions which form 
the foundation of the basic structure come from the reasoned reflection of individuals who 
are unaware of their own eventual social standing within society. Rawls assumes that, if 
decision-makers understand that there is a possibility they could end up in the least-desirable 
position, they will make every effort to make the least-desirable position at least minimally 
acceptable.   
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3.2. Public Justification 
As the previous section highlighted, Rawls begins with the basic concept of a fair 
system of social cooperation. From this, Rawls recommends that, when such a system of 
social cooperation is fully realized, the result will be a well-ordered society which not only 
protects, but also promotes, a basic structure built upon his two principles of liberty and 
equality. Given such a framework, it is possible to allege, as Allan Bloom does for example, 
that Rawls has simply described and defended the makings of a modern egalitarian liberal 
democracy. In fact, Rawls himself carefully stipulates that his theory is limited to a political, 
not metaphysical, conception of justice. More specifically, Rawls stipulates three features of 
the kind of political conception he takes to be most supportive of his claim to justice as 
fairness: 
While it is, of course, a moral conception, it is worked out for a specific subject, 
namely, the basic structure of a democratic society. It does not apply directly to 
associations and groups within society, and only later do we try to extend it to 
connect it with the principles of local justice and to cover the relations between 
peoples. 
Accepting this conception does not presuppose accepting any particular 
comprehensive doctrine. A political conception present  itself as a reasonable 
conception for the basic structure alone and its prnciples express a family of political 
values that characteristically apply to that structure. 
A political conception of justice is formulated so far as possible solely in terms of 
fundamental ideas familiar from, or implicit in, the public political culture of a 
democratic society; for example, the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation 
and the idea of citizens as free and equal. That there are such ideas in their public 
culture is taken as a fact about democratic societies.199  
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Rather than taking these stipulations to be a weaknss of Rawls’ theory, as Bloom does 
however, it is important to recall Martha Nussbaum’s suggestion that what makes the 
Rawlsian theory of justice so significant is its dual focus on just societies and on the 
connection between social justice and an individual’s pursuit of a good life. The notion that 
the Rawsian model represents a defence of liberal dmocracy, or even more robustly of 
liberal egalitarianism, reflects only the Rawlsian commitment to arrive at the political model 
which can best describe a just society. A full understanding of the value of the Rawlsian 
model (and of its importance to our understanding of education as a human right), however, 
also requires an understanding of the further Rawlsi n commitment to substantiate, through 
reasoned reflection and public justification, how the erms of fair cooperation governing free 
and equal individuals should be validated. According to Rawls, while it may be acceptable or 
intrinsically reasonable to believe that justice as fairness and political liberalism represent a 
workable political conception of justice, to have a public validation that it is so, it must also 
pass a test of reflective equilibrium.  That is, it must be supported by sound and resonating 
first principles and it must be able to demonstrate persuasively any good expected 
consequences of implementing the principles in practice.200  
According to Rawls, in the search for the most acceptable political conception of 
justice for specifying the fair terms of cooperation between citizens, regarded as free and 
equal and as both reasonable and rational, it is important “to work from both ends.”201 That 
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is, we need a workable method for determining the principles of justice to which all members 
of a society can agree and, in so doing, establish a set of principles which do not distort any 
member’s sense of justice in the process. Rawls importantly emphasizes the need to 
recognize that when discrepancies of opinion occur (and in modern pluralistic societies, they 
will) we must have two choices available to us: 
We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing 
judgments, for even the judgments we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to 
revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the 
contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them 
to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation 
that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our 
considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.202 
 
Rawls is not seeking Utopia.203 He is seeking an understanding of justice which reognizes 
(through public deliberation) that, from social cooperation, advantages follow. Moreover, he 
is seeking an understanding of justice which also publicly recognizes that, from these 
advantages, individuals (all individuals), should receive their fair share. Rawls cautions, “the 
most reasonable political conception for us is the on that best fits all our considered 
convictions on reflection and organizes them into a c herent view.”204 According to Rawls, 
however, this can only happen if two things occur. First, societies must recognize their 
obligation to develop a concept of social justice which avoids (whenever possible) morally 
arbitrary social inequities within the institutions they create. Second, societies must 
                                                     
202 Ibid. 
203 John Rawls, (1985) “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 
(3): 223-251. 
204 Rawls (2001), 31. 
 
   
 
 137  
determine what the most reasonable political institutions and policies will be through public 
justification, so that each individual recognizes, and accepts, these institutions and policies to 
be the best ones available to them: 
Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but argument addressed to others: it 
proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think others could reasonably accept 
to conclusions we think they could reasonably accept.205 
  
For Rawls, public justification is the best method t  resolve, or at least to sort out, the 
inevitable disagreements which will arise when individuals try to coordinate their behaviour 
for mutual advantage. By appealing to the need for each individual to have at least a 
minimally good life, Rawls can importantly recommend this notion of public justification to 
ensure just and fair principles and policies, and to ensure that these principles and policies are 
realized through reason, not coercion or force. 
In the case of the basic structure of society, for example, Rawls confidently asserts 
that most individuals would accept as political essentials those rights listed in a document 
like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – essentials like 
accountable political processes and institutions, ba ic civil rights and liberties, freedom of 
thought and conscience, and personal security. He ass rts this because he believes that any 
reasonable individual will recognize that there are certain common political essentials which 
must be in place to have at least a minimally decent society. To this, Rawls also confidently 
asserts that most individuals will agree to a minimum set of social essentials like those listed 
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in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – 
essentials like freedom from discrimination, an adequate standard of living, health care, and 
basic primary education. He asserts this because he b lieves that any reasonable individual 
will not be willing to risk themselves not having at least a basic minimum set of social 
essentials or primary goods from which to pursue fre ly the things in life they wish to 
pursue.206  
To endorse the so-called negative rights listed in the ICCPR, it seems intuitively 
correct to endorse Rawls’ confidence that most individuals would be willing to accept these 
rights and liberties, granted other individuals do the same. Moreover, as Chapter 1 suggested, 
to endorse a protected sphere which can grant all individuals personal freedom and autonomy 
to make choices about what is in their own personal best interest, typically, only demands 
that others not interfere with those choices. In the case of the economic, social and cultural 
rights listed in the ICESCR, on the other hand, this Rawlsian confidence seems more 
problematic. To endorse the so-called positive rights listed in this document is to endorse a 
commitment to an unconditional provision of the conrete benefits necessary to live a 
minimally decent life. And, according to Brian Orend for example, it is this requirement of 
provision which leaves many sceptical about both the concept, and the cost, of socio-
economic rights.207 Given that education is usually taken to be such a positive socio-
economic right, the next section considers if a Rawlsian understanding of social institutions, 
                                                     
206 Orend (2002): 82-87. 
207 Brian Orend, “Justifying Socioeconomic Rights,” chapter 1 in Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Claude E. 
Welch Jr. (eds.) Economic Rights in Canada and the United States (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 
   
 
 139  
and the role education plays within these institutions, and within our understanding of the 
good life, can provide sufficient justification for the UN claim that education is a 
fundamental human right despite this requirement of pr vision and its associated costs. 
3.3. Is The Claim To A Right To Education Reasonable? 
According to Rawls, everyone has both the capacity for a sense of justice and the 
capacity for a conception of the good. Rawls argues that, if a society treats all individuals as 
free and equal citizens, and establishes a basic stru ture built upon the principles of justice as 
fairness, they can use these capacities for mutual advantage to create a social infrastructure 
which can produce social benefits for everyone, and which can manage those benefits in a 
fair and equitable way. Rawls takes this to be the most reasonable model for the basic 
structure of society because, not only can such a model provide individuals with greater 
opportunities for a meaningful life, but such a model can provide societies with greater 
opportunities for ongoing prosperity and permanence as well.  
But, Benjamin Barber, for example, criticized Rawls and this desire to defend a model 
which encourages both personal ambition and social benevolence.208 For Barber, this 
blending of what he takes to be contrary ideals makes the Rawlsian theory of justice 
untenable, rather than reasonable. In response to this criticism, however, Rawls does provide 
one potential method for dealing with this seemingly noticeable incongruity. According to 
Rawls, his desire to blend ambition with benevolence is only untenable if one assumes that 
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individuals will come to mutually beneficial social rrangements spontaneously. Rawls 
recommends instead that, while the capacity for social justice may be inherent to everyone 
(and clearly there are many outstanding examples of altruistic individuals who place the 
greater good of society before their own immediate ne ds), it is something which requires 
development, development which must come from education nd experience. That is, 
“acquaintance with and participation in that public culture is one way citizens learn to 
conceive of themselves as free and equal, a conception which, if left to their own reflections, 
they would most likely never form, must less accept and desire to realize.”209  
For Rawls then, to maintain a fair system of social ooperation from one generation to 
the next, children must be seen as ‘prospective citizens’ in training, and their education must 
reflect and encourage the ideals of political justice. Rawls supports this need for formal 
education because he argues that only a public system of education can enable a child to 
develop both her own sense of worth and her own sense of citizenship. And so, Rawls 
recommends: 
The value of education should not be assessed solely in terms of economic efficiency 
and social welfare. Equally if not more important is he role of education in enabling 
a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this 
way to provide for each individual a secure sense of his worth.210 
 
Rawls concludes that a societal focus on education can lead to the obvious benefits of 
economic efficiency and improvements in social welfare. More importantly, however, he 
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argues education can enable a person to enjoy and to participate in the culture of her society 
as well. Ultimately, however, a societal focus on education can lead to the main benefit 
which Rawls suggests can be derived from participating in a public system of education – the 
ability to coordinate with others for mutual social advantage.  
While the Rawlsian emphasis on the importance of education may deal with how to 
develop citizens who are both ambitious and benevolent, and, in so doing, answer Barber’s 
criticism, we might ask: does this provision leave Rawls with a different problem – namely, 
an ongoing commitment to social indoctrination? Recall from Chapter 2, that the liberationist 
and the libertarian acknowledge that a socio-economic right, like the right to education, is 
nice to have when there is a feasible infrastructure o support it but, as a fundamental, 
publicly-administered right, it is both economically prohibitive and inherently unwise – 
especially if the motivation for claiming this is to create future citizens. For these critics, not 
only is a free public system of education expensive, but also a compulsory system of public 
education indoctrinates children into a particular system of thought with little room for 
choice, and the desire to grant the same opportunities to all leaves little room for excellence. 
Given such scepticism, how can Rawls maintain that,not only is education a public good, but 
basic primary education is a fundamental public good which should be provided to all 
children? Is Rawls correct to claim that this is the most reasonable understanding of the role 
which education should play within the basic structure of society, given the inevitable costs 
(social and economic) that such a role will entail?  
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To answer this question, it seems prudent to begin by suggesting that the 
liberationist’s belief that children should be allowed to direct and support their own 
education is, at the least, incomplete. Granting complete autonomy rights to children fails to 
account for the fact that children are inherently unable to provide for their own formal 
education (at least at the basic primary level). With this in mind, it seems that the 
protectionist’s assertion that, there is a responsibility on the part of someone else to bear the 
burden of this right which children are not capable of fulfilling themselves, seems correct. 
Thus, the opponent of the claim to a publicly directed and funded system of education 
should, at least, be willing to acknowledge there is a duty on the part of someone else to 
fulfill the child’s need for an education. Of course, such an acknowledgement fails to support 
the further claim that this responsibility should be realized through a public institution (as the 
libertarian has so forcefully asserted). Thus, to understand why a publicly directed and 
funded system of education is the most reasonable model, it is important to consider further 
the concept of the duties correlative to the realization of a child’s right to education.  
In Chapter 2, it was suggested that the protectionist offers a reasoned and reflective 
understanding of the obligations which adults have to care for and protect children. O’Neill 
and Purdy, suggest that it is the responsibility of adults to provide things like education for 
children. O’Neill and Purdy also recommend that, while children are entitled to certain 
positive rights, like the right to education, it is the obligations adults have with regard to 
these rights that ultimately ensure that children are able to fulfill their entitlements. From a 
strictly pragmatic point of view, this notion of obligation which ties children’s rights to what 
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the protectionist takes to be the more fundamental obligations of adults, seems correct 
because children, especially young children, are dependent on adults for their care and for 
their education. And as Rawls has noted, it is necessary to have a public system of education 
to ensure that children develop the skills and knowledge to participate effectively in 
society.211 As society’s future citizens, however, Rawls also notes that children have basic 
rights which impose constraints even on the family to act in such a way as to respect and 
fulfill those rights. To establish that the claim to a system of public education is the most 
reasonable claim, then, a broader understanding of both the rights children have and the 
duties adults have toward those rights is required. An , as mentioned in Chapter 2, this is a 
notion that both O’Neill and Purdy do recognize, despite the fact that they are reluctant to 
acknowledge children as independent rights-holders. 
As this chapter has already outlined, according to Rawls, the most important duty we 
have is to protect and promote the rights of all individuals to social institutions which are 
just. According to Rawls, this is achieved by first complying with and actively participating 
in public institutions, including one dedicated to education, which takes this into account. 
Beyond this, Rawls adds that we also have a duty to support, when it is feasible to do so, the 
institutional reforms necessary to bring about justice as fairness. It is not the institutions 
which create the rights (as O’Neill for example contends), it is the fact that human beings 
have certain unchallengeable rights that enables us to coordinate for mutual advantage to 
create social institutions. For Rawls, a public system of education is the most reasonable role 
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for education to play within society because it recognizes both the inherent rights children 
have to live a life of meaning, and the obligations thers have (including children 
themselves) to fulfill those rights and to ensure that through their fulfillment, society as a 
whole benefits.  
Recall from Chapter 2 that Joel Feinberg supports the claim to education as a 
fundamental right by pointing out that rights are not meant to be divisive devices necessary 
to protect the “demands for things the claimant desires.”212 Rather, according to Feinberg 
“rights give us control over other parties’ duties to us and (sometimes) over their duties to 
third parties.”213 According to Feinberg, it is important for children to have an acknowledged 
‘anticipatory autonomy right’ like the right to education, so that children can control (even 
indirectly through concerned secondary parties), the kind of education to which they should 
be exposed, to maintain an open door to their future.  
With this in mind, John Rawls, Joel Feinberg214 and James Nickel215 all recommend 
that the claim to public education is the most reason ble claim, because it addresses the needs 
of children, both as dependents and as “potentially r tional and autonomous creatures whose 
potentials need to be developed through education.”216  For Rawls, Feinberg and Nickel, 
rights must be seen as both claims to some benefit or freedom, and claims against some 
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agent to act, so as to make available a particular benefit or freedom. And, according to 
Nickel, it is reasonable to claim a right to education provided this claim is focused on, and 
limited to, the fulfillment of educational essentials like “literacy, numeracy, and preparation 
for social participation, citizenship, and economic activity.”217 Thus, the burden of the 
requirement of provision often associated with education becomes an exaggerated claim, 
provided the requirements for the fulfillment of a child’s basic right to education are not too 
demanding, economically or socially. After all, many countries prioritize military 
expenditures which far exceed any costs which may be entailed by the provision of 
appropriate educational resources necessary for basic literacy, numeracy and socialization. If 
one considers the difference between societies which only focus on the requirements of 
survival, and those which broaden this focus to include the minimum requirements necessary 
to lead a life of meaning, it is easy to support at le st the claim to basic primary public 
education. Clearly, the ability to read, write and socialize provide many significant and 
essential personal and social benefits for both children and society. Furthermore, as Nickel 
has pointed out, it is often the case that critics of publicly directed and funded basic primary 
education assert that providing education for all is too onerous because these critics only see 
the child’s claim as a claim to education. Nickel contends, however, if the child’s claim to 
education is considered to be both a claim to education, and a claim against some agent to 
act, so as to make available an education, then it is d fficult to deny that there is an obligation 
to respond appropriately to this claim. For Nickel: 
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Advocates and theorists of human rights have spent pl y of time defending the 
claims-to that human rights contain, but have devoted much less effort to developing 
accounts of claims-against. This is not surprising i ce dealing with the duty side is 
harder and less fun. It is harder because general duties are more difficult to justify 
than claims about the moral value of something. Andit is less fun because it deals 
with the production rather than the consumption side of rights, the side where people 
bear burdens rather than receive liberties, protecti ns, or benefits.218  
 
These burdens which Nickel refers to, however, are not the onerous burdens that have been 
suggested historically as a reason for neglecting certain socio-economic rights. As Brian 
Orend has commented, the costs associated with human rights are costs which we cannot 
reasonably avoid – “rights, to be made real, cost real time, effort and resources.”219 And, as 
Nickel has highlighted, education is not one of the most expensive rights from which 
societies can choose to support, but it is one of the most essential.  
For Rawls, Feinberg and Nickel, then, one reason to support the claim to education as 
a reasonable claim is the idea that adults have certain duties which they must fulfill on behalf 
of children to compensate for their inherent vulnerability. A second reason to support this 
claim as a reasonable one is the idea that particular adults (parents/educators) and institutions 
(publicly directed and funded elementary schools), have duties which they must fulfill on 
behalf of children to satisfy societal demands, and to foster societal cooperation. Most 
importantly, however, according to Feinberg and Nickel, echoing Rawls, the claim is a 
reasonable one because all children have rights to cer ain fundamental social and political 
essentials (including education) necessary for them to have a meaningful life. Moreover, for 
                                                     
218 Nickel (1993). 
219 Brian Orend (2006), 12. 
 
   
 
 147  
Feinberg and Nickel, as for Rawls, the claim is a re sonable one because there is a social 
obligation to ensure that these rights can be realiz d through fair and just social cooperation, 
and not simply through the caring actions of the benevolent, or the coercive actions of the 
powerful. Children are dependents, and educating children entails certain unavoidable costs, 
both economic and social, but, as this chapter has demonstrated, these costs do not negate the 
rights which children have to an education. Moreover, these costs should not be used to 
diminish, or somehow to downgrade, the claim to a fundamental right to basic primary 
education.  
To conclude this chapter, a Rawlsian framework recognizes basic primary education 
as the necessary link to increasing individual functioning and contentment within society. If 
individuals are happier and more able to interact so ially, not only are their lives more 
meaningful, but society in general is more productive and more connected. To suggest that 
the cost of providing free and compulsory basic prima y public education is too onerous is to 
fail to recognize these benefits and the role education should play in society. Moreover, it 
fails to recognize that, for certain social benefits to exist, they must be integrated with both a 
fair system of social cooperation a d a publicly directed and funded system of basic prima y 
education. Instead of asking if we can afford to prvide basic primary education as a free and 
compulsory public good and service, we should be asking can we afford not to – a question 
which the next chapter considers further.  
While a Rawlsian understanding of the role of education in society provides a 
justifying framework for establishing education as a public good, it fails to provide a 
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satisfying justification for why society in general should actively support the millennium 
development goal to achieve free and universal basic primary education for all by 2015. The 
next chapter considers how Thomas Pogge applies the Rawlsian conception of a just society 
to a global institutional framework to determine what the most reasonable role education 
should play in every society, not just a developed Western democracy. 
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Chapter 4 
Pogge’s Challenge to Social Institutions 
Thomas Pogge, like John Rawls, is interested in analyzi g social institutions. More 
specifically, Pogge is interested in establishing how such an analysis can be used to support 
cooperative social institutions, and to justify theneed for reform when these institutions are 
demonstrably unjust. To do this Pogge recommends that it would be beneficial to adapt 
Rawls’ theory of justice to the complexities of the real world – the real world, which is 
interconnected and global in scope.220 Pogge chooses to adapt the Rawlsian theory of justice 
in this way because, while he is in favour of Rawls’ account of our natural duty to remove 
injustice through institutional reform, he also wants to question how far our moral concern 
for social institutions should extend.221 That is, like Rawls, Pogge is interested in how we 
should assess the institutional framework necessary to provide and manage the primary 
goods and services which result from social cooperation. Further to this, however, Pogge is 
also interested in reflecting on this from a global human rights point of view. Given that the 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) to achieve basic primary education for all is also a 
goal which is global in scope, this chapter consider  Pogge’s rights-respecting model, to 
reflect upon whether the MDG to achieve free and universal basic primary education for all 
by 2015 is a reasonable and justified goal.  
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It is important to note that Pogge is most interested in how to achieve another 
MDG,222 one which focuses on the important and worthwhile task of cutting the world’s 
extreme poverty in half by 2015. Given such a focus, Pogge is often more ‘silent’ than Rawls 
on the topic of education specifically. Nonetheless, this silence is not an indication that 
education is not relevant to Pogge’s research, nor does it indicate that Pogge’s research is not 
relevant to our understanding of the role which education should play within society. While 
Pogge’s desire to reform unjust social institutions is not explicitly aimed in the first instance 
at the institution of education, clearly his overall approach is germane in this regard. 
With this in mind, section 4.1 begins with Thomas Pogge’s conception of human 
rights as moral human rights. This is followed in section 4.2 by a clarification of Pogge’s 
conception and analysis of social institutions. These Poggeian distinctions will be used to 
understand his unique approach to human rights, which builds upon the concept of Rawlsian 
reflective equilibrium to combine the libertarian desire to limit rights discourse to negative 
rights alone, with the protectionist desire to secure positive rights for all. Further to this, 
section 4.3 considers why it is important for Pogge to suggest that, with regard to the 
institutional reform necessary to achieve the MDG to eradicate poverty, we all have to 
recognize our responsibility to fulfill our negative duty of justice to ensure that the social 
institutions, in which we participate, are just. This chapter concludes by considering how the 
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second MDG of achieving free, and compulsory, basic primary public education for all by 
2015 nicely complements Pogge’s desire to fulfill the first MDG aimed at world poverty. 
4.1. Moral Human Rights 
In his book Making Sense of Human Rights223 James Nickel suggests that our current 
understanding of human rights is the result of the natural progression from the domain of 
theologians to the domain of philosophers and, finally, to the domain of lawyers and 
politicians. This is so, according to Nickel, because a claim to a human right is a specific 
stipulation about what is, and is not, permissible within a given society or within a given 
legal framework. Further to this, Nickel contends that, for such a claim to be enforceable, it 
cannot be tied abstractly to some vague characteristic of human nature or divine law but must 
be tied to minimum standards for the concrete evaluation of legal and political norms. 
After World War II, the UN established an international political movement to create 
laws to govern the unjust actions of nation-states nd to provide a mechanism, namely human 
rights, for individuals to be able to make claims against these unjust actions. For Nickel, this 
“political project, embodied in the contemporary human rights movement, aspires to 
formulate and enforce international norms that willprevent governments from doing horrible 
things to their people and thereby promote internatio l peace and security.”224 As mentioned 
in the summary of the creation of the UDHR in chapter 1, the UN created the UDHR as a 
human rights instrument designed to provide a standard against which the actions of 
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individual countries could, and can still, be held to account. Nevertheless, Thomas Pogge has 
also pointed out that, beyond these legal and political instruments, it “has come to be widely 
acknowledged that there are also moral human rights, whose validity is independent of any 
and all governmental bodies.”225  
According to Pogge, while Nickel is not incorrect to suggest that the creation of 
positive law can support the realization of human rights, this legal compulsion will be valid 
only if respect is given to moral human rights as well – only if, so to speak, the legal lines up 
with the moral. Pogge goes further, to suggest that the very phrase ‘internationally 
recognized human rights’ indicates this extra-legal sense of rights, which exist even outside 
of the UN’s framework for human rights law. This section focuses on this clarification, 
which Pogge makes regarding the important distinctio  that can, and should, be made 
between moral human rights and legal human rights.  
What does it mean for a human right to be moral? According to Pogge, to establish an 
internationally acceptable conception of human rights, including a universally acceptable 
conception of the right to education, “we should conceive human rights primarily as claims 
on coercive social institutions and secondarily as cl ims against those who uphold such 
institutions.”226 He does not deny the importance of the legal rights and enforceable 
obligations to which Nickel refers, but Pogge recommends that even “human-rights lawyers 
can acknowledge that the legal rights and obligations they draft and interpret are meant to 
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give effect to preexisting moral rights.”227 The importance of recognizing this for Pogge is 
not to chart a change within rights discourse – as Nickel does – it is to establish common 
links and ideas among the three concepts of natural law, natural rights and human rights, and 
to establish how these commonalities have contributed to our understanding of the moral 
notion of human rights. Pogge claims that, while it is noteworthy that the idea of natural law 
progressed to the idea of natural rights, which progressed again to the idea of human rights, 
what is more important is that each of these ideas sh res some key concepts regarding the 
nature of moral claims and social interaction. Among these is the idea that we stand in a 
certain moral relation to each other – a relation which is outside of any societal structure in 
which we may find ourselves – which make human rights claims unique and universal.  
This is an important distinction for Pogge because he believes that, if the legal 
dimension of human rights is emphasized over this moral dimension at least two 
complications will occur. First, Pogge contends that it is often possible to realize one’s 
human rights without the need to appeal to legal support to do so.228 For example, Pogge 
suggests that if an individual is able to satisfy his or her nutritional requirements 
independently, then his or her human right to an adequate supply of food has been satisfied 
without the additional need to call upon legal support to do so. It may be the case that the 
social structure is already set up to recognize and support the particular human rights of its 
members through a system of mutually beneficial social cooperation. Stressing the need to 
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legalize these rights, in a society where individuals c n already freely access these rights, is 
not only an additional step that is unnecessary for that society (except maybe for the 
lawyers), but can be potentially damaging as well, by establishing the need for costly 
bureaucracies and, in general, wasting resources on things which have already been 
established and enjoyed.  
The other complication, according to Pogge, occurs when a country drafts a trophy 
constitution that highlights all of the legal rights citizens are entitled to claim, but fails to 
enable all citizens actually to realize them – a complication Pogge extends even to countries 
which have established constitutions but fail to address the rights of all citizens within their 
borders.229 For example, it is often the case that countries have elaborate constitutions, 
outlining the details of the rights and benefits to which the country’s citizens are entitled, but 
these countries fail either to enforce these rights or to include those members who exist on 
the social periphery. In the case of educational laws, for example, Katarina Tomaševski, 
whose work will be discussed in detail in chapter 7, is driven by the fact that there are many 
cases where children are said to ‘have’ an education but the particular educational experience 
they are exposed to actually violates their human rights.  
An example, from Canadian history, is those Aboriginal children who were forced to 
give up their native language and culture to attend compulsory mainstream public schools.230 
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According to the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, it was believed that 
Aboriginal children could benefit from these ‘residential schools’ because it was deemed that 
public education held the greatest promise for natio -building. According to this Report, the 
minister of Indian affairs, Frank Oliver, predicted in 1908 that education could “elevate the 
Indian from his condition of savagery and make him a self-supporting member of the state, 
and eventually a citizen in good standing.”231 At the time, the government of Canada 
believed (or at least espoused) that by providing Aboriginal children with access to a 
residential school experience, not only would it be possible to build a stable and united 
nation,  it would be possible to provide Aboriginal children with the ‘same’ educational 
opportunities as all Canadian children. Unfortunately, however, as the Royal Commission 
was to uncover, these well-meaning intentions to provide Aboriginal children with an 
education were built upon four false assumptions – amely that:  
1. Aboriginals were believed to be inherently inferior and incapable of self-
government;  
2. Treaties were seen merely as bureaucratic memoranda of understanding, to be 
formally acknowledged but frequently ignored;  
3. Wardship was appropriate for Aboriginals, so consent was not always 
necessary;  
4. The concept of development could be defined by non-Aboriginal values 
alone.232  
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 156  
 
For both Pogge and Tomasevski, the significance of the human rights movement is severely 
threatened by the fact that assumptions such as these – made in the name of human rights –
are both possible and real. 
With these complications and false assumptions in mind, Pogge recommends that a 
human rights claim must not be exclusively limited o regulatory devices aimed at the actions 
of government officials to prevent them from doing horrible things to their people. Instead, 
human rights claims should be viewed as ethical guidelines aimed at the actions of all 
members of a society to monitor the design of the basic social structure in which all members 
participate.233 Moreover, according to Pogge, they should be ethical guidelines which can 
fulfill  both Article 25 and Article 28 of the UDHR specifically. Article 25 stipulates: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care. Article 28 
stipulates: Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.  
In light of this, Pogge suggests that, for a claim to be a human rights claim, it must be 
a vital concern relevant to humans, to all and only humans, and must be sufficient to 
outweigh other concerns which may also require action. In addition to the obvious stipulation 
that human rights are rights for humans, Pogge suggests that, if a claim is identified as a 
human right, then it is a claim that everyone should be able to make regardless of their 
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economic or social status. The external attachments, group memberships, or social 
conventions to which an individual belongs should have no bearing on the ability of that 
individual to make a human rights claim. Not wanting to establish an absolutely egalitarian 
understanding of human rights, however, Pogge suggests further that he does not mean to 
exclude certain permissible biases. That is, while it is important to the concept of human 
rights that we should treat everyone with equal consideration, it is also permissible, for 
example, for an adult to respect the rights of all children while at the same time expressing 
greater partiality toward her own children.234 This partiality, however, is limited in that 
Pogge also recommends that, for a claim to be a human rights claim, it cannot be driven by 
particular moments in time, or by particular cultures or traditions. Moreover, human rights 
must be broadly understandable and applicable. Parochi l and narrow-minded approaches to 
social interaction would fail to meet Pogge’s criterion.235 For Pogge, then, human rights are 
not about fairness of treatment and consideration exclusively, nor are they about designing a 
specific way of life for all of humanity. Pogge’s realistically utopian approach to human 
rights represents a dynamic plan for the establishment of “a single, universal criterion of 
justice which all persons and peoples can accept as the basis for moral judgments about the 
global order and about other social institutions with substantial international causal 
effects.”236 
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In a desire to avoid the uncontrolled individualism which critics correctly charge some 
rights advocates with, Pogge is also careful to highlight what he claims is the ‘official’ nature 
of human rights. Where the liberationist in chapter 2, for example, was interested in simply 
securing equal rights for all to enable all individuals, including children, to be completely 
free to govern their own lives, Pogge is interested in establishing a criterion of social justice, 
which confirms the need for equal consideration within a reasonable social context. More 
specifically, for Pogge, human rights claims are ethical guidelines aimed at the actions of all 
members of a society to monitor the design of basic social institutions, and to protect all 
members from arbitrary violations as a result of the actions of others within that basic 
structure. According to Pogge, however, we do not classify every unjust action as a human 
rights violation. To claim that your human rights have been violated is a special and 
especially serious claim which should be reserved for certain specific kinds of unjust actions.  
One example that Pogge offers is the important distinction between having one’s car 
arbitrarily stolen and having one’s car arbitrarily stolen by one’s own government.237 
According to Pogge, the first violation of one’s pro erty, while unfortunate and a crime, does 
not qualify as a human rights violation. This kind of violation is simply a violation of the 
laws, which exist, in a given society for the protection of property. For such a violation, it is 
inappropriate to contact the UN to file a grievance. Usually, there are appropriate local and 
national legal remedies which must be exhausted before a human rights complainant can go 
to the UN to file a grievance. The second violation,  the other hand, represents a more 
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substantial violation because the individual doing the violating is in a position of authority, a 
position granted under the assumption that, in return for that authority, certain protective 
measures will be in place.  
In the interest of capturing a single, universal conception of social justice which can 
be accepted by all as the most reasonable foundatio of the basic structure of society, Pogge 
suggests that only a concept of moral human rights makes sense. With this in mind, however, 
he also suggests238 a further, but related distinction which needs to be made – the distinction 
between an interactional approach and an i stitutional approach. The traditional interactional 
approach within political philosophy takes human rights as constraints on the conduct of 
individuals or collective agencies. According to Pogge, this is the wrong approach for 
meaningful social reform. He claims this to be so because an interactional account is 
concerned directly with the criterion of ethical conduct of individuals and collective 
agencies, rather than with the degree to which the social practices and institutions, in which 
those individuals find themselves, are just or unjust. By claiming a criterion of institutional 
justice instead, Pogge claims he is able to develop an approach that, while ultimately 
interested in the ethical conduct of individuals and collective agencies, pragmatically places 
the burden of human rights fulfillment on the design of the social institutions in which those 
individuals participate.  
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Recall the desire to create, in the CRC, a document which avoids the divisive nature of 
negative and positive rights, in favour of a more inclusive language, which can be used to 
develop an understanding of what is needed for any child to have a decent standard of living. 
Recall also the Rawlsian desire to bridge this gap,through reflective public deliberation, 
between individuals who are both reasonable and rational. By focusing our moral judgments 
on shared social practices, rather than on individual ethical conduct as the proper content of 
human rights claims, Pogge also affirms a position between two extremes – between the 
libertarian account of negative rights and the welfarist or protectionist account of positive 
duties. When human rights are the focus of moral claims, Pogge recommends that the 
libertarian claim to negative rights can be inappropriately minimal because it allows us to 
ignore or disregard many human rights violations simply because our causal role in the 
establishment of those violations is not obvious.239 Similarly, Pogge recommends that the 
protectionist claim to positive duties can be inappropriately burdensome because it suggests 
that the affluent have an automatic responsibility to feed, save or rescue the impoverished, 
regardless of their causal role.240 Instead of linking his own view with either the libertarian or 
the protectionist, Pogge suggests that we need to recognize a manageable method to limit 
human rights claims while at the same time establishing a conception of human rights which 
is both meaningful and universal. The fact that an exact line cannot be established between 
the acts and omissions by which we should abide is unproblematic for Pogge. What is more 
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important for Pogge is to come to an agreement regarding the nature of human rights and 
responsibilities which can sustain “a near-universal conviction that the detrimental relative 
impact of our acts is morally more significant than the (equal) detrimental relative impact of 
our omissions.” 241 With this in mind, Pogge defines human rights thusly: 
Human rights are, then, moral claims on the organization of one’s society. However, 
since citizens are collectively responsible for their society’s organization and its 
resulting human-rights record, human rights ultimately make demands upon 
(especially the more influential) citizens. Persons share responsibility for official 
disrespect of human rights within any coercive institutional order they are involved in 
upholding.242 
 
This institutional focus of Pogge’s builds upon his belief243 that we must begin with the 
recognition of the personal and ethical value of human life to establish a broad range of 
possible options for a minimally worthwhile life. He claims that it is natural for most 
individuals to want a moral point of comparison from which to assess the social situations in 
which we find ourselves. Moreover, he suggests that this moral point of comparison is 
necessary to build a social structure, which incorporates what he deems to be the most 
essential presuppositions of just social institutions – namely the need to establish the right of 
all to liberty of conscience and to political participation.244 If this foundation, which he refers 
to as the formulation of an internationally acceptable core criterion of basic justice,245 is 
taken as the most reasonable option, Pogge contends that other basic fundamental rights and 
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freedoms can be secured – like the right to education – to establish a viable human rights-
respecting community. 
Following Rawls, Pogge suggests that consideration needs to be given to the basic 
structure of a society to understand how the distribu ion of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms affects the ability of a society as a whole t  determine the division of institutional 
advantages which result from social cooperation. Where Rawls included in his list of basic 
social goods things like basic rights and liberties, equality of opportunity, a minimal level of 
income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect,246 Pogge suggests a similar set 
including physical integrity, subsistence supplies (food, shelter, health care), freedom of 
movement and action, basic education and economic partici ation.247 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Rawls stipulates that it is how a society distributes these basic primary 
goods which will determine how just the society is and what the chances are of its members 
realizing at least a minimum standard of living. Pogge carefully nuances this idea, however, 
to suggest that, although Rawls frames his work on the concept of distributive justice, 
designing institutions which respect human rights is not just about redistribution of goods 
and services within a closed national boundary.248 Pogge claims that the importance of this 
Rawlsian vision of a just society is its focus on a dynamic plan for the future. For Pogge, 
however, this plan must include three things.249  
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First, it is important to recognize the Rawlsian idea that institutions should be 
responsible for maintaining the “fair value of political liberties”250 so that individuals who 
are similarly motivated and endowed can actively participate in, and appropriately influence, 
these institutions, and the social and political decisions which are made through these 
institutions. Pogge also suggests that it is important o recognize the Rawlsian notion that this 
should be based on first securing some advantages for the least well off. Most importantly for 
Pogge, however, it must also be based on a plausible conception of global justice, which is 
sensitive to international social and economic nequalities, as well as a reasonable 
assessment of how involved any individual’s moral concerns should be with regard to the 
nature of the institutions in which she participates. While he does not mention the relevance 
of education to this goal, it is reasonable to suppose that Pogge, like Rawls, assumes that at 
least a minimum level of basic primary education be made available for all. It is possible to 
make this assumption because Pogge recommends that: 
We have gradually come to understand how deeply the structure of our society shapes 
our conduct – not merely by determining in large part a person’s menu of options and 
the various incentives and disincentives attached to them, but also by influencing 
rather profoundly what interests, desires, and abilities persons develop in the first 
place. Moreover, human lives are increasingly interdependent, affecting one another 
through highly complex networks of interrelations.251 
 
With this in mind, it is important to understand what Pogge means for something to be a 
social institution.  
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4.2. Just Social Institutions 
For Pogge, social institutions are not specific corporations or agencies, rather they are 
social systems that have been designed to determine and deliver the appropriate level of 
goods or services deemed necessary, particularly by governing authorities, for the individuals 
within that society to carry out day-to-day activities and social interactions. He states: 
Institutions are a social system’s practices or ‘rules of the game,’ which govern 
interactions among (individual and collective) agents as well as their access to 
material resources. Institutions define and regulate property, the division of labor, 
sexual and kinship relations, control over and respon ibility for children, as well as 
political and economic competition; and how they govern how collective projects are 
undertaken and executed, how conflicts are settled, an  how social institutions 
themselves are created, revised, interpreted, and enforc d.252  
 
The most basic and fundamental of these institutions f rm the basic structure, or institutional 
scheme, of a society.  
Further to this understanding of social institutions as social systems, Pogge suggests 
that it is important to distinguish between what he ref rs to as the ‘ground rules’ and the 
‘institutions’. The ‘ground rules’ are the official rules, or conduct-guiding codes of values, of 
a particular social system. They form the foundation for the entire system. The ‘practices’ or 
‘institutions’, on the other hand, represent how these ground rules have been interpreted by 
and applied to a given society. To understand how a society has interpreted the ground rules, 
however, Pogge recommends that we have to do more than simply identify the basic 
structure of a given society. We have to understand he causal role that the basic structure 
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plays in determining whether an individual gets the objects of her vital needs, and we have to 
understand the implicit attitudes which make up the basic structure. With this in mind, Pogge 
carefully distinguishes between ethics and justice.  
Pogge’s conception of ethics is directed towards the traditional idea that ethics is the 
moral evaluation of the kind of life one should lead, or the kind of individual one should 
strive to be. His conception of justice, on the other hand, is directed towards the moral 
evaluation of the social institutions which inform and support human interaction. As already 
mentioned, Pogge favours a human rights discourse which emphasizes the moral nature of 
human rights but this emphasis is directed towards holi tically evaluating social institutions, 
not towards judging individual acts.253 This is important for Pogge because he believes that 
ultimately, it is the design of our social institutons which determine whether we get the 
objects of our vital needs or not. For Pogge, the need to strive to be a virtuous per on, or to 
strive to lead a virtuous life is secondary to striving to design and maintain just social 
practices. Pogge’s interest in shared practice rests in his belief that “social arrangements tie 
their members together through normative expectations that are based upon special ties, 
including moral ties, which define special rights and obligations, powers and 
responsibilities”254 – an observation which has led Pogge to base his conception of moral 
human rights on the need to focus on the ethical nature of social practices, rather than on the 
ethical conduct of individuals.  
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Pogge further divides his understanding of justice into passive and active justice. 
According to Pogge, when we analyze institutions to determine whether the prospective 
recipients are able to obtain the goods or services which a particular institution is responsible 
for producing or providing, we only gain insight ino the passive justice of that institution. 
Pogge contends that, to develop an understanding of both the causal role that institutions 
play, and the implicit attitudes which are upheld in institutions, we need to look beyond the 
partial understanding of rights violations to be gained by analyzing a society’s distributional 
scheme alone. To discern whether the institution itself is just or unjust, Pogge recommends 
instead that we should consider the active justice of a social institution. 
Pogge has a concern that many people, especially the powerful, are not motivated to 
change unjust social institutions. They do not find it morally compelling. According to 
Pogge, a more comprehensive understanding of both the rules necessary to achieve the best 
distributional scheme of goods and services, and the harms in which we participate in 
imposing upon others, would provide a more promising alternative necessary to mitigate 
unjust social institutions.255 One advantage Pogge offers for adopting this active sense of 
justice is that it helps to clarify which potential causes of harm should be judged as just or 
unjust. Consider, for example, a murderer who is killed randomly by a tiger. Under a passive 
conception of justice, it is possible to claim that such an act is a just act. But, in reality, it 
should be viewed as neither a just nor an unjust act. While it is possible to describe the death 
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as a tragic event, human hands did not cause the death, so it is not possible to classify it as a 
just act or just retribution for the crimes that the murderer committed; it is simply a random 
act of nature. Only the foreseeable consequences of intentional human actions and practices 
can be labeled just or unjust. Justice is (only) about our social world; it is not also about 
nature and the cosmos in general. 
A more significant advantage which Pogge offers for adopting an active account of 
justice is the possibility to reflect more accurately upon who bears responsibility for human 
rights violations which, in turn, allows for a more dynamic understanding of the complex 
nature of the types of social interaction which led either to the protection of human rights or 
their violation. This is a consequence which he suggests supports his justification for why 
human rights violations should not be judged solely by the distribution of goods and services 
to which individuals have access within a society. Human rights violations should also be 
judged based on the positive relational opportunities which a society can, and should, afford 
to its members.  
For Pogge the relational opportunities which social institutions are able to offer to 
their members are essential, not because he believes that social institutions necessarily shape 
us directly as a totalitarian state would, but because he believes that social institutions, 
regardless of the degree to which they have been lib ralized, exert profound influence over 
the social context in which we find ourselves immersed. With this in mind, however, Pogge 
expresses two worries about social institutions.256 The first worry concerns cases where 
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social institutions are entrenched but people still fail to get what they need, or that to which 
they are entitled. The second worry concerns the fact th t, often, the traditional conception of 
social institutions, or the basic structure of a society, is confined to a view with closed or 
national boundaries. This is a conception which inadvertently causes some people to be 
unaware of the impact of their actions on others, leaving Pogge to conclude that some – 
many – individuals neglect their duty not to interfere with the choices of others. Pogge 
suggests that this occurs for a variety of reasons, but one of the most significant factors worth 
considering is the concept of moral loopholes, which Pogge suggests have been built into the 
basic structure of most societies. 
According to Pogge, moral loopholes are commonplace within the existing social 
practices and institutions in which we currently participate. For example, it is ethically 
acceptable under many circumstances to choose to trat your own differently then how you 
would treat others. As already mentioned, Pogge himself suggests that certain permissible 
biases are acceptable to maintain a viable understanding of human rights to which universal, 
or at least near-universal, agreement can be attained. While group formation may be natural, 
and may provide people with a sense of belonging and v lue, the degrees of separation 
between the various groups also reinforce the distance between our moral concern for those 
who are in our direct vicinity, and those with whom we have no direct contact. We are at a 
distance from some people, and so we put them at a dist nce in our minds and concerns. But 
our actions can – especially in today’s globalized world – still impact upon these people. 
Pogge recommends that the only adequate method to deal with this natural tendency of 
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human thinking and of social institutions is to recognize that, while there are identifiable and 
important differences among social groupings, these diff rences are not absolute, nor are we 
so isolated that our actions within one social grouping do not affect another in some way.  
To move beyond the customary notion of ‘us versus them’, Pogge recommends that 
we need to break up such traditional aggregates to determine whether social groupings are 
genuine or merely superficial. That is, whether they are social groupings which have 
unconsciously developed as a result of meaningful social interaction or whether they are 
social groupings which have been artificially forged or artificially maintained. Once such a 
determination can be made, according to Pogge, it is easier to reflect on the possibility that 
rights violations are not only about the unjust disribution of the goods and services which a 
society has to offer to its own members. Pogge recommends that we also need to reflect upon 
how we structure our social institutions and moral codes, and how that structure interferes 
with our ability, and the ability of others, to apply these codes in any effective, or rights-
respecting, way. On Pogge’s account, it is no longer acceptable for countries to agree to 
disagree. The impoverished (and the illiterate and u schooled) masses of the world are 
entitled to have a proper justification for why human rights violations continue to be a 
problem for them.257 Moreover, those who participate in social institutions which cause such 
unjust effects have a duty both to understand the nature of their social interaction, and to 
participate actively in bringing about change in this regard.  
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Pogge suggests that we all have an obligation to rec gnize our negative duty of justice 
to refrain from upholding institutional structures which avoidably violate human rights. We 
have this obligation, according to Pogge, because “nearly half of all human beings alive 
today are living in severe poverty,” 258 severe poverty which he believes to be in many cases 
the result of avoidable human rights violations. While it is important to recognize that Pogge 
acknowledges the need for broad-based philosophical reflection on what a conception of 
severe poverty entails, he often identifies people living in severe poverty as those who lack 
secure access to adequate quantities of basic necessities like food, shelter, and medical care. 
To alleviate such extreme poverty, he recommends better access to these basic necessities for 
everyone, but he makes this recommendation based on the further need to compel some 
morally, particularly socially influential individuals, to avoid thoughtless approval of the 
existing institutional schemes, which seem to perpetuat , not alleviate, global poverty. Of 
course, for Pogge, this is in the first instance an economic issue but, as the next chapter 
suggests, it is more deeply seen as an issue of weakness of will, and/or of a severe shortage 
of social or academic awareness. The next section considers what relevant connections can 
be made between the establishment of Pogge’s abstract institutional approach and the 
practical desire to meet the MDG to achieve free and universal, basic primary public 
education for all by 2015.  
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4.3. What Role Can Education Play? 
To recap, Pogge takes human rights to be ethical guidelines aimed at the actions of all 
members of a society to monitor the design of the basic social structure in which all members 
participate. He approaches human rights in this way because he believes that it is ultimately 
the design of social institutions which determine whether people get the objects of their vital 
needs or not. As mentioned in section 4.1, Pogge stat s hat, “this institutional understanding 
can draw support from Article 28 of the UDHR.” 259 He chooses to emphasize this particular 
article because, for Pogge, it is more than just a finite list of what human rights there are; it is 
a simple statement about the concept of human rights tself which clearly establishes who is 
entitled to claim human rights, what kinds of rights should be considered as legitimate 
entitlements, and how we can measure their success. Again, Article 28 of the UDHR states: 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration can be fully realized  
For Pogge, this simple statement includes four key id as.260 First, Pogge endorses the 
reference in Article 28 to the UDHR itself, as a sufficient set of guidelines to assist us in 
understanding what it means for something to be a human right. He is not interested in 
establishing a definitive list of specific human rights, beyond what is found in the UDHR, 
because he is not so much interested in particular instances of human rights violations per se. 
Pogge is much more interested in (what he takes to be) the unique and universal moral 
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relationships which we have with each other, and in the benefits which can be derived from 
those relationships when they thrive. Second, he suggests that Article 28 is careful to limit 
the scope around which any institutional structure should be organized. This article does not 
stipulate the need for absolute guarantees to human rights fulfillment; rather, it stipulates the 
need to recognize the rights and freedoms which can be fully realized. Moreover, he suggests 
that Article 28 indicates that any declaration that a particular institutional scheme is a human 
rights-respecting scheme should be recognized only when the human rights of all of its 
members have been realized – an idea which, according to Pogge, is only relevant if the 
further stipulation of Article 28 (that everyone is entitled to a rights-respecting social and 
international order) is not just realized but also fulfilled.  
Pogge perceptively chooses to highlight this article because he advocates a universal, 
or near-universal, agreement that human rights are real and indivisible. Additionally, he 
advocates a conception of rights which is focused on the kind of rights that are not only 
essential to the survival and success of individuals, but also to the survival and success of 
societies. As already mentioned, Pogge chooses to combine the libertarian and the 
protectionist views to provide a more inclusive justification for the moral obligations we 
have to uphold regarding the protection of human rights. His interest in such a combined 
approach is not to present a utopian theory of ‘everything for everyone’; rather, he is most 
interested in establishing a more inclusive, morally compelling approach to human rights 
which neither demands individual rights at all costs nor demands responsibility for the 
provision of those rights at all costs. In so doing, Pogge wants to answer the question: “Have 
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we organized our moral commitments in a way that reflects, and helps effectively achieve, 
what by our own lights matters?”261 Moreover, he fine-tunes this query further by also 
questioning: “Can the fact that a morality gives ince tives toward regrettable conduct 
constitute at least some reason to revise this morality?” 262 Of course, his abstract interest in 
having a justification to revise ‘this morality tha gives incentives toward regrettable conduct’ 
is rooted in his genuine interest in the need to engage the institutional reform necessary to 
achieve the first MDG to eradicate poverty. He suggests that to do this, however, we all have 
to recognize our responsibility to fulfill our negative duty of justice not to impose severe and 
preventable harms upon others. 
Recall the distinction that was made in section 4.2 between what Pogge takes to be th  
ground rules of a society and what he takes to be a society’s institutions. The ground rules 
are the actual conduct-guiding codes, and the institutions represent how a society has 
interpreted these codes to varying degrees of consiste cy, success and sometimes perversion. 
Recall also that Pogge recognizes that, to bring about effective social change, there needs to 
be compelling reasons to do so. For Pogge, these rea ons need to be morally compelling, 
since he is interested in legitimate and long-lasting social change, not social change by force 
or coercion. With this in mind, Pogge’s institutional approach seems to offer a significant 
development in both our understanding of what makes n institutional scheme one which is 
rights-respecting and in our understanding of who should be held accountable to ensure that 
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social institutions are set up to respect human rights and to limit, whenever possible, 
violations of those rights. Nonetheless, has Pogge assumed too much? By accepting the 
UDHR as a sufficient base, or a sufficient set of gr und rules, from which to develop his own 
conception of human rights, has Pogge simply assumed a particular set of ground rules from 
which all societies are supposed to build their social infrastructure?  While Pogge does of 
course include education within his list of basic so ial goods, without an understanding of the 
role which education can, and should, play in this regard, Pogge seems simply to assume that 
individuals will be engaged and motivated by the UDHR as it stands.  The rest of this section 
considers how a more comprehensive understanding of the role which education plays in 
society can contribute to, and complement, Pogge’s d sire to establish mutually beneficial 
social institutions, and to modify those which are not. 
The MDG to achieve free and universal primary public education for all complements 
Pogge’s commitment to the kind of institutional reform necessary to eradicate poverty and 
transition to global justice, but advocates of thisMDG take the additional step of looking to 
the contributions which all individuals can make, including children. At the Dakar World 
Education Forum in 2000, for example, individuals and gencies committed to achieving 
education for all (EFA) included in their framework for action the stipulation that: 
Education is a fundamental human right. It is the key to sustainable development and 
peace and stability within and among countries, and thus an indispensable means for 
effective participation in the societies and economies of the twenty-first century, 
which are affected by rapid globalization. Achieving EFA goals should be postponed 
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no longer. The basic leaning needs of all can and must be met as a matter of 
urgency.263 
 
By recognizing that the basic learning needs of all must be met, supporters of EFA are not 
only suggesting that this stipulation is a matter of urgency for the needs and interests of 
children. They also make this suggestion in light of the kind of institutional reform to which 
Pogge refers. To achieve and maintain stable and cooperative social institutions, and to 
rectify those existing social institutions which seem merely to perpetuate social injustices, 
requires an unyielding commitment to the development, implementation and maintenance of 
every child’s right to basic primary public education. Moreover, it requires a commitment to 
an education which will not only provide children with the basic skills of literacy and 
numeracy necessary to make something of themselves in the world, but a human rights-
respecting education which will also enable children to make something of their citizenship. 
If Pogge’s assertion that the institutions a society d velops represent how a society has 
interpreted these codes, then the institution of education should reflect a rights-respecting 
foundation also. 
For Pogge, rights-respecting institutional schemes ar  those which – among other 
things – allow all citizens to participate, at least to some proportional degree, in the social 
decision-making process, and that provide all citizens with secure access to certain necessary 
goods and services for those citizens to do this in a meaningful way. As in the case of the 
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CRC, and its desire to promote both the liberty and the welfare of children to enable them to 
develop and grow into rights-respecting adults, Pogge also recommends such an approach in 
the realization of just social institutions. To develop and maintain just social institutions, it is 
necessary for individuals to have the freedom to participate in the social decision-making 
process, and to have access to the necessary resourc  to be able to do this effectively. Not 
wanting to assume a position which recommends that it is possible to design social 
institutions in such a way that everyone affected by the institutions has absolutely guaranteed 
access to all of the goods and services which they want, Pogge is careful to qualify that he 
advocates a concept of secure access (to be discussed in a moment). An important 
qualification which seems to be missing, however, is the need to connect the desire to 
promote the liberty and welfare of children (as stipulated in the CRC) with that of adults. 
Why assume that each group belongs to its own unique world, with its own unique set of 
rights and responsibilities? Why not assume, instead, that there is a continuum of learning 
and experience which needs to develop gradually over tim ? Not only do individuals require 
the freedom to be able to participate in the social decision-making process, they require a free 
and compulsory system of basic education which can develop the skills and knowledge 
necessary to participate in and maintain those just social institutions. 
With regards to secure access, on Pogge’s account, a person has secure access to the 
objects of her rights based on the degree to which she is able to obtain the social goods and 
services which are most essential to her well-being. Recall his list of basic social goods, 
which included physical integrity, subsistence supplies (food, shelter, health care), freedom 
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of movement and action, basic education and economic participation. To this list, he is also 
careful to recommend that an institutional scheme should be assessed on the degree to which 
such social goods are accessible, not on the level of actual goods that an individual receives. 
Most importantly, for Pogge, “a person has secure acc ss to the object of some human right 
only when she is not prevented by social obstacles from acquiring the knowledge and know-
how necessary to secure this object for herself.”264 Clearly, Pogge is interested in how 
deficits in social goods should be measured, but he is not interested in all deficits, nor is he 
interested in all potential harms that an individual can experience. It would not be possible to 
imagine, outside of ideal theory, an institutional scheme which did not experience any 
deficits or harms whatsoever. With that being said, however, the key to Pogge’s institutional 
account is the need to measure institutionally avoidable deficits to determine whether what 
he refers to as ‘core injustices’ have occurred.  
Depending on what the ground rules are, when a government official violates one of 
the main principles found within his or her country’s ground rules, individual citizens will 
likely experience harms against them. Likewise, when an individual is unable to obtain some 
good or service which that individual believes to be her entitlement, she will experience a 
violation of her personal well-being. A core injustice, however, occurs when some 
individuals neglect their negative duty of justice not to interfere with the choices of others, 
provided others do the same. To reiterate, according to Pogge, “human rights are not 
supposed to regulate what government officials must do or refrain from doing, but are to 
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govern how all of us together ought to design the basic rules of our common life.”265 For 
Pogge, the greatest injustice occurs when some individuals suffer from avoidable or 
foreseeable human rights violations. To prevent or at least alleviate core injustices, he 
suggests that it is necessary to accept that “human age ts are not to collaborate in upholding 
a coercive institutional order that avoidably restricts the freedom of some so as to render their 
access to basic necessities insecure without compensating for their collaboration by 
protecting its victims or by working for its reform.”266 Pogge contends that, if more 
individuals (particularly those from the wealthy West rn countries) recognize both the role 
which they play in contributing to core injustices and the role which they can play in 
alleviating these injustices, then achieving the MDG to cut the world’s poverty in half by 
2015 will become a morally motivating goal worth attempting to achieve.  
This focus on core injustices, however, address only the first stipulation which Pogge 
makes regarding the social obstacles which prevent an individual from obtaining secure 
access to the objects of her vital needs. To address th  further stipulation which Pogge 
suggests, regarding the individual’s ability to acquire the knowledge and know-how 
necessary to secure these objects for herself, requires recognition of the need for free and 
compulsory basic primary public education. Most individuals, despite what the liberationist 
claims, are unable simply to figure everything out n their own – even Rousseau 
acknowledged this. To achieve the kind of social reform which Pogge deems to be necessary 
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to alleviate world poverty requires both the economic infrastructure which Pogge emphasizes 
and an educational infrastructure which can prepare people for this task. 
Of course, economic resources are essential, and Pogge’s suggestion of a Global 
Resources Dividend (GRD) is intriguing. The GRD is a proposal by Pogge which posits that 
individual governments should not have absolute librtarian property entitlements to the 
natural resources which fall within their borders, because natural resources belong to the 
world in general, not to nation-states which have be n artificially created over time. 
According to Pogge, since the resources belong to everyone, everyone should be entitled to 
share in the benefits which can be derived from these r sources. To this effect, he 
recommends, all governments which would like to utilize or sell the natural resources from 
within their territory should be required to pay a small user fee, a user fee which would 
contribute to a global resource fund. Once established, this global resource fund could 
provide the global poor with a dividend or share representative of their own inalienable claim 
to a fair share of the economic benefits derived from the natural resources used. 
Nevertheless, even with this proposal for a GRD, Pogge himself expresses great concern over 
the traditional view which simply accepts the duty of the wealthy to deliver hand-outs to the 
needy.267 Providing individuals with a fair share of the natur l resources which should be 
available to all is one contribution which can be made to enhancing the lives of individuals, 
especially those who are impoverished. Providing a share of the knowledge-based resources 
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which we have collectively been able to ascertain and use to our advantage, is another. 
Therefore, Pogge’s suggestion that we all have a responsibility to recognize our negative 
duty not to interfere with the choices of others should not be limited to economic choices 
alone. 
According to Pogge, “fully one-third of all human beings still die from poverty-related 
causes,”268 a massive statistic, which Pogge suggests is at leas diminishable, if not 
avoidable. The MDG to cut the world’s poverty in half by 2015 represents the commitment 
of the UN to improve upon this statistic; Pogge urges that now it is important for everyone 
else to realize this commitment. While he recognizes that reducing severe poverty is not an 
easy goal, he suggests that it is a goal which is easier to achieve than reducing other sources 
of human misery (like violence due to military or despotic manoeuvres, for example). Why 
does he believe this to be the case, when it is posible to suggest that extreme poverty arises 
from a variety of sources which are inherent to each individual country, including civil strife, 
dictatorships, and poor governmental planning? It would be easy for a sceptic – especially 
one from a wealthy country, which is not suffering from extreme poverty – to question why 
his prosperity should be undercut to alleviate another country’s internal difficulties.   
In response to this, Pogge suggests that, while some extreme poverty is the result of 
internal impediments, it is possible to identify at least three major factors of note269 which 
international society as a whole has contributed to the problem of poverty. First, Pogge looks 
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to the massive grievous wrongs, which multiple countries contributed to throughout history, 
like slavery, imperialism and genocide.270 Second, Pogge suggests that wealthy countries 
should be careful when they disown the problem of poverty without first considering that we 
all depend on a single natural resource base. While it may be profitable in the short term to 
use freely the resources from a needy or corrupt neighbour’s country, sustainability should 
also be a consideration. Finally, Pogge suggests tha  we need to recognize that we coexist 
within a single global economic order. The social and economic transactions which we 
participate in on a daily basis have an impact which ripples throughout the entire world, a 
fact that is slowly becoming more apparent as advocates raise our awareness of issues such 
as child labour, global warming, extreme inequities b tween the global rich and the global 
poor and, of course extreme inequities between the literate and the non-literate children of 
the world. 
With these factors in mind, Pogge concludes that there should be no further reason to 
deny the existence of the problem of poverty, and the role society as a whole plays in 
perpetuating this problem. The solution that he offrs, however, is not to assert that we have 
a positive duty to do whatever is necessary to reduc  extreme poverty. Nor is the solution to 
allow impoverished countries to demand just retribuions from wealthy countries for all 
grievous harms which have ever been committed. The solution which Pogge offers is a 
pragmatic one which he believes morally compels thoe in positions of influence to look 
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beyond the status quo to initiate global institutional reforms, and to motivate those in 
positions of need to actively participate in this transition to global justice. As previously 
mentioned, however, one factor which Pogge fails to account for sufficiently is the role 
which education can and should play in positive globa  institutional reform necessary to at 
least partially alleviate the inequities which Pogge has so clearly highlighted.  
According to Rhoda Howard-Hassmann, for example, the fact that “no international 
law obliged the West to protect human rights during its own era of economic expansion,”271 
can be interpreted both disapprovingly and constructively. Of course, the application 
(dominance) of Western norms upon much of the world has resulted in many grievous 
wrongs, including (most definitely) the ones to which Pogge refers. For Howard-Hassmann, 
however, this negative consequence has led to at least one positive consequence – namely the 
fact that not only has globalization sped up the process of capitalist expansion, globalization 
has led to a greater ability to resist the negative eff cts of capitalism. This is possible, 
according to Howard-Hassmann, because the process of globalization has enabled a 
‘leapfrogging’ effect for human rights. According to Howard-Hassmann: 
In the contemporary global society, oceans are crossed and centuries ignored as all 
sectors in the world engage in a giant debate about wha  human rights are or ought to 
be, what people from different parts of the world are entitled to, and who or what 
agencies are expected to respect or implement thoserights. Over the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans, the Mediterranean and Black Seas, human rights leap from developed 
to underdeveloped regions. Over the centuries of the irst Great Transformation, 
human rights leap to the Second Great Transformation. And as in the children’s game 
of leapfrog, the last are often the first.272  
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Where Pogge correctly identifies the need for persons t  share the responsibility for official 
disrespect of human rights within any coercive institutional order they are involved in 
upholding, Howard-Hassmann correctly identifies the ne d to recognize that this occurs both 
within trans-national institutions and corporations and in the form of ‘grass-roots 
globalization’. Pogge is correct to assert that the wealthy West should recognize and 
understand the impact that their actions have had on the both the world in general, and on the 
lives of those who inhabit this world. But, as Howard-Hassmann has pointed out, the world 
can also benefit from the networks and interrelationships which have resulted through this 
process of globalization – networks and interrelationships which in my view can be enhanced 
by advancements in rights-based educational reform. 
In summary, Pogge’s institutional approach to the promotion and protection of human 
rights is both thorough and commendable. He provides a comprehensive explication for the 
need to reflect on both social institutions in general and on the specific causal effects which 
we bring to bear upon those social institutions in particular. He also provides a morally 
compelling justification for why we should make every ffort to participate in, and to 
maintain, just social institutions, and what effect this kind of active justice-seeking 
participation can have on achieving the MDG to eradicate poverty. Moreover, Pogge’s 
conception of global social justice suitably addresses the concern raised in chapter 2, that, 
while it is important to understand the obligations we have towards others, such an 
understanding will only be applicable to all individuals, if there is also an understanding of 
why we have these obligations in the first place – namely an understanding of moral human 
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rights. Despite all that can be taken from the work of Pogge, he fails to provide an adequate 
account of how individuals, even influential ones, develop the capabilities to act on this 
knowledge. Rather than assuming that documents like the UDHR, and encouragement from 
‘moral leaders’, can provide appropriate guidelines and models to assist us in this endeavor, 
this chapter has suggested the additional need to look to the structure of educational 
institutions to determine what having an education ca  contribute to our ability to create and 
sustain just social institutions.  
Advocates of Education for All, recommend, first, the obvious need to secure the 
political will to bring about such reforms (as championed by Pogge), like securing full 
ratification of the CRC (including the US). They also recommend, however, that civil society 
should also be included as active, participating agents in these reforms. Such an approach 
requires a model for institutional reform which not only compels us to reflect upon the design 
of social institutions but which also compels us to reflect upon the capabilities that 
individuals have actually to contribute to just inst tutions. Before considering how the EFA 
has applied these ideas in practice, it is important first to consider the work of Amartya Sen. 
Sen, like Pogge, is interested in how to eradicate poverty, but he approaches this goal from 
the perspective of what individuals can do with the c oices and resources that are available to 
them. He contends that while it is correct to have concern for how certain institutional 
structures can deprive individuals of their means to well-being, it is equally important to look 
to achieving certain levels of basic capabilities, below which people count as “scandalously 
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deprived.”273 Sen suggests that: “The capability of a person corresponds to the freedom a 
person has to lead one kind of life or another.”274 If Pogge is correct to suggest that 
individuals should, to the best of their ability, ‘(re)design’ institutions which avoidably fail to 
fulfill human rights, then it is important to understand how it is that individuals come to be 
capable of acting in this way. Pogge is correct to challenge our understanding of the basic 
structure of society and to highlight the impact social institutions have on individuals. Sen, 
however, is equally correct to challenge our understanding of human rights, to suggest that, 
“any affirmation of social responsibility that replaces individual responsibility cannot but be, 
to varying extents, counterproductive.”275 The next chapter considers Sen’s solution to this 
problem of counter-productivity which he bases on his belief that, to understand one’s 
capability to act in a certain way is to understand the difference between what an individual 
values doing or being, and what capabilities or freedoms an individual has to achieve what 
she values. Where Pogge under-develops the role which education can and should play in the 
design and maintenance of just social institutions, the next chapter will demonstrate how 
Sen’s capability theory nicely complements Pogge’s institutional theory. That is, the next 
chapter will demonstrate how Sen integrates the need for children to have secure access to 
basic rights (like education) for which Pogge has forcefully argued, with the need for 
children to have secure access to the kind of educational experiences which will enable them 
to act on these basic rights.  
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Chapter 5 
Sen’s Challenge to Human Rights 
To realize the Millennium Development Goal to achieve free and compulsory basic 
primary public education for all, it has been suggested that at least two things need to occur. 
First, the right itself needs to be acknowledged as a right worthy of recognizing and 
supporting. That is, all rights have associated costs (even if they are minimal) which must be 
met for their realization. If a right is real, then the individuals, who have to bear the burden 
of the right, must be morally compelled to act in such a way as to enable the claimant to 
realize his or her claim. Second, for the right to be meaningful for the claimant, there needs to 
be a social context in which the claimant can do something with the right, once it has been 
obtained.  
As the last chapter indicated, valuable insight is gained by considering the importance 
of social institutions and the role that these institutions can, and should, play in securing 
rights for individuals. Rawls and Pogge have substantial contributions to make to our 
contemporary understanding. In particular, their approach provides a greater understanding 
of the role which social institutions should play in the creation and maintenance of a basic 
social infrastructure which is both mutually beneficial and rights-respecting. With regard to 
the institution of education in particular, their approach provides general insight into why we 
should be morally moved to recognize and support the right of every child to an education as 
an essential element of the child’s ability to develop both as an individual and as a member 
of a larger social whole. This chapter considers the work of another philosopher interested in 
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reforming social institutions, namely Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, to address the further and 
more specific task of understanding the social context which is necessary to translate the 
abstract claim that a child has a right to education into a claim which is practically 
meaningful for every child. 
Like Rawls and Pogge, Sen recommends that, “one of the characteristics of human 
agency is the ability to scrutinize and re-examine our values and priorities in the light of fresh 
information and new understanding. The process of institutional reform depends on such 
scrutiny and critique.”276 Where Pogge places the burden of institutional reform on the 
obligation of some to achieve secure access for all to a universal set of fundamental human 
rights, Sen recommends the additional stipulation that, while having these rights is essential 
to our well-being, they will only be effective in ifluencing our standard of living if 
individuals are in a position to do something with those rights. Thus, Sen’s focus is more on 
individual empowerment, as opposed to Pogge’s strategic plea to the powers-that-be. 
For Sen, one’s level of poverty can be identified in more than one way – most 
obviously, through the assessment of one’s ability to secure basic necessities. Most 
important, though, is the assessment of one’s ability to convert these necessities into 
meaningful action. Sen’s approach looks beyond the question of whether or not we have 
fulfilled our duty not to interfere with the choices of others to consider whether the choices 
that people make are genuine choices, that is, choices which will enable them to achieve 
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what they value. Sen claims that “a right gives a person a certain opportunity.”277 
Importantly, he adds to this a caution: “A right may be of no use at all to a person for various 
reasons.”278  This chapter considers some of the reasons Sen off rs for this distinction. In 
particular, section 5.1 considers Sen’s recommendation that, to understand the minimum 
standard of living below which no individual should have to exist, we need to look beyond 
rights, and beyond the provision of resources, to acknowledge that poverty is a much more 
complex notion of capability deprivation. That is, poverty is not just about rights violations 
and economic deprivations (as championed by Pogge), it is about any kind of deprivation 
which may stand in the way of an individual obtaining the things she both values and needs. 
By considering poverty in this way, it is possible to gain information which is intrinsically 
relevant to the realization of the two articles of the UDHR which Pogge has highlighted – 
Articles 25 and 28. Moreover, it is essential to understanding the inescapable connections 
between poverty and education. Thus, to implement fully a global human right to education, 
an understanding of what it means to be deprived of capabilities is essential.  
Sen recommends that a broader understanding of the capabilities necessary to convert 
rights into something meaningful provides the approriate metric from which to gain 
information about the fundamental rights and freedoms societies should support. Sen is 
careful to emphasize, however, that not being able to use effectively a right which someone 
has does not necessarily diminish the right itself; it merely points out that more careful 
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reflection is required, either with regard to the nature of the right, or to the nature of the 
individual’s particular situation.279 With this in mind, section 5.2 considers how a focus on 
human capabilities can influence not only whether someone has access to a particular set of 
rights, including a right to education, but whether those rights enable that individual to 
participate effectively within society – presumably the reason to want to recognize our rights 
in the first place.  
While an understanding of whether an individual cano vert her right to education 
into meaningful action is important and informative, it is also important to have an 
understanding of whether such an approach is sustainable. To this end, section 5.3 considers 
why the use of Sen’s capability approach can provide the proper content to a rights-based 
theory like Pogge’s, which not only allows for the effective realization of certain essential 
human rights, like the right to education, but which also allows for sustainable development 
of a rights-respecting social infrastructure.        
5.1. Human Capabilities 
Recall that Article 25 of the UDHR states veryone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, and Article 28 
states everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized. Recall as well that Pogge 
recommends that articles such as these become more plausible on his ‘institutional 
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understanding’ because he can avoid unwieldy claims to positive rights which everyone must 
somehow fulfill, while maintaining that “each member of society, according to his or her 
means, is to help bring about and sustain a social and economic order within which all have 
secure access to basic necessities.”280 Moreover, he strengthens this claim further by 
suggesting that Article 28 in particular identifies: 
The crucial human-rights-based responsibility in this world: the responsibility of the 
affluent states and their citizens for the global economic and political order they 
impose. This order is the key obstacle to the realization of human rights. Our 
preeminent moral task is to reshape this order so that all human beings have secure 
access to the basic goods they need to be full and respected members of their 
communities, societies, and of the wider world.281 
 
With this, Pogge presents a lucid and morally compelling justification for why we all have a 
responsibility to recognize and value certain fundamental human rights to which we are all 
entitled. Beyond this, however, it is necessary to give consideration to Sen’s important caveat 
that we need to distinguish what we value doing or being from the capability or freedom 
which we have to achieve what we value.282    
Sen’s qualification is significant because it is important to understand that we are 
inescapably affected by the social, political and economic opportunities which are available 
to us, as Pogge has so eloquently articulated. To achieve the kind of institutional reform to 
which Pogge refers, however, an understanding of how human agency correlates with this 
                                                     
280 Pogge (2002), 69 
281 Thomas Pogge “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities,” in Pablo de Greiff and Ciaran Cronin (eds.) 
Global Justice and Transnational Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 
282 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), chapter 2. 
 
 
   
 
 191  
institutional support is necessary. Where Pogge focuses on human rights and the effect 
realizing these rights can have on the standard of living which individuals can achieve, Sen 
carefully converts these rights into a notion of having capabilities to achieve personal well-
being and human agency. If we have real opportunities, according to Sen, we can achieve 
certain functionings or beings and doings which we value (like being nourished, being 
educated, or being confident to participate actively in one’s own social environment). Sen 
defines capability, then, as “the alternative combinations of functionings from which a person 
can choose. Thus, the notion of capability is essentially one of freedom – the range of options 
a person has in deciding what kind of life to lead.”283 With Sen’s definition of capabilities in 
mind, though, it is possible to suggest that having a certain amount of material resources 
available to you will also present you with certain freedoms from which to make life choices. 
What value is added by considering which capabilities an individual has over which rights or 
resources they have?  
An emphasize on capabilities or open-ended freedoms, in this way is important 
because not only is it important for individuals to be able to achieve a certain level of well-
being, it is important to be able to distinguish having a certain standard of living from the 
value which can be gained from achieving that standard. For example, Sen suggests that, if 
you consider two persons with identical functionings in a certain respect – they are both 
starving, say – the correct thing to do, if you are ble, is to offer them some food. If, on the 
                                                     
283 Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 10-11. Also Amartya Sen, “Rights and Capabilities,” in Amartya 
Sen, Resources, Values and Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1984). 
   
 
 192  
other hand, you discover that one person is starving because they live in a country that is 
experiencing a famine, and the other is fasting to make a political statement, how you 
respond to this additional information is significant.284 It is significant because only one 
individual truly requires assistance. Thus by understanding both the things which an 
individual values, and the freedoms which that individual has to achieve that which he 
values, more appropriate decisions can be made regardin  the kinds of assistance which 
should be provided to that individual.   
As already mentioned, Sen utilizes a conception of poverty which is not limited to a 
single economic dimension of an individual’s impoverished state. His is a much broader 
notion of poverty as an unfreedom, or as a lack of real opportunities, both in the form of 
personal misfortune and social constraints. He believ s this to be the case for a variety of 
reasons; most notably, however, he claims that a cap bility approach should be favoured over 
one which highlights, for example, income levels or resource allocation because such an 
approach can provide a broader informational base from which to ‘sensibly identify’ one’s 
level of poverty and the consequent aid necessary to address that poverty.285 Sen echoes 
Pogge in his belief that “the usefulness of wealth lies in the things that it allows us to do – the 
substantive freedoms it helps us to achieve.”286 Moreover, he shares Pogge’s desire to 
understand more completely the social infrastructure which is needed to make a positive 
difference in people’s lives. Sen argues, however, if more information is available to 
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determine one’s level of poverty or capability deprivation then, presumably, more 
information is also available to determine the leve of social infrastructure which is 
necessary. Where it is traditional to give consideration to the obvious rights which 
individuals are entitled to – like life, liberty and property – an understanding of one’s level of 
capability deprivation makes the need for a right to education or health care, for example, 
more obvious.  
In light of this, Sen argues, the unfreedoms which an individual may suffer from arise 
from two sources: inadequate processes and inadequate opportunities. For Sen, a theory like 
Pogge’s is essential for analyzing the social processes which we engage in, but it fails to 
develop fully the two-way relationship between processes and opportunities, which Sen 
believes to be necessary for effective human agency a d development. To establish this two-
way relationship, Sen differentiates his approach from other, more traditional, methods of 
establishing a public criterion of social justice. Where some focus on the primacy of income 
and wealth, or on subjective psychological satisfaction, or on procedures for justice, Sen 
recommends that we need to focus on a person’s freedom to choose from possible livings: 
[f]reedom is not only the basis of the evaluation of success and failure, but it is also a 
principal determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness. Greater 
freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the 
world, and these matters are central to the process of development.287 
 
As Sen points out, an understanding of an individual’s freedom to choose is important to be 
able to evaluate appropriately an individual’s, or group’s, well-being or standar of living. 
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This is so because an assessment of changes in income level, or in preference-fulfillment, 
may not be able to assess the value of those changes to the individual who experiences them. 
People often have adapted preferences, which might indicate that they are experiencing an 
improvement in their standard of living but which, in reality, reflect false improvements in 
their standard of living because these improvements bear no meaning on their actual situation 
or circumstances. A good example of this is the cas of Aboriginal children mentioned 
earlier, who in fact experienced an improvement in their standard of living based on the 
Canadian Government’s standards, but in reality, it was a false increase because they lost so 
much of the things which were of real value to their community. With this kind of a situation 
in mind, Sen argues that aggregative measurements of a ociety’s general well-being may 
hide or mask the reality of the individuals within that society. Moreover, blanket statements 
of the rights which individuals have can also hide or mask the reality of the opportunities 
which an individual has to act on those rights. At the very least, the rights talk only begs the 
further question of how to make rights real, and it is here that Sen can add importantly to the 
debate. To determine whether an individual is actually experiencing an improvement in her 
standard of living requires a general sense of societal well-being, an understanding of the 
norms to which the society aspires, and the additional information to be gained from 
assessing the real opportunities or freedoms which an individual has. 
It is important to note that the freedom Sen refers to i  not the same kind of freedom 
which the liberationists, as discussed in chapter 2, were attempting to capture. Sen is not 
interested in a notion of freedom built upon a complete lack of restrictions, or on the 
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exclusive desire for self-satisfaction. For Sen having an entitlement to a set of freedoms is 
not simply a claim against others for something which one is somehow owed, nor is it about 
demanding certain objects or services which others mu t provide. The conception of freedom 
which Sen wants to capture is based on his understanding that: 1) more freedom gives us 
more opportunity to achieve those things that we value, and have reason to value 
(opportunity freedoms); and 2) the process through which things happen may also be f 
importance in assessing freedom (process freedoms).288 According to Sen, both grounds give 
us reasons to value freedom. Beyond this, though, they give us reasons to reflect further on 
what we can do with the freedoms we have available to us.  
According to Sen, when one type of freedom is taken to be more vital, as in the debate 
between utilitarians and libertarians, the ability to make appropriate ‘trade-offs’ between 
what one values and what the system can allow is lost: 
To give unconditional priority to the demands of processes can be quite inviable since 
they could, quite possibly, lead to terrible effects on the lives of people, in which case 
sticking to them – come what may – would not be reason ble. On the other hand, to 
treat processes as not being relevant for valuation is also not very plausible since we 
do attach importance to processes and have reason to value the fulfillment of 
appropriate processes.289 
 
Sen argues instead that, for freedom to be a meaningful concept, these two features of 
freedom – processes and opportunities – must be allowed to share the same space to provide 
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individuals with as many ‘freedoms’ from which to choose as possible, given their own 
individual circumstances.  
Thus, Sen is not simply referring to Rawls’ sense of ‘ qual liberties for all’. Sen 
advocates a more robust concept of freedom which takes the “freedom of individuals as the 
basic building blocks of development”290 – building blocks which should integrate into a 
functioning whole the personal concerns which an indiv dual has regarding his own life with 
the general concerns of society. According to Sen, then:  
The capability perspective concentrates on what actual opportunities a person has, not 
the means over which she has command. More particularly, the capability perspective 
allows us to take into account the parametric variability in the relation between the 
means, on the one hand, and the actual opportunities, on the other.291  
 
For Sen, these “parametric variations”292 are the contingent personal and social 
circumstances unique to each individual. They are important, however, not because they 
represent the uniqueness of individuals; they are important because they can have an impact 
upon an individual’s standard of living of equal significance to the impact individuals may 
also endure from the more traditional constraints like deficiencies in income or commodities. 
As a result, these variations need to be accounted for, and addressed, within public policy 
intended to support the creation and distribution of socio-economic goods and services, like 
education. 
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Sen identifies five key categories of variation within the personal and social 
circumstances of individuals. First, there are what he refers to as personal heterogeneities, or 
the wide variety of physical differences which can be found in any given society. Sen 
includes in this group some obvious distinguishing features, like age and gender, which can 
have an impact on an individual’s opportunities andchoices. For Sen, the issue of gender in 
particular is most important to the question of educational rights as discussed in further detail 
in chapter 6. He also includes some more complicated physical differences like disability or 
susceptibility to illness which not only have an impact on an individual’s ability to obtain a 
certain standard of living, but which might not be fully correctable in any social scheme. The 
second group Sen refers to concerns the environmental diversities which may not be intrinsic 
to an individual, but which nevertheless can affect an individual’s well-being. In this group, 
he is referring to things like the ability to control one’s climate, severe disturbances in the 
weather, or the presence of disease or pollution. Third, Sen emphasizes that not only do 
environmental factors influence an individual’s ability to function in society, variations in 
social climate are equally influential. Within this category, Sen includes things like 
availability of educational services (which again is d scussed in chapter 6), public security or 
health care. Related to this, Sen offers a fourth se  of differences found in the general nature 
of relational perspectives in which we find ourselves engaged. In this category, Sen includes 
Adam Smith’s famous statement that to “appear in public without shame” requires different 
resources for different kinds of societies. For example, having a low income in a wealthy 
country might have a greater impact on an individual th n having an even lower income in a 
poor country. Finally, Sen suggests that there are distributional differences within families 
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which should be included within any comparative evaluations of individual advantage. For 
example, girls may have fewer opportunities than boys – like going to school – based on 
distributional factors which are specific within a p rticular family, but which may not be 
reflected in the larger social distributions.   
As already mentioned, for Sen, a person’s actual freedoms depend on two things: the 
kind of resources and goals he or she has; and the ability he or she has to convert these 
available resources into the achievement of those gals.293 According to Sen, the fact that 
such a wide-ranging set of parametric variations exi ts is both meaningful and informative – 
a feature which supporters of Sen’s capability approach, like Martha Nussbaum, have 
emphasized by suggesting that while “very closely linked to rights, the language of 
capabilities gives important precision and supplementation to the language of rights.”294 For 
instance, the desire to alleviate global poverty, or to reduce human rights violations by 
ensuring that everyone has secure access to an equal s t of basic goods, is only valid if what 
matters is for everyone simply to have primary goods. If, on the other hand, it matters what 
actual freedoms people have to use those primary goods, then the disadvantages, which can 
often be perpetuated due to noteworthy inequities in social and personal contexts, even if 
individuals have access to the same bundles of primary goods, also need to be taken into 
account. Sen’s recommendation to include the idea that “ he variable conversion rates of 
primary goods into capabilities can be quite crucial” 295 is clearly important to our 
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understanding of whether individuals can meaningfully convert their rights in general. More 
notably, however, it is important to our understanding of whether individuals can 
meaningfully convert their rights into the kind of action necessary to fulfill what Pogge takes 
to be our pre-eminent moral task.  
Recall Pogge’s claim that our pre-eminent moral task is to reshape the global 
economic and political order so that all human beings have secure access to the basic goods 
they need to be full and respected members of their communities, societies, and of the wider 
world. To achieve this task, and to avoid unwieldy and unpopular claims to positive rights, 
Pogge correctly and pragmatically emphasizes that we have a negative duty of justice to 
ensure that the social institutions in which we participate are just. Pogge is in fact critical of 
Sen in this regard because Pogge suggests that staking claims to compensation for greater 
needs based on inherent differences makes establishing positive rights and freedoms an even 
more controversial responsibility, which has the potential to become even less morally 
motivating for many individuals to want to recognize.296 Given Sen’s understanding of an 
individual’s ability to convert rights into capabilities, however, it is possible to argue (as Sen 
himself does)297 that, to fulfill Pogge’s desire to morally move ind viduals to re-design and 
reorganize unjust social schemes requires a further stipulation that this needs to be done in 
light of how social institutions correlate to human agency. Individuals must be able to judge 
how important a particular freedom or right is in relation to other claims or actions. 
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Similarly, individuals must be able to judge the extent to which they can make a difference. 
According to Sen, if individuals are given real opprtunities to develop capability sets from 
which they can make such informed choices, the two-way relationship between processes 
and opportunities can be realized. Thus by accepting capabilities as the proper content of 
rights, Sen’s theory nicely complements Pogge’s desire for an active theory of global justice.  
Without the inclusion of Sen’s understanding of the fre doms necessary for 
individuals to convert their rights into capabilities, Pogge’s desire to morally motivate 
individuals to recognize their negative duty of justice remains simply (though significantly) a 
prescription for what should happen to achieve a mutually beneficial just global society. 
According to Sen, though, while he is not suggesting that the capability approach can 
adequately deal with the process aspect of freedom on its own, it can provide essential 
information which is relevant to the assessment of the opportunity aspect of freedom. That is, 
for Sen, a theory like Pogge’s is essential for analyzing the social processes which we engage 
in, but it fails to develop fully the two-way relationship between social processes and social 
opportunities which Sen, following Rawls, argues is es ential to our understanding of what 
“the fairness or equity of the processes involves, or about the freedom of citizens to invoke 
and utilize procedures that are equitable.”298  
By considering poverty as a broader notion of capability deprivation, Sen’s capability 
approach provides additional validation for Pogge’s claim that we have a negative duty of 
justice to avoid interfering with the choices of others. Moreover, we have additional 
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validation for the kinds of social institutions to which we should collectively devote energy 
and resources. In particular, Sen provides important v lidation for the establishment of 
education as a fundamental right which is not only beneficial to an individual’s ability to 
have a life which that individual values, but which s also beneficial to influence that 
individual’s ability to convert other rights into positive action. The next section considers 
whether having basic human capabilities, like the capability to be educated, can further 
enable an individual to participate effectively within the society in which she finds herself.  
5.2. Effective Participation 
As the previous section highlighted, Sen firmly endorses a belief which favours a 
combination of individual agency and institutional support as essential to understanding both 
the role which society must play in aiding individuals to live meaningful and rewarding lives 
as well as the personal responsibility which indiviuals must also recognize in achieving this 
goal. This reciprocal relationship, according to Sen, is the most promising way to justify 
human rights as a viable mechanism for poverty allevi tion and positive human development. 
He, like Pogge, highlights the ethical nature of human rights, that is, the need for human 
rights to exist outside of tight political or bureaucratic boundaries. Sen also calls attention to 
the need to acknowledge that simply because a fundamental human right is not automatically 
realized does not mean that the right itself should be rejected or dismissed: 
Human rights can include significant and influenceabl  economic and social 
freedoms. If they cannot be realized because of inadequate institutionalization, then, 
to work for institutional expansion or reform can be part of the obligations generated 
by the recognition of these rights. The current unrealizability of any accepted human 
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right, which can be promoted through institutional or political change, does not, by 
itself, convert that claim into a non-right.299  
 
Thus, Sen, like Pogge and Rawls, recommends that there are fundamental human rights to 
which all individuals should be entitled and should have the benefit of, but the universality of 
these rights rests on public discussion or interactive processes. For Sen, a meaningful 
understanding of human rights, capable of actually modifying social circumstances, is the 
result of on-going open public discussion and debate, or what Sen (echoing Rawls) refers to 
as “global public reasoning.”300 For this public scrutiny to be effective, however, Sen 
cautions that advocates of human rights must accept that maintaining a ‘domain of continued 
dispute’ is not indicative of a failure of the theory behind human rights, it is an 
acknowledgement that: 
A theory of human rights can, therefore, allow considerable internal variations, 
without losing the commonality of the agreed principle of attaching substantial 
importance to human rights (and to the corresponding freedoms and obligations) and 
of being committed to considering seriously how that importance should be 
appropriately reflected.301 
 
This is an idea which Sen suggests highlights the need to reflect more seriously on the 
capabilities (and related educational opportunities) which individuals have to act or to 
participate in society, rather than on the rights or resources which are available to them.  
According to Sen, both good quality governance and community-based public action 
are thoroughly interdependent. He claims that, “therol  of the public is not confined to 
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influencing or challenging the decisions of the government. The agency of the public is also 
directly important in many fields of economic and social activity.”302 This is a notion of 
agency, which Sen argues demonstrates the two-fold nee to establish what resources people 
have, and to develop what they can do with those reources. Moreover, as already mentioned, 
it is a notion of agency which also seems to support P gge’s desire to fulfill what he deems 
to be the crucial human-rights-based responsibility – namely to reshape institutional schemes 
so that everyone can have secure access to the basic goods they need to be full and respected 
members of their communities. Not only does a focus on capability play an indirect 
economic role, through enhancing the choices available for people, a model that develops 
human capabilities like Sen’s also has direct relevance to the well-being and substantive 
freedoms of an individual. And it is these substantive freedoms which are necessary, 
according to Sen, if the ultimate goal is like that of Rawls or Pogge, namely, to have agents 
who can contribute to positive social change.  
With this in mind, it is important to recall the discussion on perfect and imperfect 
rights and obligations. On Onora O’Neill’s account, it was suggested that she posits the need 
to institutionalize our imperfect obligations so that there is, at least in principle, an 
enforceable understanding of imperfect rights to which we have a corresponding obligation 
to recognize towards others. Recall also that it was suggested that, while the work of Pogge 
improves upon O’Neill’s understanding of moral obligation by providing a more morally 
compelling account of human rights, he relies too heavily on the UDHR as the justification 
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for this account. Within this line of thought, Sen provides an argument for accepting rights as 
goals which not only contributes to Pogge’s morally compelling account for why we should 
act on our moral obligations, but which also provides the additional justification necessary to 
support Pogge’s rights-based position over O’Neill’s duty-based one:  
If rights are fundamental, then they are also valuable, and if they are valuable 
intrinsically and not just instrumentally, then they should figure among the goals. If 
rights-realizations are goals, then they can systematically enter moral calculations of 
anyone who can help. This is of obvious advantage wh n dealing with what has been 
called ‘positive freedoms’ (e.g., the right to medical attention, employment, etc., even 
the right not to be hungry.)303 
 
By matching fundamental rights to positive freedoms in this way, Sen offers a justification 
for our moral obligations which is not only instrumentally beneficial to institutional reform 
but which is also intrinsically beneficial to personal well-being.  
This is an idea which Onora O’Neill unexpectedly supports in her discussion of justice 
as it relates to women: “The weak risk recurrent injustice unless institutions are structured to 
secure the option of refusal or renegotiation for those whose capacities and opportunities are 
limited.”304 Rather than unconditionally endorsing Sen’s capability approach to secure these 
options, however, O’Neill maintains that an approach which can establish “which 
arrangements a plurality of interacting agents with finite capacities could consent to”305 will 
provide the most satisfying results. These results, according to O’Neill, can avoid the 
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relativist demand for oversensitivity to difference as well as the idealist demand to abstract 
that difference entirely away. As a result, despite acknowledging that her account of 
vulnerabilities is fully compatible with Sen’s account of capabilities,306 she arrives at a 
different conclusion. O’Neill concludes: “The most significant features of actual situations 
that must be taken into account in judgments about justice are the security or vulnerability 
that allow actual others to dissent from and to seek change in the arrangements which 
structure their lives.”307 This is a conclusion which reflects the suggestion, f und in section 
2.3, that O’Neill favours the perspective of agent obligation over the perspective of recipient 
rights.  She favours such an approach because she claims that, while the rhetoric of rights is 
an important guide for establishing what it is that individuals could consent to, meaningful 
rights claims require a corresponding ‘official’ understanding of the obligations which are 
involved. 
This slight diversion from the capability-rights debate is necessary to suggest that it is 
important to reflect on Sen’s suggestion that “responsibility requires freedom.”308 Both 
O’Neill and Pogge have suggested that there are certain responsibilities or obligations which 
some have towards others to ensure that avoidable violations of the rights or the well-being 
of others are not supported or allowed to proliferat . This idea is also reflected in Sen’s belief 
that “as people who live – in a broad sense – together, we cannot escape the thought that the 
terrible occurrences that we see around us are quintessentially our problems. They are our 
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responsibility.”309 Thus, Sen, Pogge and O’Neill all share the same beli f that the 
institutional structure of a society plays a profound role in determining whether an individual 
gets the objects of her vital needs. From this idea, they all argue that there is a moral duty or 
obligation to reform, to the best that one can, the avoidable wrongs in which one may find 
oneself engaged. Sen expands upon this even further by suggesting: “without the substantive 
freedom and capability to do something, a person can ot be responsible for doing it.”310 
Thus, by combining the ideas of these philosophers – rather than treated them as opponents – 
it becomes possible to recommend that we have certain obligations to assist others in 
achieving a certain standard of living, or level of security, and we have an account of how to 
engage actively the impulses and habits of the indiv duals necessary to achieve the positive 
social reforms which they recommend. All that remains is to answer the libertarian challenge 
that, even if we did have compassionate or pragmatic reasons to support a notion of human 
rights which protects positive welfare (including the right to education), the inevitable costs 
associated with providing such social benefits make it impossible to move beyond acts of 
charity or benevolence . In section 2.2, it was noted that Jan Narveson maintains that, if there 
is an inability to explain why the rest of us have th onerous obligation to cater to the 
unfortunate or the vulnerable, then we should have no interest in supporting claims to 
positive human rights, especially ones which cater to, or attempt to overcompensate for, 
individual differences.  
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First, it has already been explained that it is in reply to such criticisms that Pogge uses 
a negative rights-respecting framework – that is, the framework used by libertarians like
Narveson – in his justification of why we should make every effort to participate in, and 
maintain, just social institutions, including ones which may require the provision of positive 
human rights like having an education. Sen completes this by providing an account of 
positive freedoms which is based on the promotion of i dividual capabilities rather than 
positive rights or obligations. And it is this focus on individual capabilities which can explain 
not only why we need to cater to the vulnerable, but also that does so in a way which can 
avoid the “nanny-state”311 that the libertarian, in my view, rightfully rejects. 
For example, in a review of Sen’s work on inequality, G. A. Cohen has commented 
that, “apart from the sheer quantitative question of what income is needed, in different 
conditions, to generate a given amount of capability, attention to capability desiderata 
suggests improvements for comparatively little expenditure.”312 What Cohen is referring to 
here specifically are Sen’s observations on Kerala, a poor state in India with a socialist 
government which has been able to provide basic goods and services to its citizens in a 
relatively cost-effective way. At the time of Sen’s study, Kerala was one of the poorest states 
in India but one with a very high life expectancy.313 In an effort to explain how this was 
possible, Sen compared Kerala to other Indian states ( nd later more globally to include for 
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example African Americans in the US).314 Through this comparative analysis, Sen concluded 
importantly that the time-honoured tradition in Kerala to support basic positive freedoms like 
general education (especially literacy), basic healt c re, and the elimination of gender 
inequities (most specifically those related to female education), seems to be linked to the 
improvements in standard of living which citizens of Kerala experienced. According to Sen: 
The success of Kerala in achieving support-led security adds force to the plausibility 
of following this route even when the economy is very poor. The fact that Kerala has 
achieved such success through careful and wide-coverage public support shows how 
much can be achieved even at a low level of income, if public action is aimed at 
promoting people’s basic entitlements and capabilities.315  
 
Sen argues that, because things like basic education nd health care are labour-intensive, 
these public services actually have costs which are relative to the labour markets in which 
they are being used. Therefore, waiting until a country is wealthy enough to support such 
public services is a step which need not delay vital progress. It is manageable for countries to 
deliver these essential services regardless of the ‘wealth’ of the country. Rather than focusing 
on the cost of goods and services, Sen recommends, it is more important to focus on the level 
and quality of education which individuals can access to be able to contribute ultimately to 
the basic structure of society as educated and active itizens.  
By focusing on capabilities in this way, Sen is able to defend the idea that, for 
individuals to participate effectively in the societies in which they find themselves, they need 
the substantive freedom to assume the responsibility to act “as citizens who matter and whose 
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voices count, rather than living as well-fed, well-clothed, and well-entertained vassals.”316 
With this in mind, Sen accounts for the cost of providing certain positive freedoms, by 
suggesting that the opportunity to develop capability sets is necessary to outweigh the greater 
costs that would be incurred by placing the burden of protecting the interests of one onto 
another over an entire lifespan. Moreover, he accounts for the limits which are necessary to 
make the provision of positive freedoms possible, by stipulating that individuals are not 
passive recipients waiting to receive a bundle of goods, which others are required to provide 
for them. On the contrary, individuals must be ultimately in charge of their own well-being 
but, for this to occur, they require a particular kind of social context, which acknowledges 
and supports both the process freedoms and the opportunity freedoms through which an 
individual is able to make genuine choices and genuine contributions. That is, a social 
context, including the right to basic education, the right to basic healthcare and the right to 
political/civil participation is central to satisfying the need to expand human freedoms and to 
develop and maintain stable societies.  
Is Sen’s capability approach sustainable? The libertarian has correctly identified why 
it is important to curb the level of assistance that one individual is required to provide for 
another. Such a view, however, fails to take into account the important, and often avoidable, 
social and economic disparities that exist. Sen, Pogge and Rawls have offered 
counterarguments that attempt not only to recognize this libertarian worry that unchecked 
positive rights can do more harm than good, but that also attempt to balance this worry with 
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the more urgent worry that many human rights violatns are the result of avoidable and 
unjust human interactions. With that being said, however, it would be important to consider 
some of Sen’s critics who have questioned if his capability approach is operational at all. The 
next section considers if the highly flexible and wi ely adaptable nature of the capability 
approach positions it as a theory which is essential to the establishment of a human rights-
respecting community necessary to enable positive human agency and sustainable 
development through social mechanisms like education nd preventative health care, or if its 
breadth and flexibility actually reduce the potency of its human development agenda.  
5.3. Sustainable Development 
Sen is fond of the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, and he often refers to the significant 
advancements that she spearheaded both for the rights movement in general, and for 
women’s rights in particular (not to mention her unfailing desire to expand access to 
education for girls and women). For example, he begins his discussion paper on sustainable 
human development317 with a reference to her belief that “it is justice, not charity, that is 
wanting in the world.”318 Like Wollstonecraft, Sen’s interest in justice does not lie in a ‘head-
in-the-clouds theory’, with which some of his critics have charged him.319 His interest in 
justice lies in his desire to establish a sustainable understanding of justice, based on fairness, 
that “must be deeply and directly concerned with the actual freedoms enjoyed by different 
                                                     
317 Sen and Anand (1996), 1. 
318 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (London: Penguin Classics, 2004), 92. 
319 Andre Béteille, “Amartya Sen’s Utopia,” in Equality & Universality: Essays in Social and Political Theory 
(USA: Oxford University Press, 2003), appendix 1.  
 
   
 
 211  
persons – persons with possible divergent objectives – to lead different lives that they can 
have reason to value.”320 In addition to this, he is also careful to highligt another idea that he 
has embraced from the work of Wollstonecraft, namely the notion that “some recognized 
human rights are not ideally legislated, but are better promoted through other means, 
including public discussion, appraisal and advocacy.”321 He recommends this to be so 
because, like Pogge and Rawls, Sen realizes that ‘str tegic distortion’ of information (similar 
to Pogge’s moral loopholes) is both common and pervasive. Sen, however, argues that the 
most effective method for dealing with such distortions is through the establishment of 
interactive and educative processes, which are interest d in avoiding partisanship in favour of 
human development:  
Partisanship is avoided not so much by taking either a conjunction, or an intersection, 
of the views respectively held by dominant voices in different societies across the 
world (including very repressive ones), but through an interactive process, in 
particular by examining what would survive in public discussion, given a reasonably 
free flow of information and uncurbed opportunity to discuss differing points of 
view.322 
 
According to Sen, this free flow of information – described in quite a Rawlsian way – is 
essential to understand that we have a shared claimto certain basic capabilities necessary to 
lead worthwhile lives. Moreover, to sustain this claim, Sen asserts that “the utopian image of 
a benevolent state looking after the interests of everyone with equity and justice has little 
impact today. The need for individuals to look after themselves, rather than relying on the 
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state, is well understood.” 323 To achieve this end toward sustainable development of human 
capabilities, however, Sen does not attempt to establi h the precise boundaries around certain 
essential moral compromises, nor does he offer a decisiv  notion of what a minimally good 
life, to which everyone is entitled, should look lie, and it is this imprecision which many of 
his critics question. 
Given such an imprecise and vague assertion that social well-being and sustainability 
are dependent on the real freedoms individuals are able to convert into real opportunities, and 
given Sen’s recommendation that, to achieve such freedoms requires a commitment to some 
form of deliberative democracy and public interventio , critics, like Robert Sugden324 have 
questioned the feasibility of Sen’s capability approach. Most importantly, Sugden wonders 
whether “given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be relevant, given the extent 
of disagreement among reasonable people about the na ure of the good life, and given the 
unresolved problem of how to value sets, it is natural to ask how far Sen’s framework is 
operational.”325 Moreover, both Bernard Williams326 and David Crocker327 point out that, if 
the construction of an action-guiding ethic is the justification for establishing a capability 
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framework, it would be important to know which functional capabilities are most valuable 
and why.328  
While Sugden, and others,329 are correct to suggest that Sen is somewhat elusiv about 
which specific capabilities would count as essential basic capabilities, Sen does offer some 
insight into what he deems to be an essential combination of certain individual and positive 
freedoms to be gained from having the basic capabilities of survival, and of education 
(literacy in particular) – crucial insights which are explored in more detail in chapter 6, 
together with the insights of Martha Nussbaum, regarding how a society should proceed with 
the achievement of universalized literacy and sustained schooling.330 It is important to note 
here, however, that while Sen is unwilling to go beyond this loose understanding of the kind 
of capabilities that would be most essential to well-b ing and sustainable human 
development, he is very specific about his justification as to why he does not stipulate a more 
satisfying or substantial list of which capabilities are essential: 
The problem is not with listing important capabilities, but with insisting on one 
predetermined canonical list of capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general 
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social discussion or public reasoning. To have such a fixed list, emanating entirely 
from pure theory, is to deny the possibility of fruitf l public participation on what 
should be included and why.331 
 
Sen wisely believes that, any workable notion of basic capabilities must be established based 
on the need to develop individual values which respect each other’s personal choices and 
cultural dependence. This is a stipulation which has led Sen to insist upon the need for open-
ended public reflection based on the relevance of inf rmation to be gained from situated 
evaluations rather than ones that are detached, or ‘evaluator-independent’, despite the fact 
that such evaluations are much more imprecise to define theoretically. 
Another worry raised by critics, according to Sabine Alkire, concerns the problem of 
“how to make strategic economic decisions that weight and prioritize capabilities.”332 For 
critics of Sen’s leftist leanings, like Andre Béteill ,333 without a more explicit statement of 
the values and principles needed to develop capability sets for individuals, all Sen has to 
offer is yet another example of unattainable egalitarian idealism, which favours misdirected 
compassion and generosity over the realities of what can feasibly be achieved in the area of 
manageable human development. According to Sen, however, while it may be the case that 
his cause has been misappropriated by a few ‘soft-minded’ individuals, careful consideration 
of his own theory of human capabilities suggests that, in fact, he is interested in something 
far less unwieldy. For example, in reference to his work on famines, Sen suggests that: 
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The ability to acquire food has to be earned. What we have to concentrate on is not 
the total food supply in the economy but the “entitlement” that each person enjoys: 
the commodities over which she can establish her ownership and command. People 
suffer from hunger when they cannot establish their entitlement over an adequate 
amount of food.334 
 
Furthermore, Sen suggests that what determines one’e titlement includes three factors: 1) 
endowment (basically, labour power based on varying levels of skill, experience, property); 
2) production possibilities (technologies, knowledg, ability to convert these into something 
useful); and 3) exchange conditions (ability to sell and buy goods). Sen stresses the need to 
support certain positive freedoms for all, not because he is interested in blindly maximizing 
what benefits individuals can gain from collective social activities; on the contrary, Sen is 
interested in probing the social factors which determine one’s entitlement or ability, so that 
the positive freedoms, which an individual is able to secure and which others are obliged to 
make available, are meaningful. 
It is important to note, as G. A. Cohen does, that given such obvious grounds for 
determining entitlement it would be possible to conclude that Sen is simply stating a truism. 
Many people assume that famines, for example, occur when individuals lose their legitimate 
entitlement to secure food. Upon further reflection though, Cohen himself concedes that the 
practical implications of Sen’s understanding of inequality and capability deprivation are 
significant. In the case of famines, for example, according to Cohen, the significance of Sen’s 
work lies in his clarification that famines are rarely the result of a dwindling supply of 
resources alone, “the immediate cause of loss of access to food is, necessarily, the fracturing 
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or withering of individual entitlement to it through wages, trading relations, personal 
production, and so on.”335 In the case of education, this is also a reality. There are many 
instances where the immediate cause of loss of access to education is the lack of individual 
entitlement through things like language barriers, gender barriers and geographical barriers, 
rather than simply a lack of resources. 
Recall Pogge’s assertion that our pre-eminent moral task is to reshape the global 
economic and political order so that all human beings have secure access to the basic goods 
they need to be full and respected members of society. If one were to act on this assertion as 
it stands, it is possible to neglect, as Cohen did, the importance of Sen’s insight. That is, it is 
possible to take for granted that one’s duty towards others who are impoverished simply rests 
in supporting official channels in their efforts to replenish dwindling supplies of resources. 
This is a point of view which seems especially likely if one does not have any immediate 
experience with extreme levels of poverty or injustice. For example, as Cohen points out, in 
the case of famines, there is “an unthinking presumption, still widespread at least in countries 
where famines are unknown, that they occur if and oly if, and because, food supply 
shrinks.”336 While this is neither Pogge’s intention nor his own personal construal, to avoid 
the possibility of translating the moral value of Pgge’s theory into the kind of unthinking 
understanding to which Cohen refers, an integrative approach is needed. Integrating Pogge’s 
challenge to redesign the basic structure of society to minimize avoidable human rights 
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violations with Sen’s challenge to maximize the basic capabilities from which individuals 
can choose a life of meaning and value, provides additional information necessary to make 
the kind of informationally-rich assessments which Sen suggests are indispensable to drive 
sustainable public action. To validate this claim further, however, it would be helpful to put 
the capability approach into practice. 
Two applications which have developed out of Sen’s capability approach worth 
considering in particular are: the development of an appropriate set of multidimensional 
economic tools to assess and compare the achieved well-being of different countries or 
subgroups; and the development of the interconnections between basic human capabilities 
(like having an education) and full, or at least fuller, human development. With this in mind, 
the next chapter considers Sen’s collaboration withMa bub ul Haq to create a capability-
sensitive economic framework, and his collaboration with Martha Nussbaum to create a 
capability-sensitive educational framework, the main concern of this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
A Capability-Sensitive Educational Framework 
       To refocus our understanding of human rights and capabilities back onto specific 
applications relevant to education, this chapter translates Sen’s capability approach into a 
capability-sensitivity educational framework. To do this, however, it is first necessary to 
understand the connection which Sen makes in his own work between human development 
and education. Because Sen favours a complex notion f poverty based on capability 
deprivation, he also favours the use of a multidimensional index necessary to measure these 
deprivations. Section 6.1 considers this index, to examine why it is important to be able to 
measure the vital link which Sen suggests exists between a society’s ability to deliver basic 
education and a society’s ability to contribute to human development and security. Regarding 
this desire to measure how the socio-economic succeses of a society reflects that society’s 
contributions to human development and security, Sen is careful to caution that statistics are 
only useful if the relevant information, to which they correspond, can be acted upon. With 
this in mind, section 6.2 considers Sen’s insistence upon the need to close the educational 
gaps which an index like the Human Development Index (HDI) can reveal. In particular, this 
section considers Sen’s involvement in the creation and maintenance of the Pratichi Trust. 
The final section will address the enduring issue of cost and sustainability by considering 
Martha Nussbaum’s three-part model for the development of capabilities in education to 
determine if it is possible to deliver a capability-sensitive educational framework in a 
universally cost-effective way.  
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6.1. The Human Development Index 
 First, it is important to discuss briefly the establishment of the Human Development 
Index (HDI).337 A more thorough understanding of this index can be gained from individuals 
with expertise in economics, such as the authors of the index themselves, Mahbub ul Haq338 
and Amartya Sen.339 That being said, however, it is important to sketch why the HDI was 
created as an alternative to other standard, one-dim nsional measures of well-being and 
socio-economic progress. Furthermore, it is important o consider how this evaluative aspect 
is related to Sen’s desire to improve an individual’s standard of living by expanding the 
range of things which that individual can do and be. As will be noted, education, for 
example, is especially valuable in providing information about such a range and is thus vital 
to both human development and security. 
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, ul Haq, in conjunction with Sen’s capability 
theory, and with the annual publication of the Human Development Report (HDR),340 
established a new composite index of socio-economic progress. The goal was to develop a 
broader index than the traditional one-dimensional i dices of gross national product (GNP) 
or gross domestic product (GDP). According to ul Haq, this new index was developed to 
satisfy the need “for a more comprehensive measure of d velopment that could capture all, or 
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many more, of the choices people make – a measure that would serve as a better yardstick of 
the socioeconomic progress of nations.”341 Moreover, according to ul Haq, it was developed 
to work in combination with indicators like the GNP to integrate one’s level of education and 
standard of health with one’s level of purchasing power, a combination which he correctly 
argues is necessary to “capture far more reality than GNP does.”342 For example, according 
to ul Haq, by focusing on three basic, though broadly-based indicators (life expectancy at 
birth, proportion of literacy among the adult population and individual purchasing power) the 
HDI is able to capture not only income levels but also other important social factors which 
affect the quality of life for both individuals and for society as a whole. As a result, the HDI 
has greater potential for determining how societies should support and distribute goods and 
services, like education, among its members.  
Some of the features that ul Haq highlights as benefits to be gained from the use of 
HDI over GNP include a greater awareness of important social influences like: national 
priorities; potential economic growth; and disparities between individuals and between 
various subgroups within a society. Furthermore, ul Haq recommends that the insight to be 
gained from the HDI can not only help to inform positively the various policy makers or 
‘levers of control’ which manage these social influences, but also act as an ‘early warning 
system’ or diagnostic tool both for individual countries to address their own social 
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disparities, as well as for the international community to monitor countries more effectively 
and to aid those in need.  
Of course, ul Haq is also quick to acknowledge (and ccept) the criticisms, or at least 
the recommendations for modification, which such a multi-dimensional measurement tool 
has inevitably received. But he does not acknowledge that these criticisms or 
recommendations represent fatal flaws in the HDI; they simply point to the unique and 
flexible nature of this device – a flexibility which ul Haq recommends is essential when 
dealing with the highly complex nature of either an individual’s, or of a society’s, quality of 
life. For example, he acknowledges that some critics have suggested that an even greater 
number of variables should be included, not only to address the basic human needs of 
knowledge, health and income but to address things l ke political freedoms. In addition, he 
acknowledges that some critics have questioned the need to develop a composite index, when 
perhaps a series of independent indicators might provide a more focused informational base 
from which to develop specific policy initiatives. To this, ul Haq suggests that, while a focus 
limited to an aggregate measure of basic human needs is essential to obtain manageable 
results which can be delivered universally, there is no reason why the HDI cannot also be 
disaggregated to highlight a profile more applicable to an individual country. According to ul 
Haq, for those countries at the bottom of the scale, for example, the HDI can be a highly 
effective tool. With that being said, he also acknowledges that, for the many countries which 
have successfully, or at least sufficiently, established the basic social structures necessary for 
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an acceptable standard of living, it is necessary to continue to refine the information in such a 
way that it can be adapted to the particular needs of individual countries more effectively. 
According to Sen, it is this commitment to flexibilty which makes the HDI significant 
because, through the HDI, “the world of evaluation was open to pragmatic reasoning, 
invoking different kinds of argument within a broad nd permissive framework of reasoned 
social evaluation.”343 Sen proposes that the HDI can assist in addressing not only our most 
basic needs (like being nourished, being disease-free, and being knowledgeable), but it can 
address some more complex needs (like self-respect, dignity, and human solidarity).344 
According to Sen, the elegance of the HDI is its ability to measure governments against the 
concrete capabilities of their citizens based on the three basic, though broadly-based, 
indicators.345 According to Sen, being able to measure the ability of societies to achieve these 
human capabilities has a direct influence on human capital, and a direct relevance to the well-
being and freedom that individuals can achieve through ut their lives. Further, it is also 
important to highlight that, by including literacy within the set of basic indicators, Sen and ul 
Haq establish a direct link between the need for indiv duals to be literate and the need for 
societies to provide necessary public resources lik schools for this to happen. Thus, in this 
sense, Sen is actually one of the most important theorists writing on the right to education 
today. 
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Sen also acknowledges the importance of the indirect role that these capabilities can 
play in social change and in economic production. As has already been mentioned, for Sen 
sustainable human development is not a question of the resources that one has, it is a 
question of what one can do with those resources and, according to Sen the HDI is “an 
illuminating concept that serves to integrate a variety of concerns about the lives of people 
and their well-being and freedom.”346 Moreover, it is a clear indication that education, 
especially the basic educational skill of reading, s essential. With that being said, however, 
Sen also cautions that it is important to distinguish the information to be gained from using a 
socio-economic indicator like the HDI from “the real merit of the human development 
approach [which] lies in the plural attentions it brings to bear on developmental evaluation, 
not in the aggregative measure it presents as an aid to digestion of diverse statistics.”347  
For Sen, the development of appropriate socio-economic tools to assess and compare 
the achieved well-being of different countries or subgroups is only one of the essential 
components of sustainable human development. Sen also recommends the need to develop 
socio-economic interconnections between things like basic public freedoms and human 
development. That is, sustainable development is about capability expansion, a concept 
which requires both a measure of existing states of affairs (the HDI), and a means to expand 
or improve upon those measures (that is, basic primary education, healthcare and gender 
parity). Obtaining an informationally-rich picture of social well-being is an inert exercise if 
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no reflective thought is given to what to do with that information once it has been obtained. 
With this in mind, it is important to highlight a second major focus of Sen’s work – namely, 
his focus on the agency aspect of human development – in particular, how the capability 
approach connects agency to basic public education nd human security.  
6.2. Human Development, Security and Education 
In a speech that Sen delivered to the 2003 Commonwealth ducation conference in 
Edinburgh, he asked the following question: “Why is it o important to close the educational 
gaps, and to remove the enormous disparities in educational access, inclusion and 
achievement?”348 This is an important question, given the enormous public burden typically 
associated with the public provision of formal education.349 To this question, Sen responds 
by providing six potent reasons why formal public education is both intrinsically and 
instrumentally important, and why the public should be interested in supporting it by closing 
the educational gaps that currently exist around the world.  
First, Sen highlights the connection between education nd security. For Sen, human 
insecurity is related to the obvious insecurities which result from the potential physical harms 
which others can inflict upon us, through things like terrorism and violence. But insecurity is 
multidimensional in nature. Not having the basic skills of being able to read, write and 
calculate imposes insecurities upon individuals which are, at the least, equally significant, in 
                                                     
348 Amartya Sen, “The Importance of Basic Education” full text of the speech to the Edinburgh Commonwealth 
education conference in The Guardian, Tuesday October 28, 2003. 
349 For example, in Ontario the ministry of education has budgeted for an investment of $18.45 billion for 2007-
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that they also cause life-long, inescapable capability deprivation. Not everyone is directly 
affected by terrorism, but all illiterate individuals are directly and constantly affected – and 
negatively so – by their lack of skill in this regard. If a country is willing to support the 
military and policing initiatives to protect the physical security of a society, then that country 
should be willing also to support the educational iitiatives to protect the knowledge-based 
security of that society. Second, Sen highlights the obvious potential for economic 
empowerment which comes from being literate and numerate. Related to this potential for 
job skill development, Sen suggests further that with literacy comes understanding. Sen, 
however, is interested in a notion of understanding which goes beyond the factual 
information typically associated with schooling (like improvements in one’s level of social, 
historical and geographical awareness), to being able to understand the social information 
typically associated with human rights and the concurrent obligations to those rights, which 
should be fulfilled. Fourth, Sen suggests that being able to read is essential to being able to 
participate in political decision-making. Fifth, Sen suggests that, not only is formal education 
important for political participation, it is also important for accessing a wide variety of public 
services. For example, according to Sen, being educated can translate into being able to 
utilize, more extensively and more knowledgeably, the public health services which are 
available.350 While providing free public education is a significant public burden, 
maintaining a society’s general health and well-being is an equally significant encumbrance. 
Sen argues, however, if the observable correlation between level of education and level of 
general physical well-being is recognized, the indispensable influence that educational 
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opportunities (especially those directed towards women) can have on preventative healthcare 
can go a long way to achieving general sustainable social well-being, and to alleviating a 
significant portion of the public health burden. According to Sen, “The basic level of 
education of the public can play an important part in the utilization of communal health care 
and of general medical facilities, and female education in particular is especially important in 
this regard.”351  
Finally, Sen highlights the significance of recognizi g the benefits to be gained from 
demanding that women receive the same educational opportunities to men. While it is true 
that having an education is highly relevant to men, because often men take on the role of 
economic provider for the family,352 this reality does not diminish the need to recognize the 
relevance of having an education to women. It is the women, after all, who often carry the 
burden of being the prime role-model and mentor to children, especially in the formative 
years. If the education of women is not taken to be f qual significance to that of men, then 
the potential for all children (male and female), to benefit from a comprehensive set of 
capabilities will be diminished. Thus, according to Sen, if you want to build a country, it is 
important to begin by building a school: 
The contribution of basic education to development is ot confined to economic 
progress. Education has intrinsic importance; the capability to read and write can 
deeply influence one’s quality of life. Also, an educated population can make better 
use of democratic opportunities than an illiterate on . Further, an ability to read 
                                                     
351 Amartya Sen, “Public Action to Remedy Hunger” full text of the Arturo Tanco Memorial Lecture given in 
London on August 2, 1990, arranged by The Hunger Project and CAB International, in association with T e 
Commonwealth Trust and The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
352 This claim is made on a global understanding, recognizing that in the developed Western countries thi is not 
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documents and legal provisions can help subjugated women and other oppressed 
groups make use of their rights and demand more fainess. And female literacy can 
enhance women’s voices in family affairs and reduce gender inequality in other 
fields, a benefit to men as well as women, since women’s empowerment through 
literacy tends to reduce child mortality and very significantly decrease fertility 
rates.353 
 
Despite these seemingly persuasive reasons to want to support basic primary education, 
Sen’s own appraisal of the current state of basic primary education in India, for example, is 
not very positive because, in many parts of India, education remains neither free nor 
compulsory, despite the fact that the Indian governme t is committed to ensuring universal 
elementary education.354  
To this end, in 1999 Sen devoted half of his Nobel Prize (approx. $400 000) to 
establish the Pratichi Trust for development in the areas of basic education, gender equity 
and basic health in both India and Bangladesh. The main objective of the Indian wing of this 
Trust is to aid development in the areas of elementary education and health care, and the 
important interconnections between the two. In 1999, however, the district that this Trust is 
established to aid was severely damaged by the Orissa cyclone, and more recently (2001) by 
the Gujarat earthquake. As a result, much of the effort of the Trust to date has been dedicated 
to aiding the victims of these devastating events. Nonetheless, some preliminary findings 
                                                     
353 Amartya Sen, “To Build a Country, Build a Schoolhouse,” in The New York Times (May 27, 2002). 
354 Parliamentary Research Service, The Right Education Bill The 86th Constitution Amendment Act added 
Article 21A affirming that every child between the ages of 6 and 14 years has the right to free and 
compulsory education. (New Delhi, November 21, 2005). Available online at 
http://education.nic.in/elementary/RighttoEducationBill2005.pdf. For more information on the background 
of this amendment see Niranjan Aradhya and Aruna Kashy p, The ‘Fundamentals’ Right to Education in 
India (Bangalore: Books for Change, 2006). See also Philip Alston and Nehal Bhuta, “Human Rights and 
Public Goods: Education as a Fundamental Right in India” in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson (eds.) 
Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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have been made from an initial investigation on three districts of West Bengal355 – a region in 
desperate need of reform because not only is it one of the most densely populated regions of 
India, it is also home to over 11 million children below the age of 6 and approximately 26 
million under the age of 14.356 Of those children, only about 71% (girls) and 72% (boys) 
attend school, leaving more than 1.3 million children out of school completely. And of those 
children who do attend school, 34% drop out before they complete the primary level. 
In this investigation, 18 elementary state schools and 17 Sishu Siksha Kendras (SSK) 
child development centres were examined to determine both what is already being achieved 
and what barriers and drawbacks impede progress and development. It is important to note 
that the SSK are government sponsored educational ce tres, launched in 1999, to improve 
the educational opportunities for impoverished children in West Bengal. According to Sen, 
the SSK is a unique program which relies on community-based action to provide flexible 
educational alternatives at extremely low cost.357 When 20 or more out-of-school children 
exist in a community, an SSK can be formed. Once formed, the government, in conjunction 
with UNICEF, provides mid-day meals for the children, salaries and training for the teachers, 
academic supervisors and books. As of 2006, 16,000 such learning centres have provided 
educational opportunities for more than 1 million children.358 While very similar to state 
schools, in that the SSK centres are also fully recognized elementary schools capable of 
                                                     
355 Pratichi Research Team, (2002) The Pratichi Education Report (Number 1): The Delivery of Primary 
Education in West Bengal. Introduction by Amartya Sen. (New Delhi, TLM books/Pratichi (India) Trust. 
356 Based on the 2000 census data, UNICEF Shishushiksha Karmasuchi (SSK) Education Project for W rking 
Children: West Bengal, India (Toronto: February 2007), http://www.maharaj.org/pdf/ssk.pdf.  
357 From Sen’s introduction to the “Pratichi Education Report”. 
358 UNICEF (Toronto: February 2007). 
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conferring upon children the same status as the stat chool, these centres distinguish 
themselves by catering to marginalized children (the hours are flexible, the services are more 
cost effective, the management is local, and the teach rs come from the community).  
What did this study uncover? To begin, this study uncovered positively that the desire 
to have free and compulsory education is not the primary issue. Of the parents surveyed, 96% 
stated that they supported their male child’s attendance in school and 82% supported their 
female child’s attendance, despite possibly being illiterate and unschooled themselves, 
suggesting that the problem is not simply one of motivation. Moreover, 84% agreed that 
elementary schooling should be compulsory, suggesting that at least there is great interest in 
the idea that children should be educated in a formal setting. Also, it was found that many of 
the educators involved in these schools and learning ce tres were motivated and enthusiastic 
about the prospects for improvements in the performance of the schools in which they work. 
With these reasons for optimism, however, this study also uncovered some crucial barriers 
and drawbacks which must be addressed before any sig ificant improvements can be made to 
act on this interest.  
For example, it was found that only 41% of the parents surveyed were satisfied with 
the quality of the teaching at the state schools and only 54% at the SSK. Also, according to 
Sen, on the day of a visit to one of the schools, only 51% of the registered students were 
actually in attendance at the state schools and only 64% at the SSK, and a significant number 
of teachers were absent. Another challenge uncovered by this study was the ongoing practice 
of paying private tuition to supplement the education of those children who can afford to do 
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so. Moreover, it was found that the students who were able to pay the extra tuition, were able 
to do simple tasks (like writing their names) that the other children could not, leaving Sen to 
question: “what, then, do they learn in school?”359  According to Sen, the most important 
implication of this study is that public action requires radical thinking and patience to 
overcome the deep-rooted class barriers and social obstacles which exist and which will not 
go away overnight.360 With this in mind, Sen offers a few suggestions for change which he 
thinks will help to improve the current state of elementary education in India but which are 
equally applicable to any public action directed toward education in general. Some of the 
recommendations which Sen offers in this regard include:  
1. Educators need to reflect more deeply upon their profession and the kinds of 
internal reforms which they can initiate, the unions i  particular need to apply 
the bargaining power, which has successfully promoted and improved the 
economic rights of teachers, to promote and improve the teaching profession 
more generally. 
2. School inspectors should work together with teachers and unionists to establish 
a strong and accountable profession dedicated to human development through 
education. 
3. An unequivocal end to the practice of private tuition at the elementary level, as 
it not only disadvantages the underprivileged but it encourages teacher apathy 
as well.  
4. The creation and development of strong parent-teacher collaborations, 
including ones which bridge different class backgrounds. 
5. Monitor the development and maintenance of the SSK learning centres to 
ensure that the inherent differences between the SSK and the public schools do 
not isolate the underprivileged children further. 
6. Develop the existing mid-day meal program so that it ctually works to feed 
children at school.361 
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While the work being done by the Indian wing of thePratichi Trust is only in its beginning 
stages, it represents a good example of what can be done to support and maintain over the 
long-term institutional reform to basic primary education, especially in India.362 According to 
Sen, beyond the obvious financial constraints that befall any densely populated and needy 
society like India, these organizational and conceptual changes are necessary to close the 
educational gaps to which he refers. Of perhaps even gr ater concern, according to Sen, is the 
challenge of overcoming (or at least modifying) theclass and gender barriers which deeply 
impair a child’s ability to be educated, not just because they cannot afford to go to school but 
because they are not welcome to go to school either. 
With this in mind, Sen established the Bangladesh wing of the Pratichi Trust with a 
slightly different, though complementary, focus. This trust is devoted to gender equity – 
another area of development which Sen correctly argues is deeply interconnected with 
education but which he chooses to support in a slightly different manner. In particular, in 
2004, the Bangladesh Pratichi Trust, in partnership with BRAC (Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee), began awarding annual Salma Sobhan Fellowships to women 
interested in pursuing a career in journalism. This fellowship takes literate women from all of 
the districts of Bangladesh, exposes them to well-known journalists, requires them to write at 
                                                     
362 While the information to be gained from Sen’s work in India is easily transferable to other countries 
throughout the world, the priority given to India is important because 19% of the world’s children live in 
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available online at http://www.crin.org/docs/BfC%5B1%5D.%20India.pdf.  
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least 24 published or broadcast stories and compensates them with a small stipend for their 
work. The goal of these fellowships is, first, to encourage Bangladeshi women to enter this 
non-traditional profession to correct the existing gender imbalance in the public media and, 
as recipient Selina Kabir Chowdhury proclaimed, to become ‘soldiers of the pen’ ready to 
challenge corruption, wrongdoing, and injustice. More important, however, by supporting 
women in this way, there is a ripple effect which can influence positive reform in education 
which would not be possible by simply supporting basic primary education alone. That is, by 
choosing journalism, rather than education alone, as the focus of the scholarships, this Trust 
can increase the number of positive public female rol  models, offer new career opportunities 
to women, alter the perspective of the media, and most importantly encourage literacy among 
women and girls, thus making it more difficult to silence particular sub-groups within 
society. After its first year, 32 women successfully completed the program and almost all of 
them obtained jobs at Bengali language newspapers, including nine hired by Prothom Alo, 
the largest newspaper in Bangladesh.363 And the ongoing commitment of this trust to grant 
fellowships to at least 500 women will continue to empower women by not only providing 
them with meaningful employment opportunities, but y continuing to raise awareness of 
what women can and should be doing in society through both the act of granting the 
fellowships and through giving women a voice. 
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By supporting these Trusts, Sen has demonstrated his es re to act on his own belief 
that, “human security stands, on the shoulders of human development with a particular 
adaptation of its rich vision and perspective, and this applies especially strongly to the critical 
role of elementary education.”364 He cautions, however, that not just any form of education 
will achieve the kind of social development that eith r he or, for that matter, Pogge is 
interested in achieving. To this end, Sen advocates the urgent need to recognize the 
correlation between non-sectarian, non-parochial education and well-being. For Sen, it is 
essential that the principles which embody the human rights movement also embody the 
educational reform necessary to establish education for all. According to Sen, “the question 
of openness of curriculum and the reach of reason can be quite central to the role of 
education in promoting human security. If the schools fail to do that by “thrusting smallness” 
on young children, we not only reduce their basic human right to learn widely, but also make 
the world much more incendiary than it need be.”365 And with this recommendation, it is 
possible to acknowledge that not only does Sen argue for the importance of basic primary 
education, he makes the important connection between supporting some higher, ‘elite’ 
education necessary to indirectly support the cause of primary education. 
This smallness to which Sen refers is similar to Holt’s suggestion that, all too often, 
adults choose to lock children up in walled gardens, rather than recognizing and supporting 
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their right to transition gradually from immaturity to adulthood. An important distinction 
needs to be made, however, regarding the decidedly ifferent solutions which Sen and Holt 
offer. Recall that Holt advocated an arrangement of equal rights for children, so that they can 
manage and direct decision-making regarding issues of significant importance in their lives. 
In the case of education specifically, for Holt, formal education is yet another unnecessary 
barrier between generations, which he claims prevents children from acting on their innate, 
unquenchable drive to understand their world. While sympathetic to, and aware of, the 
impact that static and lifeless schools can have on the well-being of children, Sen maintains 
that the solution is not to isolate children by removing them from public education, and from 
the opportunity to reflect openly on potential educational reforms which should be put into 
place to re-animate such schools.366 For Sen, while it is essential to recognize that education 
can engage and support the natural curiosity of children, it is even more essential to 
recognize that “in promoting friendship and loyalty, and in safeguarding the commitment to 
freedom and peace, basic education can play a vital part. This requires, on the one hand, that 
the facilities of education be available to all, and on the other, that children be exposed to 
ideas from many different backgrounds and perspectiv s and be encouraged to think for 
themselves and to reason.”367 The only way to ensure this multiplicity of ideas is to establish 
at least a minimal level of basic primary education which is compulsory to all. Thus, where 
the liberationist defends an approach to education which can free children so that they can 
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quench their thirst to understand their world whatever that world may be, Sen’s capability 
approach defends a system of education which not only recognizes the child’s need to quench 
his thirst to understand his world, but which also understands that to do so, requires a public 
environment where informed and reflective choices can be made.  
Of course, it is one thing to make grand suggestion about the things societies should 
do, but it is a completely different challenge to actu lly make things happen. Recall Brian 
Orend’s important caution regarding the requirement of provision which has left many 
sceptical about both the concept, and the cost, of ocio-economic rights like the right to 
education which, while nice to have, brings with it many associated costs – costs which for 
some countries would be impossible to bear. To this, Sen recommends that, when faced with 
the daunting task of equalizing educational opportunities for all children in a country even as 
large, and as impoverished, as India, there is a reponsibility to ensure universal attainment 
of literacy and basic educational skills at least in the younger age groups. There are important 
strategic questions to consider in implementing such a social commitment, but according to 
Sen (as Pogge also recommends), the primary challenge is to make it a more compelling 
political issue.368  
For Sen, as already mentioned, the easiest way to make the provision of education a 
morally compelling political issue is to recognize that the provision of education is a labour-
intensive activity and thus many of the associated costs are relative to the labour market of 
the particular country in question. And, as the work being done through the Pratichi Trust has 
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demonstrated, sometimes the simplest solutions (like the SSK) can bring about rewarding 
results. Beyond this, Sen recommends that, while there are obvious public burdens associated 
with the establishment of universal literacy and basic schooling (for example, provision of 
material resources like books and writing supplies, the people resources like teachers, or the 
bricks and mortar resources like the physical structures necessary to create a safe and 
nurturing educational environments), these burdens are necessary to avoid even greater 
burdens like mounting social insecurities and unnecessary inequities, particularly those 
related to gender and the larger health costs Sen enum rates. With this in mind, it is possible 
to recommend that Sen’s challenge to bring about a collective commitment to the provision 
of basic fundamental human capabilities, like education, complements Pogge’s challenge to 
reshape society’s institutions so that all human bei gs have secure access to fundamental 
basic goods. As a result, any requirement of provisi n which may be the result of achieving 
this goal is related to our negative duty of justice not to interfere with the ability of others 
(children) to achieve at least a basic primary education. Moreover, it is a duty which those in 
a position to do something have an urgent responsibility to carry out.  The next section 
considers Martha Nussbaum’s more detailed specifications about what kind of education is 
necessary to support the capabilities needed for human development. 
6.3. Capabilities and Education 
 In her work, Nussbaum states that “the basic claim I wish to make – concurring with 
Amartya Sen – is that the central goal of public planning should be the capabilities of citizens 
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to perform various important functions.”369 However, while Nussbaum acknowledges her 
immediate connection to the work of Sen, and even th  suggestion of being “closely allied to, 
but in some ways superior to, the familiar human rights paradigm,”370 she differentiates 
herself on the grounds that her own Aristotelian approach to capabilities is more suited to 
dealing with inequities and injustices, particularly those based on gender. Recall that critics 
of Sen accused him of developing an approach which lacks a complete theory of human well-
being and development. For these critics, Sen’s understanding of capabilities and 
functionings is too vague and imprecise to be of any practical value outside of an exercise in 
moral reasoning. In addition, critics have suggested that Sen’s notion of freedom in the 
capability approach focuses too much on the range of choice available to people, and too 
little on other human needs, like the non-rational aspects of humanness including emotions 
and empathy.371 This section considers how Nussbaum has countered such criticisms and 
what this means to both the establishment of the capability approach, and to the 
establishment of education as something fundamental to which all individuals can stake a 
claim. 
For Nussbaum, the greatest complications occur when on  wants to translate moral 
reasoning into public policy. This is so, according to Nussbaum, because the distinction 
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between the threshold of functionings below which no individual should be allowed to live, 
and the somewhat higher threshold of capabilities or beings and doings which we deem to be 
essential to a good life, is really quite significant – especially with regards to public policy. 
Nussbaum acknowledges that often, and importantly, the leap from human life to good 
human life is the result of individual choice and action. Echoing Aristotle, she asserts further 
that, to ensure that the first threshold is met and that individuals are encouraged to surpass it, 
the role of public policy is crucial and, the role f public policy directed at the lives of 
children and their education is even more crucial.372   
To begin, one important feature of Nussbaum’s work which separates her from Sen, is 
her effort to create a list dedicated to particular, b sic, and indispensable human capabilities 
to which, she claims, no human being should be denie  access. Where Sen’s main focus is on 
making a social commitment to the achievement of the most basic functionings of survival 
and literacy for all, Nussbaum is interested in capturing these basic capabilities and the 
higher functionings which she argues we can grow into if given the correct opportunities. 
Included in Nussbaum’s central human capabilities ar : 
Life –  the ability to live to the end of a human life of normal length,  
Bodily Health – the ability to have good health, shelter and adequate nourishment,  
Bodily Integrity – the ability to move freely from place to place and to be secure 
against violent assault,  
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Senses, Imagination and Thought – the ability to use the senses, to imagine, think and 
reason,  
Emotions – the ability to have emotional attachments,  
Practical Reason – the ability to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life,  
Affiliation – the ability to affiliate with others including the social bases of self-
respect and non-humiliation,  
Other Species – the ability to live with concern for and in relation to the world of 
nature,  
Play – the ability to laugh, play and enjoy time of leisure,  
Control over one’s Environment – the ability to be able to engage with and participate 
in one’s environment (political and material), to exercise political choice, to speak 
freely and to hold property. 373 
 
With this list, Nussbaum suggests she is able to counter the critics by providing a 
comprehensive understanding of the human capabilities fundamental to any human life, and 
which need to be developed, nurtured and furthered, or at least initially sparked though one’s 
education. She claims it is an improvement over other lists, like the fundamental human 
rights that individuals like Pogge for example have championed, because it is not as 
Eurocentric or as malecentric.374 Moreover, she claims to enhance Sen’s capability approach 
by maintaining his insight into the need for indiviual choice, and the need to recognize that 
being able to achieve certain human functionings has both intrinsic and instrumental value, 
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while, at the same time, placing a careful limit on the kinds of capabilities that should count 
for human flourishing. 
A second feature of Nussbaum’s work that separates her from Sen, is her three-part 
model for development of capabilities in education.375 Sen, although completely cognisant of 
the advantages of advanced schooling and life-long learning, recommends only a minimalist 
understanding that sustained schooling (especially in the areas of basic literacy and 
numeracy) is essential to well-being and human capability development. Nussbaum, on the 
other hand, stipulates the need for one’s educationl experience to include more broadly at 
least three things: critical thinking; world citizenship and narrative imagination; and liberal 
education.  
By critical thinking, Nussbaum is referring to the ability to reflect judiciously and 
analytically upon one’s own circumstances and one’s social environment. Nussbaum adopts 
the classic Socratic view of the ‘examined life’ to suggest that, not only is the ability to think 
critically instrumentally important for good citizenship and political participation, it is 
intrinsically important for personal introspection. For example, Nussbaum comments on one 
educational experience she encountered while in India.376 She witnessed a group of women in 
an adult literacy program called “Reflect” which encourages both literacy and critical 
thinking among its participants. Nussbaum describes what she witnessed: 
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With around twenty women from the village, we sit on the ground in a barn (where 
rats occasionally run across our feet). The women have made a map of the power 
structure of their village, and we discuss this map, as they identify possible points of 
intervention that may change the deal they have from the landlords for whom they 
currently work as sharecroppers. Everyone is animated, and the idea of criticizing 
entrenched structures of power has obviously led thse women to attach great 
importance to the associated task of learning to read and write.377 
  
While this example is one in which women are involved rather than children, she uses it to 
highlight the essential role that the capacity for critical examination of oneself, and of one’s 
situation, can and should play in the establishment of an educational context to which every 
child is entitled. For Nussbaum, this is especially important in societies which differ by 
ethnicity, caste, and religion. Recall Sen’s suggestion that one substantial obstacle standing 
in the way of educational reform in India (and in many countries around the world), is the 
challenge of overcoming (or at least mitigating) the class and gender barriers which deeply 
impair a child’s ability to be educated. Nussbaum’s insistence upon the need for an 
educational context which endorses critical thinking – that is an educational foundation 
which develops critical and self-critical capabilities which can free children from the 
authority of tradition to think for themselves – is one component necessary to overcome 
social obstacles like the ones to which Sen refers. Nu sbaum contends that critical thinking 
on its own, however, can still be parochial and dogmatic if one’s educational experience does 
not also include world awareness.  
By world awareness, Nussbaum asserts students must be given the opportunity “to see 
themselves as not simply citizens of some local region or group but also, and above all, as 
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human beings bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern.”378 And it 
is this understanding of Nussbaum’s which ties her substantially to the human rights 
community. Like both Pogge and Sen, Nussbaum is motivated by the idea that we are bound 
to each other as human beings and our actions should reflect our interconnectedness. By 
establishing an educational context which can expose children to the historical traditions, 
cultures and religions of others through literature, story-telling and reflective discussion of 
these stories another component necessary for the development of each child’s capabilities 
through education can be realized. To this end, Nussbaum recommends the urgent need to 
look beyond the rudimentary skills of basic reading, writing and arithmetic (which Sen 
deems to be essential) to embrace a multicultural education that can also develop the 
narrative imagination. For Nussbaum this is important, because she urges – echoing Richard 
Rorty379 – that children, who have been exposed to another person’s story, can connect more 
deeply with the emotions and wishes of another.  
Finally, Nussbaum highlights the value to be gained by ensuring that the time-
honoured tradition of liberal education is not only maintained, but is accepted as an essential 
component of human flourishing and capability development. By liberal education, 
Nussbaum is careful to make an important distinctio between two approaches to liberal 
education – one to be rejected and one to be embraced and cultivated.380 First, she 
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acknowledges (and rejects) a long-standing and traditional conception of liberal education, 
historically favoured by ‘the freeborn gentlemen of the propertied classes’ – a conception of 
education which, according to Nussbaum, was intended to ‘initiate’ gentlemen into the time-
honoured traditions of their elite society and to free them to do as they please in the world. 
The conception of liberal education which Nussbaum prefers – and which corresponds 
directly with Sen’s educational vision – is a conception of liberal education which Nussbaum 
claims is intended to “produce free citizens, citizens who are free not because of wealth or 
birth, but because they can call their minds their own.”381 Nussbaum has included a 
commitment to this ‘new’ vision of liberal education within her list of essential basic 
capabilities because she asserts that it is through the use of the senses, the imagination, and 
one’s ability to think that one is able to act as a truly free human being. She does not deny 
that wealth and social status are significant enablers (as the ‘old’ conception of liberal 
education asserts). But, according to Nussbaum (echoing Sen) if a ‘new’ conception of 
liberal education can cultivate a child’s ability to use her mind, then it can be possible for her 
to achieve a good life even without wealth or social st tus. For Nussbaum, such an 
educational context would include basic literacy, basic mathematical and basic scientific 
training (to which Sen refers). It would also include opportunities to use one’s “imagination 
and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own 
choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth.” 382 For Nussbaum, imaginative 
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understanding and the use of the arts can provide an enhanced educational experience which 
not only provides students with the knowledge and skills necessary for gainful employment, 
but for human compassion and understanding.  
Beyond the importance of this three-way educational model, Nussbaum (like Sen) also 
recommends that, to develop a more complete understanding of human capabilities, it is 
necessary to nurture habits of mind which are open to dialogue and deliberation. According 
to Nussbaum, then, while Pogge may be correct to suggest that the capability approach is not 
able to exclusively address the horrific injustices of the world in which we live, it does much 
more than simply postulate a “natural hierarchy in order to claim greater resources for the 
worse endowed so as to make up for their natural deficiencies and to provide them access to 
the full range of valuable human functionings.”383 According to Nussbaum, the capability 
approach cultivate freedoms such that everyone can respect each person’s struggle to 
flourish, and can treat each person as an end and as a source of agency and worth in her own 
right.384 For Nussbaum, capabilities are “basic powers of chice that make a moral claim for 
opportunities to be realized and to flourish.”385 By highlighting certain inequities then, as the 
capability approach does, Nussbaum recommends that it is possible to highlight the need to 
recognize that the inability of some to attain certain levels of functionings is a problem of 
justice – a problem of justice which requires more than an equal distribution of resources, or 
a universal set of rights on paper. It requires a social environment which favours human 
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capabilities, and that fosters those capabilities through essential public freedoms like 
education. 
With this, it is possible to conclude that Nussbaum has correctly claimed that the 
capability approach, which she developed with Sen, gives important precision and 
supplementation to the language of rights because it moves away from the concept of a 
society’s basic structure to focus on the further concept of individual capabilities. According 
to both Sen and Nussbaum, it is pointless to talk about having a right to something without 
also thinking about what capability an individual hs to realize that right– an important and 
worthwhile claim. That said, however, while Nussbaum provides a more comprehensive and 
precise statement of capability than Sen, this statement seems to assume a particular standard 
of the good life that might not feasibly apply to the desires, needs or resources of all. 
Moreover, by suggesting that the language of capabilities clarifies the role that the state must 
play in aiding individual flourishing, Nussbaum neglects Sen’s sensitivity to the need for 
both state assistance and individual responsibility.  
For example, while premature death is an unfortunate occurrence, many essential 
occupations – medical, military, and law enforcement to name a few – expose individuals to 
events that might bring about a sudden death. Should we refrain from participating in these 
occupations because they will interfere with our capability to benefit fully from a good life? 
Moreover, if Nussbaum’s list represents a minimum standard of care below which no human 
life should go, how should a society provide the resources necessary to meet all of these 
central human capabilities which Nussbaum includes, given such a wide diversity of 
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individuals? While her list is an excellent list, and certainly one worth aspiring to cultivate, it 
would be important to recall both Pogge’s and Sen’s desire to establish a cost-effective 
conception of socio-economic rights and freedoms suitable for both the developed world and 
the developing world. Finally, her three-way educational model (though arguably an essential 
component of established democratic societies, necessary for the development of reflective, 
active citizens and ideally worth striving for), places far too great a burden on developing 
countries to achieve a system of free education for all because it goes well beyond the basics 
to which Sen refers. Thus, while Nussbaum may have provided a more exacting account of 
which capabilities are essential, in so doing, she establishes the very kind of model which 
Pogge, for example, believes requires indefinite increases in expenditures on those with the 
greatest capability shortfalls.386 Consequently, on Nussbaum’s account, Pogge’s charge of 
oversensitivity to inequities may be valid. If, on the other hand, the capability approach is 
taken to be simply the endorsement of alternative combinations of basic functionings, from 
which a person can choose, then endorsing Sen’s claim for the need to support the basic 
capabilities of survival and literacy is a manageabl  and meaningful stipulation necessary to 
support the claim that education is a human right to which all children are entitled. Moreover, 
it is possible to maintain that Sen’s challenge to bring about a collective commitment to the 
provision of basic fundamental human capabilities, like education, complements Pogge’s 
challenge to reshape society’s institutions so that all human beings have secure access to 
fundamental basic goods, and ultimately can be encouraged to aspire to Nussbaum’s three-
way educational model, despite Pogge’s own suggestion to the contrary. 
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As James Nickel has pointed out, “human rights are not ideals of the good life for 
humans; rather they are concerned with ensuring the conditions, negative and positive, of a 
minimally good life.”387 Like Nickel, Brian Orend agrees that the domain of human rights 
should be reserved for those entitlements which secure the “vitally needed material goods, 
personal freedoms, and secure protections” each individual is owed simply by virtue of being 
human. With this in mind, Orend proposes a set of what he refers to as the “388foundational 
five” objects of human rights that include: personal security, material subsistence, elemental 
equality, personal freedom, and social recognition as a person and a rights-holder. By 
including the importance of recognizing our initial moral status and our membership within 
the human community, prior to our national communities, Orend establishes a compelling 
pre-political set of human rights objects. By stressing the need to focus on the idea of 
securing vital needs, he is also able (like Sen) to promote a more effective – realizable and 
cost-sensitive – set of criteria than Nussbaum. Despit  these important qualifications 
however, this list seems to favour disproportionately, as does Pogge, security and material 
subsistence needs over an equally important social consideration like education. To be fair, 
Orend does put the question of “basic” education on the table for further discussion by 
suggesting, “that some provision of education may be claimable as a matter of human 
right”389 but even Orend asserts that education is more controversial than either basic social 
security, or preventative health care.  
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Why should this be the case? Giving a needy child another food handout or regular 
immunization without also teaching the child some rudimentary academic skills is only going 
to prolong an already miserable life. If human rights are meant to protect an individual’s right 
to a minimal standard of life, then it seems essential to make an amendment to the 
“foundational five” – namely the inclusion of basic public education. That is not to suggest 
that a starving child is going to learn if forced to go to school. Rather, if Orend is correct to 
state that not having one of his set of core elements can cause real damage to one’s ability to 
function as a human being, then a minimum level of education should also be included in that 
set. But it should not be based on Nussbaum’s utopian claim alone that education should be 
focused on creating “Socratic citizens capable of thinking for themselves, arguing with 
tradition, and understanding with sympathy the conditions of lives different from their 
own.”390 It should be based on Sen’s careful admonition that, while the capability approach 
cannot adequately deal with the process aspect of freedom exclusively, it can provide 
individuals with a greater opportunity to convert the rights that they have into something 
meaningful to them through recognizing everyone’s claim to fundamental capabilities like 
basic public education.  
Therefore, providing children with access to free basic primary public education that 
can make available the basic skills of literacy andnumeracy, and which can raise an 
awareness of others is an essential component of human development and of the human 
                                                     
390 Martha Nussbaum (2002) “Education for Citizenship in an Era of Global Connection,” in Studies in 
Philosophy and Education 21: 289-303. 
   
 
 249  
rights which are required to positively support that development – an idea which is reflected 
further in Katarina Tomaševski’s recommendation that  
From the perspective of the rights of the child, education constitutes the child’s 
perception of human rights. Specific courses in human rights education are located at 
the top of the education pyramid and are unlikely to be effective if the child was 
earlier taught about her or his own unworthiness because the child happens to be 
female or disabled. One important educational experience of any child between the 
ages of three and five is being taught to perceive a iewpoint different from the 
child’s own, because small children perceive only one side of everything: their own. 
Many political and armed conflicts are founded upon each side perceiving only one 
side of everything: its own. The ability of education to socialize children into 
understanding and accepting views different from their own is an important lesson for 
all human rights education.391 
 
With this, Tomaševski advocates that respecting the right to education is a primary public 
responsibility. Further to this appeal, she suggests that, to realize this claim, three things need 
to be addressed – the d nial of the right to education, the violation of the right to education, 
and the distortion of the right to education. According to Tomaševski, people and resources 
make the difference, not abstractions. To effectively d al with situations where one’s right to 
education has been denied, violated, distorted, or any combination of these three 
interferences, requires not only formal laws and procedures to adjudicate such abuses, but 
also individuals committed to endorsing the achievement of certain educational functionings 
for all. As Tomaševski has pointed out (echoing Sen, Nussbaum and the liberationist), 
children cannot wait to grow up.392 When children are faced with educational deprivations, as 
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when individuals are faced with capability deprivatons in general, they suffer often 
irremediable harms. According to Tomaševski, “the rationale behind global human rights 
standards is to assist with their incorporation in ational education strategies, because 
education has a multiplying effect: where the right to education is effectively guaranteed it 
enhances the enjoyment of all other rights and freedoms, while when the right to education is 
denied it precludes the enjoyment of many, if not all, other human rights.”393  
Throughout chapters 3-6, it has been argued that Rawls and Pogge provide a human 
rights-based institutional framework which can protect the child’s right to access basic 
primary education. To this, it has also been argued that Sen and Nussbaum provide an 
important social context which complements, in a realistically utopian way, the moral 
challenge which the rights movement directs at society to reshape unjust social practices. The 
final chapter of this dissertation will add to this a consideration of the current Education for 
All movement in general, and of Katarina Tomaševski’s field work in particular, to provide 
some concrete examples of this integrative approach. It is important to reflect on these 
practical applications because they support the philosophical work of Rawls, Pogge, Sen and 
Nussbaum. Ultimately, however, it is important to reflect on these practical applications 
because they also provide important insight into the vigilance which is required to ensure that 
a human rights object, like education, can become a universally respected and supported 
object which does not itself become a vehicle for vi lations.  
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Chapter 7 
Education as a Human Right and Public Policy 
I have argued that to defend education as a fundament l human right which is both 
meaningful and manageable requires both the provision of educational resources and the 
freedom to do something with those resources once they have been obtained. I have also 
argued that this is essential because human rights legislation on its own is not enough, and 
neither are the good intentions of duty-bound adults acting in the best interests of the child. 
To complete this validation of the child’s right to education, this dissertation concludes by 
considering the current Education for All (EFA) revolution and the field work of Katarina 
Tomaševski. By considering these practical applications of the right to education, it is 
possible to demonstrate both why it is correct to promote and protect UN law governing the 
right to education, and why it is also correct to continue to challenge what is to be gained 
from doing this.  
As a human rights lawyer and professor of international law, and as an avid promoter 
of human rights obligations in education, Tomaševski’s work is motivated by what she refers 
to as the paradox of human rights – that is, the double role of the government as both
protector of human rights and violator of human rights.394 While a keen and dedicated 
champion of human rights (until her sudden death in 2006) she was also an uncompromising 
critic of misdirected and abusive uses of human rights for personal and powerful gain. For 
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Tomaševski, only a new human rights perspective, on from outside of the bowels of 
international law and governance, can avoid such an inconsistency. To this end, section 7.1 
considers the UN challenge to shift the existing robust worldwide commitment from the idea 
that children require special consideration of their right to have an education, to a robust 
worldwide commitment to public action which supports and sustains this right. This will be 
followed, in section 7.2, by consideration of Tomaševski’s own comprehensive commitment 
to the institution of education and her vigilant understanding that, while it is correct to 
suggest that education is a human right with immense power to transform, such an 
assumption fails to acknowledge that such transformations can be both positive and negative. 
For example, while many people, including many supporters of the EFA movement, assume 
that with more education comes more opportunities, Tomasevski demonstrates that this can 
only occur if a trilateral relationship between parent/ducator, state, and child (as stipulated 
in the CRC) is recognized, and a rights-respecting methodology is enabled. This dissertation 
will conclude by suggesting that the UN desire to create a 21st century learning society, as 
defended by Tomaševski, represents an important new human rights perspective. It is a new 
perspective which can support the goal of securing access to educational resources suitable to 
enable all children to develop a set of capabilities o lead their lives in a meaningful and 
fulfilling way. Further to this, it is also pragmatically – and crucially – a perspective which 
can ultimately enable children to play a positive role in the social institutions, in which they 
find themselves embedded, throughout their lives. 
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7.1. Education for All  
In 1990, the same year that the CRC entered into force, codifying the right to 
education for all children into international law, UNESCO held a world conference on 
education in Jomtien, Thailand. The theme of the conference was Education for All (EFA). 
Of course, establishing the CRC as an international law also meant establishing education for 
all, but the organizers of the EFA conference recognized that to establish the right to 
education as a human right, it was also necessary to influence how the world looks at both 
children and their right to education, outside of these international legal channels. To do this, 
governmental representatives from 155 countries, and an additional 150 representatives from 
various educational organizations, agreed that the traditional goal of improving access to 
educational opportunities was insufficient to adequately deal with the complex nature of 
securing a child’s right to education, especially for those children in impoverished, war-torn, 
or developing countries. The participants at this conference argued that two additional ideas 
needed to be debated. First, they suggested that there is an urgent need to acknowledge and 
deal with the fact that, despite major efforts to address the needs and rights of children in 
national and international law, millions of children continue to go without schooling, to be 
illiterate, and to lack the basic knowledge necessary to make their way in the world. Second, 
they suggested that there is also an urgent need to acknowledge that basic education is not 
only about formal schooling; rather, having an education is also about having a ‘passport for 
life’: 
Every person – child, youth and adult – shall be abl to benefit from educational 
opportunities designed to meet their basic learning eeds. These needs comprise both 
   
 
 254  
essential learning tools (such as literacy, oral expr ssion, numeracy, and problem 
solving) and the basic learning content (such as knowledge, skills, values, and 
attitudes) required by human beings to be able to survive, to develop their full 
capacities, to live and work in dignity, to participate fully in development, to improve 
the quality of their lives, to make informed decisions, and to continue learning.395 
 
Recall that the architects of the CRC insisted upon the need to understand both the necessary 
educational opportunities and the nature of the aims that these opportunities intended to 
address. The participants at this conference also insisted upon the need to address the quality 
of educational opportunities and the need to establi h a few specific key goals, especially 
focused on the nature of ‘basic education’. 
The first of these goals was to expand early childhood care and development. Other 
UN documents, prior to this conference, highlighted the need for basic primary or elementary 
education, but this conference highlighted the need to understand that the learning 
environment a child is exposed to in the first five years of life is equally, if not more 
important, especially for children in impoverished situations. In addition to this goal, there 
was the continuing desire to enhance the opportunities for all children to access basic primary 
education. This time, however, the stated goal was much more specific – to achieve by the 
year 2000396 universal access to primary education and satisfacory proof that there was 
universal completion of primary education. Recognizing that addressing questions of access 
was not enough to satisfy the achievement of education for all, a third goal was established to 
ensure that notable improvements in learning achievement occurred based on agreed-upon 
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measures of specified learning outcomes: for example, setting a goal of having 80% literacy 
by the time a child reaches the age of 14, and then following up with appropriate testing 
mechanisms to ensure that in fact the goal has been m t. As with the need to look to early 
childhood education, another goal was included which fo used on the need to consider adult 
education. Here, the interest was to focus primarily on improving the 1990 adult literacy 
rates, especially among women, so that adult illiteracy would be cut in half by the year 2000. 
A fifth goal, set to look beyond the provision of basic primary education, was the provision 
of basic education and training for youth and adults. The final goal of this conference was to 
improve the dissemination of the knowledge, skills and values required for better living and 
sustainable development. 
Not surprisingly, these six ambitious goals, directed toward achieving an education for 
all, have been slow to achieve progress and, in the cas  of some of the time-sensitive goals, 
the hoped-for timelines have come and gone without effect. The UN remains optimistic, 
however, that despite these setbacks, the revolution to achieve education for all has begun. In 
1999 for example, UNICEF published its annual State of the World’s Children report 
(SOWC),  dedicated specifically to education. As a document, it is another report on the 
efforts of the international community to ensure that all its children enjoy their human right 
to a high-quality education. As a catalyst, however, it provides positive examples of working 
models and practical strategies to manage these efforts and to empower other policy-makers 
and teachers to activate this educational revolution within their own local communities. With 
the assumption that education represents an essential force for social change, defenders of the 
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right to education and the EFA movement suggest that the need to recognize education as an 
essential human right can no longer be restricted to the rhetoric of UN documents like the 
CRC. The world’s commitment to the principle of education for all must become a reality 
that local communities act on as well. To this end, the SOWC includes a simplified list that 
represents the five key elements UNICEF deems necessary for the pursuit of local level 
educational improvements including: 1) learning for life; 2) access, quality and flexibility; 3) 
gender sensitivity and girls’ education; 4) the State as key partner; 5) care for the young, pre-
school age child.  
Rather than discuss each element in order, it would be useful to consider the 
importance of the care for the young child first. Although it is listed as the fifth element for 
consideration, it is a central complementary area for consideration in securing basic primary 
education for all. The need to deliberate on the car of the young child is not only important 
for the child’s immediate well-being, it is also ess ntial to ensure the dynamic educational 
foundation necessary for life-long learning and socialization. That is, to complement 
considerations regarding basic primary school, UNICEF argues that a focus on Early 
Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) will also improve the child’s health care, 
nutrition, future childrearing, future ability to ex rcise civic duties in an informed and 
effective way and, ultimately, the future ability to contribute actively to a stronger, more 
vibrant national economy. The SOWC clearly highlights t e strength of this commitment to 
early childhood education by stipulating: 
The world is finally recognizing that a child’s rights to education, growth and 
development – physical, cognitive, social, emotional and moral – cannot be met 
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without a comprehensive approach to serving their needs from birth. It is 
acknowledging that the mental, social and emotional development of pre-school 
children has a huge impact on their ability to thrive in the classroom and later in the 
adult world.397 
 
While the importance of this claim has the potential to undermine the importance of the 
claim to the child’s fundamental right to basic primary education, some aspects of this claim 
are relevant to, and derive both causally and logically from, recognition of a human right to 
basic primary education. For example, as in the CRC, this commitment to ECCD stipulated 
in the SOWC highlights the need to recognize and support the parent as the child’s first 
teacher. This is followed by stressing the need to rec gnize and support the ‘intersectoral 
links’ between educationalists, health professionals, nutritionists, and social workers.  
Historically these sectors have worked independently, often with the health and social 
professionals forging the first links, followed by the educationalists. The SOWC suggests, 
however, that if these intersectoral links are fostered, the burden of achieving basic primary 
education for all does not fall onto one overstressed, overburdened, under-resourced system 
designed to focus on the cognitive development of children who have already passed through 
some of their most formative years. Instead, the whole child can be addressed by a system 
that has the capacity to tackle not only the cognitive but also the physical, the social, and the 
cultural. More recently, even psychologists and cognitive scientists have been added to the 
list of important intersectoral links because physical, cognitive and social development all 
directly depend on the vitality of the rapid brain development which occurs in early 
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childhood.398 Paul Thagard and Keith Holyoak, for example, have examined how children 
learn and reason to conclude, much like Nussbaum has assumed, that children (even young 
children) are complex learners capable not only of basic educational tasks but of analogical 
thinking as well.399 As such, children should be entitled to a more broadly based primary 
educational experience which has been informed by the input of this broader spectrum of 
intersectoral professionals interested in the development and well-being of young children. 
Thus, understanding and establishing the proper educational environments for children from 
birth, rather than the traditional elementary school age can improve the child’s ability to 
develop effectively life-long learning habits. Morever, it can also improve the ability of the 
parents to participate successfully in their child’s educational development. Finally, it can 
enhance what the child is able to gain from claiming her right to basic primary education. 
The second key element suggests that, to defend the right to education for all is to 
defend the right to life-long learning. That is not t  say that one must spend a lifetime in 
school, nor is it to say that the government is somehow responsible for providing life-long 
educational training; rather, it is to emphasize the fact that, while it is obvious to question 
what is being taught, it is equally important to question what is being learned. For those 
children who either do not go to school at all, or who fail to complete enough education to 
                                                     
398 See also Howard Gardner, Multiple Intelligences: Theory in Practice (New York: Basic Books, 1993). Eric 
Jensen, Teaching with the Brain in Mind (Alexandria VA: Association for Supervision and Curriculum 
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get them past illiteracy and innumeracy, this is an obvious question. This question is equally 
important, however, for the many children who actually spend a considerable amount of time 
going to school, but who, upon graduation, remain unprepared for life. According to the 
SOWC, “Learning for life in the 21st century requires equipping children with a basic 
education in literacy and numeracy, as well as the more advanced, complex skills for living 
that can serve as the foundation for life – enabling children to adapt and change as do life 
circumstances.”400  
Of course, stating that learning for life is required, and actually establishing a 
learning-for-life attitude are two different things. With this in mind, new assessment projects 
like the joint UNESCO-UNICEF Monitoring Learning Achievement (MLA)401 have made 
significant improvements to how we measure student achievement and learning. This kind of 
assessment guide no longer follows the traditional methods of recording exam results or 
maintaining school attendance roles; the MLA attempts to gain information which will both 
uncover weakness within any given system and will provide insights for meaningful 
improvements. What kinds of meaningful improvements are these assessment tools interested 
in? Traditionally, student tests have measured things like student achievement in reading, 
writing and mathematics, or they have measured a studen ’s level of competence necessary to 
gain entry into a system of education or to promote a student to the next level. With these 
new projects, the focus has shifted to measuring not o ly whether a student has acquired the 
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appropriate reading, writing and arithmetic skills, but also whether students can apply these 
skills in a flexible way to a wider variety of situations necessary for living. For example, all 
of the pioneer nations in the original set of countries being monitored for their performance 
in meeting “minimum basic learning competencies” (China, Jordan, Mali, Mauritius and 
Morocco) identified the need for students to be able to recognize the symptoms of the major 
childhood diseases.402 By focusing on three major areas of life skills – 
health/hygiene/nutrition; everyday life; and the social and natural environment – in 
conjunction with basic reading, writing and mathematics skill, not only are children trained 
to be good students, but also they are taught to learn how to learn. That is, how to adopt 
habits of mind that will ultimately enable them to adapt to the variety of life circumstances in 
which they should find themselves. 
Education ought to be accessible to every child. Having a right to education, however, 
does not mean having a right to the same education for all; it means have the same right for 
all to an education. With this in mind, according to the SOWC, “The challenge for schools is 
to be flexible enough to adapt to the needs of the most disadvantaged children while offering 
education of sufficient quality to keep all students once they have arrived.”403 Recall Article 
14 of the ICESCR and the need to address the concern that some under-developed countries, 
given their lack of resources, would automatically be unable to secure compulsory basic 
primary education. According to the general comment on the implementation of this Article, 
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the inclusion of the element of compulsion was necessary, not to penalize directly those 
countries which are incapable of fulfilling this treaty, but to highlight the non-optional, 
interdependent nature of basic primary education and the need to increase the level of 
awareness with regard to “international assistance d cooperation” to achieve this end.404 
Similarly, the inclusion in the SOWC of the child’s right to access a high quality education 
within a framework that is flexible to meet each child’s unique needs, is not to burden 
educational systems inappropriately. The inclusion of this right to access is to highlight the 
non-optional nature of the child’s right to education. Even in countries that have well 
established educational programs, many children canot realize their right to education 
because they are members of a group that is marginalized within its own society. To achieve 
the UN goal of education for all, however, consideration needs to be given to all children, 
including those children who have traditionally been hard to reach. This includes: girls, 
especially in predominately patriarchal societies; rural children, who might not have the 
means to get themselves to school; ethnic minorities or indigenous groups who do not speak 
the common language taught at school; disabled chilren; street children who do not 
officially belong to a school district; and children caught in armed conflict. It is the hope of 
the EFA movement, that by encouraging reflection on the need to reach currently 
‘unreachable’ children, especially among policy-makers and teachers, two important 
developments will result. First, there will be an increase in the level of awareness concerning 
the plight of desperate children. More importantly, there will also be an increase in 
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information-sharing among educators so that the successful solutions by some can motivate 
others to experiment with and apply innovative soluti ns to their own seemingly 
insurmountable circumstances. 
In conjunction with the need to address levels of access, another top priority of the 
EFA movement is to raise awareness of the impact of gender sensitivity on educational 
initiatives. According to the SOWC, recognizing theimportance of gender sensitivity is the 
first step to recognizing education for all because of the ripple effect associated primarily 
with the education of girls. Women around the world are the primary caregivers of children; 
if the mother is educated, the lives of her children will likely benefit. For example, in 1997 
UNICEF examined a variety of factors that contribute to the health and well-being of infants 
and children under the age of five. While the impact of health, nutrition, water quality, 
hygiene, and education were all considered, it was found that maternal education had the 
greatest impact on the life expectancy of these children.405 This study also found that, in 
addition to improving the life expectancy of young children, there were other notable impacts 
of maternal education including: a mother’s ability to act as a role model, especially for her 
daughters; a decrease in the number of children she will have; an improvement in a mother’s 
ability to recover from complications in childbirth; and an increase in a mother’s ability to 
avoid exploitation and/or abuse within her family.  
Reflecting on the effect of improved gender sensitivity in the ability of individuals to 
access education is not limited to females either. In countries where children are required to 
                                                     
405 SOWC, figure (8), 54. 
   
 
 263  
perform agricultural or labour responsibilities fortheir families, or in countries where 
children are expected to be soldiers in ongoing armed conflicts, it is often the male children 
who are called upon to fill these roles.406 By collecting information regarding attendance 
records and drop-out rates, defenders of the SOWC argue it will be possible to track these 
educational imbalances and to rectify them by enforcing existing truancy laws or by 
reasserting the greater value to be gained by insisti g on compulsory education. Other 
strategies the SOWC offers for improving gender sensitivity include the need to establish 
child-centred learning environments like those highlighted in the CRC, and the need to 
ensure that teachers, policy-makers and resource providers are properly trained not only to 
create appropriate educational environments but also to model appropriate gender-sensitive 
actions. Defenders of the SOWC argue that, if such measures are taken, not only will 
educational environments be more amenable to both boys and girls, but those hard-to-reach 
children will have one more reason to feel safe, welcome, and necessary. 
The final key element necessary to realize the EFA movement, according to UNICEF, 
is the need to recognize the essential role that the S ate must play to ensure that every child 
can access her right to education. By emphasizing the role of the State in the SOWC 
however, UNICEF is careful to suggest that the “most critical role of the State in education is 
as a guarantor of children’s right to basic education. Experience in the last few years has led 
to a more textured understanding of the role of the State, and of the State itself.”407 The 
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stipulation of this textured understanding is important to highlight the need for State 
involvement without full State control. According to the SOWC, the State is in the best 
position to direct the entire system including involvement in curriculum development and 
design, in teacher training and management, and in seeking out and promoting creative 
partnerships for the betterment of the system as a whole. The SOWC also recommends that 
while the State’s role as ‘educational director’ is an essential element, the State cannot and 
should not act alone. The same intersectoral links which the SOWC suggests should be 
established to guide ECCD should also remain intact throughout the entire system of 
education. 
The SOWC optimistically concludes by suggesting that e world is on the “cusp of an 
education revolution.” The defenders of this document suggest that this revolution has been 
(and will continue to be) fuelled by three things. First, the near universal acceptance of a 
document like the CRC demonstrates a near worldwide commitment to the idea of the 
indivisibility of human rights, including a child’s right to education. And full ratification – 
particularly by America – of the CRC will only conti ue to strengthen the value of this 
document. Second, the current efforts by a wide variety of vocal individuals (including those 
examined in this dissertation) to ensure that children can enjoy all of their human rights help 
to demonstrate that UNESCO’s endorsement of education s a human right is not only 
correct but also vital to the success of human rights fulfillment and human development. 
Finally, the documented interest of some States – like India – to accept, and to invest (even 
minimally) in their role in the protection and promtion of the child’s right to an education 
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suggests that, while the political will to support the education revolution may not be 
universal, significant inroads are being made. Moreover, these inroads have encouraged 
supporters of UNICEF and UNESCO to recommend two things.  First, the SOWC 
recommends that, “we may be entering an era of investm nt in ‘human and social capital’ 
that will make the task of spreading the education revolution worldwide much easier.”408 
Second, the SOWC recommends that, while it may havetaken more than fifty years to 
transform the principles found in the UDHR from ideas into actions, those principles are no 
longer negotiable. Basic primary education must be viewed as a fundamental human right 
that each child is owed as a matter of minimally decent treatment, and it is everyone’s 
responsibility to do something to make this a reality. 
Clearly, supporters of EFA have deliberated at length to arrive at conclusions which 
they believe to be not only reasonable but inescapable. Their enthusiastic desire to promote 
and engage an education revolution, however, underscores the need to recall the caution 
asserted by Rawls that, no matter how well-arranged or economical a theory may be, the 
institutions which result from such moral deliberations must uphold a practical commitment 
to ongoing reasoned reflection and public justification of that theory. Recall from section 3.3 
the suggestion that Rawls defended the need, much like EFA, for a public system of 
education based on the need to develop citizens who can coordinate with others for mutual 
advantage. For Rawls, children are ‘prospective citizens’ and require a free and compulsory 
public system of elementary education which publicly deliberates on the role which 
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education should play in the establishment and maintenance of a mutually beneficial, rights-
respecting social infrastructure and on the scope of educational experiences necessary to 
enhance an individual’s life prospects.  
Recall as well that Rawls defended this understanding of the role which education 
should play within society despite the obvious slippery slope toward social indoctrination. In 
response to this challenge, it was suggested that both Rawls and Pogge recommend that the 
only way to avoid such a difficulty is to adopt a system of education which understands and 
accepts two things. First, the idea that children have rights both as human beings and as 
‘prospective citizens’ of the society in which they will ultimately become active members. 
With this in mind, the publicly-funded education whic  they receive must prepare them for 
this role. Second, the idea that adults have duties which must respond appropriately to those 
rights so that the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation can be achieved. The next 
section considers Katarina Tomaševski’s caution that with this laudable defence of the right 
to education, there remains one last unresolved question – can education itself violate human 
rights? 
7.2. Tomasevski’s 4-A Scheme  
As the previous section has indicated, the EFA is a comprehensive, human rights-
respecting approach to establish a 21st century learning society. And, as this dissertation in 
general has argued, the CRC is one of the most comprehensive and universally accepted 
human rights documents which has been established to ai  in the achievement of this end. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that many significat outcomes can be gained by 
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recognizing the importance of the role which the right to education plays as a foundational 
element in achieving these outcomes – outcomes like an increased standard of living both for 
the individual and for society, inter-generational tr nsmission of cultural heritage, 
development of national consciousness, enhanced economic and social development, and 
enhanced individual development.409  
Beyond these noteworthy outcomes, this dissertation has also highlighted the value 
associated with Thomas Hammarberg’s assertion, for example, that the innovative approach 
to the creation of the CRC was instrumental in overcoming (at least within rights discourse 
related to children) the traditional division between socio-economic rights and political rights 
which previously plagued UN discussions on human rights in general. According to 
Hammarberg, the CRC is designed to be a nice bridge between this traditional divide, 
because rather than focusing on either protected choices or protected interests in a 
counterproductive polarized way, the CRC focuses on three broader categories: to provide 
for the basic needs of children, to protect children from harm, and to allow children to 
participate in decisions which will ultimately affect their lives. And, as this dissertation has 
argued, these broader categories have been instrumental in shifting the debate from one of 
the need to protect children versus the need to free children, to one which can importantly 
realize both the child’s capabilities and the child’s status as a rights-holder.  
As already mentioned, full ratification of the CRC can provide long-term international 
protection of, and influence upon, the child’s right to access vitally needed human rights 
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objects like education through the public action insp red by EFA for example. Beyond full 
ratification, however, this dissertation has also recommended the equally important need to 
work toward ensuring that public action directed toward the implementation of documents 
like the CRC and, movements like EFA, maintain a focus dedicated to realizing educational 
opportunities which can enable children to make choices which they value regarding the kind 
of life which will enable them to live in society as full and contributing members. With this 
in mind, final consideration will be given to one of the most significant contemporary 
advocates of our need to fine-tune public action in th s regard – Katarina Tomaševski.  
Tomaševski fought passionately for the inclusion of education within the set of human 
rights objects that are indispensable not only for human survival, but for the chance to 
achieve something in one’s life more significant than mere survival. For example, she 
recommends:   
An important obstacle to universalizing the right to education is a view that education 
is not indispensable for human survival nor required for subsistence. The absence of 
education for victims of armed conflicts and disaster  dooms them to remain 
recipients of assistance while preventing them from becoming self-sustaining. Water, 
sanitation, medical services, shelter, clothing and foo  constitute the survival package 
which is offered through humanitarian relief. Including education in this package is a 
development of the 1990s, but overcoming the previous deology of survivalism has 
yet to become institutionalized.410  
 
For Tomaševski, provisions for education must be included within these survival packages 
because education is both a “passkey for unlocking other human rights,”411 and also a 
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‘multiplier’ for enhancing the freedoms one has to enjoy one’s life. Tomaševski carefully 
cautions that the damage of denying a rights-respecting education to children while they are 
growing up – wherever they are growing up – is difficult, if not impossible, to remedy 
retroactively. With this, Tomaševski concurs with the EFA that children have a prioritized 
right to education.412 Moreover, she argues, it must be acknowledged universally that the 
human rights safeguards which result from the availbil ty of a rights-respecting educational 
environment not only enhance other rights for children, but for all members of society.413 
With this in mind, Tomaševski offers a comprehensive plan for the realization of education 
as a human right which goes beyond mere questions of availability alone. Her 4-A scheme 
emphasizes the obvious need to make education vailable, as discussed above, but she also 
recommends that, truly to secure a child’s right to education, education must be accessible, 
acceptable, and adaptable. 
Tomaševski, like Pogge, suggests that, to achieve this goal, there is the obvious need 
to address the child’s ability to access the institutions which support this goal – that is, the 
level of availability of schools and of educational resources to which each child has access. 
Tomaševski makes this stipulation because she, like Pogge, believes that it is of primary 
importance to address those situations where children a e not in school because governments 
have violated their right to education by failing to provide adequate educational resources, or 
by failing to acknowledge their contributions to the establishment of a viable institution of 
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education. Tomaševski adds to this a caution: there is a deeper, and often more unpopular 
need, to address the further question of whether having the right to access educational 
institutions can itself be a violation of the child’s human rights. That is, for Tomaševski , 
echoing Sen and Nussbaum, it is not enough simply to defend the child’s right to access 
education, one must defend the child’s right to an education which is focused on the need to 
develop the child’s own autonomy and potential for independence.  
Recall the suggestion in section 4.1 that Tomaševski’s work is driven by the fact that 
there are many cases where children are said to ‘have’ an education but the particular 
educational experience to which they are exposed actually violates their human rights. The 
example that was offered was the case of Aboriginal children in Canada, who were provided 
with ‘an education’ but it was an education that clear y violated the rights of those children. 
Not only were they physically removed from their families and communities, they were 
forced to adopt a new language, and a new set of values nd beliefs, at the expense of their 
own. The result, it seems widely agreed, was not successful. To date, in the case of 
Aboriginal children at least, some changes to public policy have been, and continue to be, 
made. Nonetheless, according to Tomaševski, there remain many more instances where 
children may ‘have’ access to schools and teachers, but their rights continue to be violated 
because the kind of educational opportunities to which they have access are not acceptable. 
And, this is a fact which seems to highlight the importance of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s views 
on educational content focussing on developing more culturally-sensitive or situation-
specific capabilities. In addition, according to Tomaševski, historical instances of rights 
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violations are not confined to impoverished or corrupt nations either (as the Canadian case 
demonstrates). Tomaševski found that there is no automatic association between a country’s 
wealth and its ability to perform in the area of education.  
Recall Pogge’s suggestion that the institutions which a society supports reflect how 
the ground rules or conduct-guiding codes have beenint rpreted by, and applied to, that 
particular society. For Tomaševski, the failure of the US, for example, to acknowledge the 
CRC, by ratifying it and making itself accountable to the rights of children, is reflected in its 
failure to realize effectively every American child’s fundamental right to free basic primary 
education, despite easily having the wealth to do so. And for Tomaševski, such a blatant 
disregard for accountability toward children’s rights is unacceptable.  
Of course, it has been suggested, in chapter 1, for example, that there are those who 
believe that the United States does respect the rigts of children, it simply chooses to do so 
with its own legislation, such as, the No Child Left Behind (NCBL) Act414 designed to raise 
educational standards and to ensure that no child is left behind.415 The NCLB (similar to the 
Common Sense Revolution f the Mike Harris Conservatives in Ontario), focuses primarily 
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on accountability and assessment issues within the public school system in the United States 
(Canada).416 The NCLB was drafted in this way to reflect the belief of the existing American 
administration that, to bring about desired improvements in student achievement, standards 
must be established for curriculum content, especially in the areas of math, reading and 
science. Moreover, the NCLB also emphasizes the need for those standards to be tested to 
provide a workable snapshot of the nation in those subject areas. According to Linn et al, 
however, while the goals of the NCLB to improve theeducational standards of America’s 
youth are laudable, the NCLB fails to achieve its goal of no child left behind because the 
requirements of the law enforcing these accountabili y measures have made it prohibitive for 
many states to comply. So, while the legislation claims to be representing an educational 
model where no child is left behind, it actually leav s the most vulnerable in the most 
precarious position. It is important to note that this sub-optimal nature of the NCLB is being 
debated in the House again as the current administration seeks to reauthorize NCLB417 – a 
fact which seems to support Tomaševski’s initial criticism of the inadequate governmental 
support for the rights of every American child to an education.  
While it is doubtful that Tomaševski would grant that the unequal consequences of 
legislation like NCBL is acceptable, some actions were taken in response to her American 
report which Tomaševski endorsed. For example, the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR), working with the Institute for Education and Social Policy (IESP), prepared a 
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document entitled Civil Society and School Accountability: A Human Rights Approach to 
Parent and Community Participation in NYC Schools.418 This document is a proposal by a 
non-governmental organization interested in ‘exposing and opposing human rights 
violations’ in the American system of public education through the creation of an 
Ombudsperson for the right to education. According to Tomaševski this document and its 
desire to establish a more permanent presence of active nd involved civil defenders of 
public institutions and human rights represents a more adaptable approach to education than 
the NCLB by effectively addressing things like racial discrimination, opaque educational 
bureaucracies, and language barriers within the school system.419  
In addition to Tomaševski’s concern for the importance of interpreting and applying 
the CRC so as to capitalize on its comprehensive ars n l of provisions and protections for the 
rights of children (not of governments or of parents), she expresses another concern for the 
recent escalating desire to view education as a traded service. According to Tomaševski, the 
biggest challenge to education as a human right is to stop the current progressive 
liberalization of trade in education420 – a sentiment which echoes Sen’s concern for the 
ongoing practice of private tuitions in elementary schools in India for example. To prevent a 
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change in the discourse related to education as a hum n right from one of entitlements to one 
of purchasing power, Tomaševski emphasizes her strong belief that: 
The insistence on the rule of law in human rights stem  from the fact that governance 
is exercise of power and human rights are safeguards against abuse of power. The 
raison d’ être of the right to education is to act s a corrective to the free market. 
Governments have human rights obligations because education should not be treated 
merely as a commodity.421 
 
It is important to note that Tomaševski’s claim that education is a right and not a commodity, 
is not a reaction of distaste to the free market per se, rather it is a reaction to the need to 
reflect upon the original objective which advocates of rights for children took to be their 
focus. These pioneers of the children’s rights movements, as discussed in chapter 1, focused 
on the need to make education free and compulsory for all (especially the most 
impoverished), so that abuses such as child labour, child marriage/pregnancy, child poverty 
and child illiteracy could be effectively controlled, if not abolished.422 Tomaševski concurs 
by suggesting education should not be allowed to bec m  a traded commodity despite the 
fact that it is important to recognize that the provision of basic education services is a 
tradable product which can provide children with the skills and knowledge necessary to 
become active, contributing members of society. According to Tomaševski what is more 
important to recognize is the fact that education is much more than this. The provision of a 
free and compulsory, publicly-supported system of education represents a vital means 
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necessary to protect children (presumably) from their own vulnerabilities and from the 
abuses of power which are often inherent in adult-chi d relationships. That is, while the 
starting point for establishing a right to education is virtually undisputed – children need 
assistance to survive and they need development to thrive – how this starting point gets 
translated into practice is an entirely different matter – a matter which should not be left to 
the random nature of the free market (at least at the most vital early childhood, and basic 
primary, levels). 
Tomaševski has argued that, throughout the 20th century, a human rights toolbox has 
been formed to enable people to challenge the actions of both their governments and of each 
other to end human rights violations.423 For human rights in general, this toolbox includes 
Donnelly’s and Howard’s suggestion that we all require and are entitled to the recognition of 
our rights to survival, membership, protection and empowerment. For human rights relating 
to children specifically, this toolbox includes Hammarberg’s suggestion that children in 
particular all require and are entitled to the recognition of their rights to provision, protection 
and participation.  
Tomaševski’s challenge for the 21st century is to recognize that, for these toolboxes 
(which support and sanction human rights in general and children’s rights in particular) to be 
properly utilized as a means to human development rathe  than as a means to human 
manipulation and exploitation, another toolbox needs to be forged. This new toolbox would 
support the fundamental right to an education which is available, accessible, acceptable and 
                                                     
423 Tomaševski (2006b), preface. 
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adaptable (and of course, affordable – recalling Sen’s important evidence in this regard). In 
making this claim, Tomaševski does not deny that the provision of universally available, free 
and compulsory basic primary education entails certain costs. In fact, she often criticizes 
organizations like the UN for chronically making promises about the entitlements that 
children have without having either the authority, or the means, to follow through on those 
promises.424 Moreover, in making this claim, Tomaševski is also careful to acknowledge that 
the right to education does not translate into an entitl ment to have an unlimited source of 
educational resources and services which a government is obliged to provide. She carefully 
limits her claim to education to suggest that governments have a human rights obligation to 
guarantee free and compulsory basic education for children up to the minimum age425 for 
legal employment, with a corresponding progressive realization of the availability of more 
substantial educational resources and services available for those who would choose to utilize 
them independently and self-sufficiently. For Tomaševski, the options for children to work or 
to marry prematurely must be severely curtailed through governmental commitments to, and 
enforcement of, compulsory schooling. Moreover, it is essential that the educational 
experiences in which children are compelled to participate are responsive to both the child’s 
immediate reality and to the rapidly changing globa re lities in which the child is embedded. 
                                                     
424 Katarina Tomaševski (2005) “Has the Right to Education a Future Within the United Natins? A Behind-the-
Scenes Account of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education 1998-2004,” in Human Rights Law 
Review 5 (2): 205-237; and also (2005) “Unasked Questions about Economic, Social and Cultural rights 
from the Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education (1998-2004): A Response to 
Kenneth Roth, Leonard Rubenstein, and Mary Robinson,” in Human Rights Quarterly 27: 709-720. 
425 According to Tomaševski, the minimum recommended age for employment is sixteen, and the globally 
accepted minimum is fourteen. See “Education has becom  a traded service,” in Human Rights Features (5-
12 April 2004). 
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7.3. A 21st Century Learning Society 
UNESCO’s aim to construct a 21st learning society by promoting the Millennium 
Development Goal to achieve free universal basic primary public education for all by 2015 is 
both an important and worthwhile objective. Currently more than 70 million children of 
primary school age do not, or cannot, attend school426 – a staggering statistic which suggests 
that the establishment of a right to education is a high priority claim in today’s world. To 
address the fact that so many children are unable to attend school, this dissertation has 
provided an account which integrates two philosophical approaches – one which focuses on 
human rights and one which focuses on human capabilities and individual actions. Of course, 
independently, the human rights-based approach and the human capability approach are both 
significant and valuable schools of thought worthy of separate scholarship. To address the 
issues related to the validation of the human right to education, however, I have argued that it 
is both necessary, and highly advantageous, to combine these views.  
I begin by suggesting that John Rawls and Thomas Pogge ffer an important 
framework which recommends that to achieve a mutually-beneficial, rights-respecting 
society citizens should recognize their obligation t  avoid morally arbitrary social inequities 
to determine, through a process of public justification, which policies are the best ones 
available to them. Given such a framework, according to Rawls, individuals should have the 
social freedom to maximize their own desired ends, provided no one is left to fall below a 
                                                     
426 Nicholas Burnett (Director), “Education for All by 2015: Will We Make It?” EFA Global Monitoring Report 
2008 (Paris: UNESCO, 2007). Available online at www.efareport.unesco.org. 
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basic social minimum. Consequently, this Rawlsian fr mework represents a dual focus on 
just societies and on the connection between social justice and an individual’s pursuit of a 
good life. 
This dual focus is significant, because the establishment and maintenance of a stable 
society depends on social norms and institutions which all members can accept as reasonable. 
And can accept as reasonable without unnecessarily distorting their own sense of justice in 
the process. Moreover, this Rawlsian dual focus is important to our understanding of the 
basic structure of society because it can achieve two things. First, it can deepen our 
understanding of the role which institutions should play in the creation, and maintenance, of 
a mutually-beneficial, rights-respecting social infrastructure. Second, it can deepen our 
understanding of why we should be morally motivated to recognize and support these 
institutions. But, neither Rawls, nor Pogge, provide an explicit account of the institution of 
education, in particular. So, this dissertation provides an informative conceptual Rawlsian 
space necessary to openly and critically consider: 1) the role education should play within the 
larger social structure of a stable society, and 2) the scope of educational experience 
necessary to enhance an individual’s life prospects. 
Typically, the institutions which are deemed to be essential to a society are institutions 
which govern property, security, politics and the economy, but, I have argued that education 
is an essential institution as well. Education plays  large role in achieving just societies 
because education can develop a child’s sense of self, and her sense of citizenship. While it is 
true that the provision of education is costly and multifaceted, a public institution of 
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education needs to be in place to manage the kinds of educational opportunities which are 
available, and to secure the kinds of resources which are necessary, because not all children 
are as highly motivated and self-directed as the lib rationist would have us believe. Nor are 
all parents as available, knowledgeable or economically apable to secure an education on 
behalf of their children as the libertarian would have us believe. Moreover, to address the 70 
million children worldwide who do not, or cannot, claim their right to education, an 
understanding of what a public institution of education should entail is essential. 
With this in mind, the first part of this integrative account articulates the value to be 
gained from endorsing an institution of education through the formalization and unanimous 
acceptance of documents like the CRC which emphasizes that children should have a 
protected voice – a human right – to basic necessiti  l ke education. This human rights-
based approach stipulates that there is a duty on the part of all governments, especially 
wealthy governments, to influence and support the institutional reforms necessary to achieve 
at least the provision of free basic primary education for all children – an important claim, 
but one which cannot stand alone. It cannot stand alone because it fails to address adequately 
those cases where children are said to have a ‘right’ to education but are unable to act on that 
right.  
To address this concern requires the insight to be gained from the capability approach 
which accounts for the further responsibility on the part of all individuals to ensure that the 
kinds of educational reforms which governments undertak  can provide children with the 
freedom to act on their rights. Thus, to achieve the MDG of free and compulsory basic 
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primary education for all requires both the active involvement of official channels as 
represented by advocates of human rights and of civil society as represented by the actions of 
interested and involved individuals. So, the second part of this integrative account suggests 
that while it is important to secure and protect a right to education, it is equally important to 
be able to convert this right into meaningful action. 
Here I draw upon an important qualification which Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum offer. This qualification suggests that having rights will only be effective in 
influencing an individual’s standard of living if that individual can do something with that 
right as well. Thus, to implement fully a global human right to education, an understanding 
of what having an education should be able to do for individuals is necessary also. It is 
essential, because an unyielding commitment to capabilities as the proper content of 
children’s rights encourages us to look beyond securing rights to determine whether an 
individual is actually experiencing an improvement in her standard of living. That is, it 
encourages us to seek out a deeper understanding of the norms to which a society aspires. 
Also, it encourages us to seek out a richer measure of existing states of affairs, like the 
Human Development Index or the joint UNESCO-UNICEF Monitoring Learning 
Achievement programme. Finally, a commitment to capabilities encourages us to seek 
functional solutions which can assist children in achieving a level of well-being which is of 
value to them because it enables them to act on the rig ts that they have within the societies 
in which they exist. 
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Of course, the desire to make basic primary public education free to all is a demanding 
goal economically, socially and culturally. To address the demanding nature of this goal, a 
simple suggestion which has been offered in this dis ertation, is to forcefully restate the need 
to ratify fully the CRC. Although this suggestion is largely symbolic, it is worthwhile 
because the United States is one of the remaining two countries who have yet to sign (the 
other being Somalia). Given that the US is as powerful and influential as it is, an 
endorsement of the CRC by the US is significant. With regard to its own domestic 
responsibilities to the establishment of a stable and supportive system of education for its 
children, the significance of full ratification may have a limited effect. Although Tomaševski 
has highlighted that, even within American borders many children go without education, or 
are at least unable to benefit from educational opportunities which are meaningful to their 
own individual development. With regard to the responsibilities to the MDG to achieve free 
and universal basic primary education for all children, however, the significance of full 
ratification is noteworthy for a variety of reasons. For example, full ratification of the CRC 
would represent: a universal acknowledgement of children’s rights; a universal 
acknowledgment of the need for greater awareness of and accountability to the plight of all 
children; greater opportunities for resource sharing; and most importantly a universal 
endorsement of the key role which education plays in the development of children and of 
societies.  
A more complex suggestion which has been offered in this dissertation is the need to 
look beyond the symbolic act of full ratification of the CRC toward individual public actions. 
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To answer the question – how should public action be directed to respond to the UN claim 
that education is a fundamental human right to which all children are entitled? – this 
dissertation has argued that it is essential to recgnize that basic primary education is a 
fundamental right which is of equal significance to the traditionally accepted rights to 
security and political freedom. This is so, because education is necessary for both individual 
initiative and social effectiveness. Further to this, I have argued that to realize this right to 
education for all in a meaningful and manageable way, it requires a Rawlsian model for 
institutional reform which motivates us to reflect upon the design of social institutions and 
upon the capabilities individuals have to contribute to those social institutions. Finally, by 
applying this model more directly to the institutional reform dedicated to education in 
particular, I have articulated a more robust Rawlsian notion of the role education should play 
in the establishment of a just society and in an individual’s pursuit of a good life. To 
conclude, by integrating the concept of human rights wi h the concept of human capabilities 
in this way, I have also reflected Katarina Tomaševski’s challenge for the 21st century to 
establish a new human rights perspective from outside of the bowels of international law and 
governance – a perspective which takes education to be a vital human rights object which is 
as significant to an individual as food or freedom, but which is also significant to society as 
an indispensable means of realizing sustainable devlopment, prosperity and permanence. It 
is not enough simply to defend the child’s right to access education, one must defend the 
child’s right to an education which is focused on the need to develop the child’s own 
autonomy and potential for independence and individual action both within the immediate 
   
 
 283  
society to which the child belongs, and within the global society in which the child will 
interact.  
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Appendix A 
International Documents Most Relevant to the Human Right to Education 
(in whole or in part) 
 
 
Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1924) 
By the Present Declaration of the Rights of the Child, commonly known as the ‘Declaration of 
Geneva,’ men and women of all nations, recognizing that mankind owes to the Child the best that it 
has to give, declare and accept it as their duty that, beyond and above all considerations of race, 
nationality or creed: 
1. The child must be given the means requisite for its normal development, both materially and 
spiritually; 
2. The child that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be nursed; the child that is 
backward must be helped; the delinquent child must be reclaimed; and the orphan and the 
waif must be sheltered and succored; 
3. The child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress; 
4. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood, and must be protected against every 
form of exploitation; 
5. The child must be brought up in the consciousness that its talents must be devoted to the 
service of fellow men. 
 
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (1945) 
The Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare: 
That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of 
peace must be constructed; 
That ignorance of each other’s ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the 
history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through 
which their differences have all to often broken into war; 
That the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial 
of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the 
propagation, in their place through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality 
of men and races; 
That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and 
peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and co stitute a sacred duty which all the 
nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern; 
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That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments 
would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the 
peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefor  be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the 
intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind. 
For these reasons, the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal 
opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free 
exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the 
means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes 
of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other’s lives; 
In consequence whereof they do hereby create the Unit d Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific 
and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of 
the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established 
and which its charter proclaims. 
Article 1 – Purposes and Functions 
1. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting 
collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further 
universal respect for justice, for the rule of law nd for the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, 
language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. To realize this purpose the Organization will: 
a. Collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of 
peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such 
international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word 
and image; 
b. Give fresh impulse to popular education and to spread of culture;  
By collaborating with Members, at their request, in the development of educational 
activities; 
By instituting collaboration among the nations to adv nce the ideal of equality of 
educational opportunity with out regard to race, sex or any distinctions, economic and 
social; 
By suggesting educational methods best suited to prepare the children of the world for 
the responsibilities of freedom; 
c. Maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge; 
By assuring the conservation and protection of the world’s inheritance of books, works of 
art and monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned 
the necessary international conventions; 
By encouraging co-operation among the nations in all br nches of intellectual activity, 
including the international exchange of persons active in the fields of education, science 
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and culture and the exchange of publications, objects of artistic and scientific interest and 
other materials of information; 
By initiating methods of international co-operation calculated to give the people of all 
countries access to the printed and published materials produced by any of them. 
3. With a view to preserving the independence, integriy and fruitful diversity of the cultures 
and educational systems of the States members of this Organization, the Organization is 
prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic 
jurisdiction. 
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
Article 25 
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the ev nt of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether 
born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection. 
Article 26 
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and 
fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible 
to all on the basis of merit 
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all natio s, racial or religious groups, and 
shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children. 
 
Resolution 421 of the General Assembly of the UN (1950) 
Fifth Session – Section E 
Whereas the Covenant should be drawn up in the spirit and based on the principles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Whereas the Universal Declaration regards man as a person to whom civic and political 
freedoms as well as economic, social and cultural rights indubitably belong, 
Whereas the enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural 
rights are interconnected and interdependent, 
Whereas, when deprived of economic, social and cultural rights, man does not represent the 
human person whom the Universal Declaration regards s the ideal of the free man, 
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Article 7 
1. Decides to include in the Covenant on Human Rights economic, social and cultural rights and 
an explicit recognition of equality of men and women in related rights as set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations; 
2. Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to request the Commission on Human Rights, in 
accordance with the spirit of the Universal Declaration, to include in the draft Covenant a 
clear expression of economic, social and cultural rights in a manner which relates them to the 
civic and political freedoms proclaimed by the draft Covenant; 
3. Calls upon the Economic and Social Council to request the Commission on Human Rights to 
take such steps as are necessary to obtain the co-operati n of other organs of the United 
Nations and of the specialized agencies in the consideration of such rights; 
4. Requests the Economic and Social Council to consider, at its welfth session, the methods by 
which the specialized agencies might co-operate with the Commission on Human Rights with 
regard to economic, social and cultural rights; 
 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) 
Principle 3 
The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality. 
Principle 7 
1. The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the 
elementary stages. He shall be given an education which will promote his general culture and 
enable him, on a basis of equal opportunity, to develop his abilities, his individual judgement, 
and his sense of moral social responsibility, and to become a useful member of society. 
2. The best interests of the child shall be the guiding principle of those responsible for his 
education and guidance; that responsibility lies in the first place with his parents. 
3. The child shall have full opportunity for play and recreation, which should be directed to the 
same purposes as education; society and the public authorities shall endeavour to promote the 
enjoyment of this rights. 
 
Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960) 
Article 1 
1. For the purpose of this Convention, the term “discrimination” includes any distinction, 
exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education and in 
particular: 
a. Of depriving any person or group of persons of access to educaiotn of any type or at any 
level; 
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b. Of limiting any person or group of persons to education of an inferior standard; 
c. Subject to the provisions of Article 2 of this Conve tion, or establishing or maintaining 
separate educational systems or institutions for persons or groups of persons; or 
d. Of inflicting on any person or group of persons conditions which are incompatible with 
the dignity of man. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the term “education” refers to all types and levels of 
education, and includes access to education, the standard and quality of education, and the 
conditions under which it is given. 
Article 2 
1. When permitted in a State, the following situations shall not be deemed to constitute 
discrimination, within the meaning of Article 1 of this Convention: 
a. The establishment or maintenance of separate educational systems or institutions for 
pupils of the two sexes, if these systems or institutions offer equivalent access to 
education, provide a teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard as well as 
school premises and equipment of the same quality, nd afford the opportunity to take the 
same or equivalent courses of study; 
b. The establishment or maintenance, for religious or linguistic reasons, of separate 
educational systems or institutions offering an education which is in keeping with the 
wishes of the pupil’s parents or legal guardians, if participation in such systems or 
attendance at such institutions is optional and if the education provided conforms to such 
standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, in particular for 
education of the same level; 
c. The establishment or maintenance of private education l institutions, if the object of the 
institutions is not to secure the exclusion of any group but to provide educational 
facilities in addition to those provided by the public authorities, if the institutions are 
conducted in accordance with that object, and if the education provided conforms with 
such standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, in 
particular for education of the same level. 
 
European Social Charter (1961) 
Article 7 – The right of children and young persons to protection 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of children and young persons to 
protection, the Contracting Parties undertake: 
1. to provide that the minimum age of admission to employment shall be 15 years, subject to 
exceptions for children employed in prescribed light work without harm to their health, 
morals, or education; 
2. to provide that a higher minimum age of admission to employment shall be fixed with respect 
to prescribed occupations regarded as dangerous or unhealthy; 
3. to provide that persons who are still subject to compulsory education shall not be employed in 
such work as would deprive them of the full benefit of heir education; 
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4. to provide that the working hours of persons under 16 years of age shall be limited in 
accordance with the needs of their development and p rticularly with their need for 
vocational training; 
5. to recognize the right of young workers and apprentic s to a fair wage or other appropriated 
allowances; 
6. to provide that the time spent by young persons in vocational training during the normal 
working hours with the consent of the employer shall be treated as forming part of the 
working day; 
7. to provide that employed persons of under 18 years of age shall be entitled to not less than 
three weeks’ annual holiday with pay; 
8. to provide that persons under 18 years of age shallnot be employed in night work with the 
exception of certain occupations provided for by national laws or regulations; 
9. to provide that persons under 18 years of age employed in occupations prescribed by national 
laws or regulations shall by subject to regular medical control; 
10. to ensure special protection against physical and moral dangers to which children and young 
persons are exposed, and particularly against those resulting directly or indirectly from their 
work. 
Article 10 – The right to vocational training 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to vocational training, the Contracting 
Parties undertake: 
1. to provide or promote, as necessary, the technical and vocational training of all persons, 
including the handicapped, in consultation with employers’ and workers’ organisations, and 
to grant facilities for access to higher technical and university education, based solely on 
individual aptitude; 
2. to provide or promote a system of apprenticeship and other systematic arrangements for 
training young boys and girls in their various employments; 
3. to provide or promote, as necessary: 
a. adequate and readily available training facilities for adult workers; 
b. special facilities for the re-training of adult worke s needed as a result of technological 
developments or new trends in employment; 
4. to encourage the full utilisation of the facilities provided by appropriate measures such as: 
a. reducing or abolishing any fees or charges; 
b. granting financial assistance in appropriate cases; 
c. including in the normal working hours time spent on supplementary training taken by the 
worker, at the request of his employer, during employment; 
d. ensuring, through adequate supervision, in consultation with the employers’ and worker’s 
organisations, the efficiency of apprenticeship andother training arrangements for young 
workers, and the adequate protection of young workers g nerally. 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
Article 1 
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose f their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based 
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territo ies, shall promote the realization of 
the right of self-determination, and shall respect tha right, in conformity with the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article 10  
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that: 
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and while it is 
responsible for the care and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into 
with the free consent of the intending spouses. 
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after 
childbirth. During such period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave with 
adequate social security benefits. 
3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on behalf of all children and 
young persons without any discrimination for reasons f parentage or other conditions. 
Children and young persons should be protected fromeconomic and social exploitation. Their 
employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper 
their normal development should be punishable by law. States should also set age limits 
below which the paid employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by 
law.  
Article 13  
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They 
agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and 
the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. They further agree that education shall en bl  all persons to participate effectively 
in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all 
racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the 
maintenance of peace. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full 
realization of this right: 
a. Primary education shall be compulsory and available fre  to all; 
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b. Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary 
education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate 
means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; 
c. Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by 
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free 
education; 
d. Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those 
persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education; 
e. The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an 
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching 
staff shall be continuously improved. 
3. The States Parties to the Present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents 
and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for thei  children schools, other than those 
established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards 
as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education 
of their children in conformity with their own convictions. 
4. No part of this Article shall be construed so as to in erfere with the liberty of individuals and 
bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the 
principles set forth in paragraph I of this Article and to the requirement that the education 
given in such institutions shall conform to such mini um standards as may be laid down by 
the State. 
Article 14 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at t e time of becoming a Party, has not been 
able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory 
primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years, to work out and adopt a 
detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of 
years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of c mpulsory education free of charge for all. 
 
United Nations Declaration Regarding Social Progress and Development (1969) 
Part II 
Social progress and development shall aim at the continuous raising of the material and spiritual 
standards of living of all members of society, with respect for and in compliance with human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, through the attainment of the ollowing main goals: 
Article 10 
a. The eradication of illiteracy and the assurance of the right to universal access to culture, 
to free compulsory education at the elementary level and to free education at all levels; 
the raising of the general level of life-long education; 
Article 11 
Social progress and development shall aim equally at the progressive attainment of the following 
main goals: 
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The education of youth in, and promotion among them of, the ideals of justice and peace, 
mutual respect and understanding among peoples; the promotion of full participation of youth 




African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981) 
Article 17 
1. Every individual shall have the right to education 
2. Every individual may freely, take part in the cultural life of his community 
3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the community 
shall be the duty of the state. 
Article 25 
States parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, 
education and publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the present Charter and 
to see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and duties are 
understood. 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
Article 28 
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this 
right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: 
Make primary education compulsory and available freto all; 
Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and 
vocational education, make them available and accessibl  to every child, and take appropriate 
measures such as the introduction of free education nd offering financial assistance in case 
of need; 
Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means; 
Made educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all 
children; 
Take measures to encourage regular attendance at school  and the reduction of drop-out rates. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to nsure that school discipline is 
administered in a manner consistent with the child’s human dignity and in conformity with 
the present Convention. 
3. State Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters relating to 
education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance and 
illiteracy throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and technical knowledge 
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and modern teaching methods. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of 
developing countries. 
Article 29 
1. States Parties agree that the education of the child s all be directed to: 
a. The development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and physical abilities to 
their fullest potential; 
b. The development of respect for human rights and funamental freedoms, and for the 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; 
c. The development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, 
language and values, for the national values of the country in which the child in living, 
the country from which he or she may originate, andfor civilizations different from his 
or her own; 
d. The preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of 
understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, 
ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin; 
e. The development of respect for the natural environme t. 
2. No part of the present Article or Article 28 shall be construed so as to interfere with the 
liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject 
always to the observance of the principle set forth in paragraph 1 of the present Article and to 
the requirements that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum 
standards as may be laid down by the state. 
 
European Social Charter Revised (1996) 
Article 17 – The right of children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right of children and young persons to grow up 
in an environment which encourages the full development of their personality and of their physical 
and mental capacities, the Parties undertake, either directly or in co-operation with public and private 
organisations, to take all appropriate and necessary measures designed: 
1. to ensure that children and young persons, taking account of the rights and duties of their 
parents,  
a. have the care, the assistance, the education and the training they need, in particular by 
providing for the establishment or maintenance of institutions and services sufficient 
and adequate for this purpose; 
b. to protect children and young persons against neglig nce, violence or exploitation; 
c. to provide protection and special aid from the state for children and young persons 
temporarily or definitively deprived of their family’s support; 
2. to provide to children and young persons a free prima y and secondary education as well as to 
encourage regular attendance at schools. 
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